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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
“Race is relevant today […] The different voting patterns of many people of color give 
politicians the motive to suppress their votes, and the unique physical and socio-
economic traits that characterize people of color make them particularly vulnerable” 
(Overton 2006, p. 81). 
 
Background of Study 
 Researchers debate the relationship between voting restrictions and political participation 
identifying a range of potential explanations.  Classic institutional approaches, pointing to a long 
tradition of selective demobilization, suspected that rules changes and restrictions on the 
franchise were essential to understanding American voting patterns (Burnham 1970, p. 81; 
Burnham 1987, p. 109).  This literature detailed various efforts to make voting more difficult, or 
impossible, for targeted groups (Keyssar 2000, 2012).  The Voting Rights Act of 1965, along 
with subsequent bi-partisan reauthorizations of the historic law, convinced many that our nation 
had overcome its exclusionary past (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, p. 11).  Contemporary 
voter suppression laws challenge this assumption.  Researchers identify four competing theories 
to explain the impact of targeted demobilization in recent elections.  This study examines two 
cases, Florida and North Carolina, to assess the plausibility of these explanations.   
 Although contemporary voter suppression laws pale in comparison to prior suppression 
of the franchise, researchers disagree on their specific effects.  Several scholars argue that voter 
suppression methods target African American citizens, but conflicting evidence exists indicating 
precisely how they work (Minnite 2010, p. 153; Overton 2006, p. 148; Piven et al 2009, p. 9; 
Bassetti 2012, p. 174).  This study employs careful process tracing to explain this mechanism.   
 Keyssar (2012) argues that voter suppression, ―differs conceptually from outright 
disfranchisement because it does not involve formally disqualifying entire groups of people from 
the polls; instead, policies or acts of ‗suppression‘ seek to prevent, or deter, eligible citizens from 
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exercising their right to vote. Historically, voter suppression seems to arise when organized 
political forces aim to restrain the political participation of particular groups but cannot, 
politically or constitutionally, disfranchise them outright‖ (Keyssar 2012, p. 30). 
Voter suppression advocates integrate socio-psychological and economic theories of 
participation by targeting individual voters via group markers (Verba et al 1995, p. 269; Downs 
1957, p. 260).  Much of what we know about political behavior is segmented by sub groups.  
These identities provide powerful predictors of voting behavior.  They also allow for 
sophisticated targeting and gerrymandering.  One efficient mechanism employed for shaping the 
electorate is raising the participatory costs for groups who most often vote for the opposing 
party.  However, this strategy creates a perverse cycle.  Most simply stated, targeting minority 
voters becomes more attractive as minorities increasingly vote en bloc.  Likewise, as one 
political party suppresses minority voters, these voters are then even more likely to vote against 
that party.  
 
Statement of Problem 
Albeit with many fits and starts, America achieved near-universal adult access to the 
franchise.  The exclusion of any adult citizen without cause violates the basic premises necessary 
for democratic self-governance.  Yet, some discriminatory exceptions to the franchise are more 
easily justified than others. For example, restrictions on children, those mentally incapacitated, 
and prison inmates are generally accepted; while those targeting race, gender, or seniority are 
widely shunned (Manza, Brooks & Uggen 2004, p.  277).  During the first years of this nation; 
property, gender, and other qualifications allowed only a quarter of adults the franchise (Keyssar 
2000, p. 4).   Expansions of this fundamental right are celebrated as proof of American progress.   
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Recent legal and political trends indicate that targeted demobilization is on the rise, thus 
increasing the need for political scientists to measure the phenomena.   Several key 
developments contributed to the reemerging salience of voter suppression.  First, the turnout of 
African American and Hispanic voters spiked.  For example, in the two most recent presidential 
elections minority voters increased their share of the American electorate (Lopez 2009, p. ii).  
Second, these citizens voted overwhelmingly for one political party.  Third, the historic election 
and reelection of the nation‘s first African American president, along with increasing partisan 
polarization, provoked an intensification of attempts to tighten electoral regulations.  
Many state legislatures responded to these electorally ominous demographic and social 
changes by instituting voter suppression laws.  Overall, the Brennan Center for Justice counted 
180 pieces of state legislation aimed at making it harder to register or vote introduced between 
the beginning of 2011 and August of 2012 (Election 2012: Voting Laws Roundup).  Between 
2010 and 2011 upwards of thirty-four states introduced voter identification laws; nine states 
passed them via referendum. Seventeen states enacted ―proof of citizenship‖ laws requiring an 
official birth certificate for registration (Weiser & Norden 2012, p. 2).  Other states restricted 
registration drives, reversed previous reforms like early voting, and adopted other forms of 
targeted demobilization.  This study‘s findings reveal that these contemporary voter suppression 
mechanisms depressed African American participation in Florida. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation adopts a historical-institutional approach to analyze state voting systems 
and voter suppression.  I build in the broader tradition of institutionalism, and more specifically, 
realignment theory that has produced many meaningful insights into American political 
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development.  This study explores several implications raised by the evolutionary realignment 
hypothesis advanced by Carmines and Stimson (1989, chps. 8 and 9).  In their seminal work 
Issue Evolution (1989) they found that political change was dynamic and evolved over time.  In 
short, they contended that the 1980‘s partisan realignment was a product of the integration of 
racial and ideological issues in the late 1960‘s.  This period was marked by white backlash to the 
civil rights and social justice agenda identified with previous alignments.  Dated to roughly the 
late 1960‘s (scholars offer competing dates), the ―Reagan realignment‖ witnessed the regression 
of many civil rights movement, New Deal, and Great Society initiatives (Black & Black 2002, p. 
24).  Along with retractions of liberal economic and social policies, the new realignment was 
also associated with inconsistent support for voting rights.  Despite a national push to make 
voting more convenient, this study identifies a range of measures adopted that were intended to 
discourage or suppress participation. 
The central finding of this dissertation is that contemporary voter suppression measures 
negatively impact African American participation.  This study traces the origin and evolution of 
these laws to the broader partisan realignment of each state.  I contend that the prior alignment, 
built partially on appeals to white racial resentment, is being replaced by a majority coalition 
comprised of more non-white American voters.  Although voter suppression attempts are 
intensifying, these techniques are becoming increasingly risky.  As U.S. politics transition to 
much more racially diverse electorates, voter suppression measures create a perverse incentive.  
This electoral approach requires more intensive demobilization at a time when racial appeals are 
increasingly subject to backlash.   
Voter suppression measures may provoke push back among those targeted.  Additionally, 
partisan and cynical attempts to suppress voters may inspire counter demobilization from interest 
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groups, elites, and the media (Hasen 2012, p. 6).  Civil rights and voting advocates often 
publicize voter suppression laws to spur get-out-the-vote efforts and media coverage of these 
measures presents a public relations problem for their proponents.  Most importantly, racially 
based voter suppression runs contrary to widely held democratic beliefs and values (Gerken 
2009, p. 30). 
This process was not, however, automatic or pre-determined.  This study contends that 
Republican Party elites actively chose to institute voter suppression laws, and that this pattern 
was consistent with prior decisions to pursue the ―southern strategy‖ and write off the black 
electorate.  However, unlike past versions of the approach, the electoral consequences of this 
strategy may be changing.  In an increasingly diverse society, Republican elites are faced with 
two choices.  The first would be expanding the electoral base of the Republican Party to include 
minority citizens.  The second would be finding new and creative ways to suppress the vote.  For 
the cases, and period under review, the GOP adopted the latter approach. 
 
Purpose of Study 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to assess competing explanations of the relationship 
between voter suppression and participation within and across two cases studies, Florida and 
North Carolina from 1988 to 2012.  During this time period, government officials across cases 
adopted starkly differing levels of voter suppression allowing for a rough natural experiment.  
This study employed qualitative process tracing to chart the development of contemporary voter 
suppression measures in each state.  To gain an accurate description of voter participation, I 
scrutinized quantitative registration, demographics, and turnout data.  As a result, quantitative 
methods and reasoning are utilized in conjunction with the analytic narrative presented. 
6 
 
 
 
The literature divides into four general explanations by which voter suppression efforts 
might affect elections: 
 
H1: Discouraging Voter Hypothesis - The first, termed by Lott (2006)
1
 as the 
discouraging voter hypothesis, suggested that actual voter fraud was rare, and thus 
regulations served to discourage eligible voters.  Many scholars argued strongly that voter 
suppression measures negatively impacted participation and specifically targeted African 
American citizens (Overton 2006, p. 148; Piven et al 2009, p. 9; Bassetti 2012, p. 174). 
Despite strong face validity and theoretical support for this view, empirical studies 
returned contradictory findings. 
 
H2:  Ensuring Integrity Hypothesis - The second, ensuring integrity hypothesis, argued 
that reform efforts promoted trust and confidence in the electoral system which produced 
increased participation (Lott 2006, p. 12).  
 
This model, albeit somewhat counter-
intuitively, predicted that states with stricter election rules would show higher levels of 
participation than those with more navigable voting systems. 
 
H3:  Minimal Effects Hypothesis - Berinsky (2005) added a third, contending minimal 
effects hypothesizing that citizens who were most likely to vote would overcome minor 
restrictions and technical hurdles (Berinsky 2005, p. 482).   
 
                                                          
1
 The first two hypotheses were identified and termed by (Lott 2006, p. 5).  Another Lott hypothesis - 
―eliminating fraud‖ was subsumed under the voter integrity hypothesis.  The widespread occurrence of 
voter fraud was disproven by the literature and refuted by the data presented in this study.   
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H4:  Voter Suppression Backlash Hypothesis - Finally, another plausible and related 
explanation might be that voter suppression opponents were able to inspire additional 
voters by publicizing voter suppression efforts.   I term this the voter suppression 
backlash hypothesis; perhaps suppression angered targeted voters providing increased 
incentive to vote.    
 
Significance of Study 
Access to the ballot box is an essential requirement for a healthy democracy.  Questions 
of low turnout and voting rights are particularly salient in contemporary American politics.  
Partisan de-alignment, polarization, and low participation all place increased emphasis on 
selective mobilization and demobilization of voters.   
Building on a rich body of research that detailed racially inspired demobilization; this 
study focuses on the impact of contemporary voter suppression efforts on African American 
participation.  I argue that targeted demobilization exacerbated the naturally occurring 
inequalities inherent to participatory government and states with active voter suppression 
efforts should display lower levels of black participation.   
However, contemporary voter suppression differed from past occurrences on several 
important counts.  First, public opinion on race evolved to where blatant appeals to racism were 
no longer socially acceptable.  Without strictly enforced racial norms and the threat of violence, 
today‘s demobilization methods were much more subtle.  Second, historical suppression 
depended on overwhelming one-party political control; in both cases studied two-party 
competition was the norm in recent elections.  Most southern states transitioned from one-party 
Democratic control to two-party competition or Republican dominance; Florida in the early 
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1990‘s and North Carolina in 2012.  Third, the American electorate is becoming much more 
diverse further increasing the potential risks of provoking counter-demobilization and backlash.   
This study adds much needed empirical evidence to the growing subfield of voting 
studies that assess voter suppression.  My results contribute to the existing debate over the 
significance of targeted demobilization.  I fill crucial gaps in the literature by compiling a 
comprehensive look at demobilizing electoral reforms.  This study finds that voter suppression 
was more intense in Florida than in North Carolina for the period under review.  Consequently, 
African American participation in North Carolina surpassed the same in Florida, spiking 
noticeably across multiple measures for the 2008 and 2012 elections. 
Additionally, this study finds that Census-derived data over-estimated African American 
participation.  I construct a new, more reliable, measure of voter registration which revealed 
interesting findings.  First, from 1988 to 2012, African American participation increased more 
modestly in Florida than in North Carolina.  However, gains in African American participation 
were not as large as popular accounts suggest.  Second, due to high levels of excitement among 
black Americans for the 2008 and 2012 elections, black registration in Florida increased, but 
still trailed behind whites in the state.  Third, high levels of African American registration and 
turnout in North Carolina reveal that under the right conditions; racial disparities in 
participation can be mitigated, or even eliminated. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
 This study is divided into seven chapters.    
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Chapter One, the Introduction, outlines the scope and boundaries of the project 
establishing the problem; purpose, and significance of the study.  The chapter introduces 
important concepts and then outlines the organization of the dissertation.   
Chapter Two, the Literature Review, summarizes previous scholarship with a focus on 
voter suppression, racial disfranchisement, and electoral participation.  A small but active 
research line has developed to chart contemporary demobilization techniques.  Prior research has 
reached conflicting results on the impact of individual voter suppression mechanisms.  This 
study contributes to the scholarly debate by explicating the development of voter suppression 
across two cases.   
Chapter Three specifies and defends the methodological approaches and data sources 
chosen to assess alternative explanations of the relationship between voter suppression and 
political participation.  This study adopts a historical-institutional approach to place these and 
other related issues into a broader context. Historical attempts to suppress voter turnout are well-
documented; the impact of progressive reforms on lower class and ethnic participation, and the 
one-party Jim Crow South‘s tight racial restrictions on access to the ballot have received 
considerable attention (Keyssar 2000, p. 91-93; Walton 2001, p. 22; Kousser 1974, p. 62).  This 
study situates more recent voter suppression attempts in this tradition.  Although the methods 
evolved with the times, contemporary voter suppression shares much in common with historical 
attempts to restrict access to the franchise.  Most notably, these methods target African American 
citizens.  
Finally, the Methodology chapter explains the strengths and weaknesses of my approach.  
This study combines qualitative process tracing bolstered by quantitative evidence of voter 
registration and turnout across and within the cases.    
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Chapters Four and Five detail the development of state voting law and levels of voter 
suppression within the two cases; first North Carolina and then Florida.  These sections begin by 
detailing the partisan transition of important political offices in each state.  Next, I trace the 
development of state and national voting reforms, including mobilizing and demobilizing 
measures, to establish the level of voter suppression present.  Although most states incorporated 
mobilizing reforms like early voting and same-day registration; some state executives and/or 
legislatures adopted targeted demobilization.  Florida represents a case of high voter suppression; 
state officials practiced strict felon disenfranchisement, purged registration lists, and witnessed 
long lines at the polls in recent elections.  North Carolina leaders, under the period in question, 
developed a much less restrictive voting system with longer early voting periods, milder 
restrictions on former felons, and eased registration policies.    
Chapter Six, African American Participation, reports quantitative turnout and registration 
data across the two cases comparing them to each other, national, and regional averages.  This 
chapter utilizes three measures of political participation to assess competing theories of voter 
suppression.  Next, county level registration, population, and demographics data are employed to 
address competing alternative explanations.  
Chapter Seven, Conclusions and Recommendations, summarizes the studies main 
discoveries, limitations, and implications for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2: Review of the Literature 
“The American party system, in sum, was fundamentally transformed during the mid-
1960s.  The progressive racial tradition in the Republican Party gave way to racial 
conservatism, and the Democratic Party firmly embraced racial liberalism.  These 
changes unleashed political forces that permanently reshaped the contours of American 
politics” (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. 58). 
Introduction 
A variety of approaches are deployed to measure the impact of contemporary voter 
suppression laws.  These research efforts produced conflicting results.  To clarify these 
differences, I focus here on the following subjects: institutional models of demobilization, racial 
disfranchisement, partisan realignment or issue evolution, and contemporary voter suppression.  
First, this chapter highlights traditional institutional explanations for U.S. turnout.  Then, I 
discuss the scholarly debate between realignment theory and the issue evolution model.  Next, 
the literature review explains and connects my thesis to the relevant theoretical frameworks.  
Finally, I explore the most recent research on contemporary voter suppression measures. 
 
Institutional Model: Theories of Demobilization 
There is a rich tradition which investigates electoral rules, institutions, procedures, and 
other structural determinants of voting behavior.  Institutional explanations long posited that 
registration rules and electoral administration influenced political participation. Some 
emphasized the strategic nature of voter suppression stressing the importance of partisan control 
in shaping patterns of demobilization (Burnham 1970, p. 81; 1987, p. 109).  Although 
historically the Democratic Party restricted access to the franchise for partisan gain, 
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contemporary demobilization was largely promulgated by the Republican Party.
2
  The partisan 
tilt of more recent attempts to restrict the franchise suggest that the Democratic Party supported 
greater inclusiveness, while the Republican Party sought to make voting more secure, and hence 
more difficult (Hasen 2012; p. 8).  As evidence, researchers studying roll call voting records 
found that between 2005 and 2007 Republican legislators overwhelmingly supported photo 
identification requirements.  When it came to voting on these laws during this period, 95 percent 
of Republican legislators voted in favor, while Democrats were 98 percent opposed (Minnite 
2010, p. 153).   
Wang (2012) dated modern voter suppression by the GOP to 1964.  In that year, under a 
program titled Operation Eagle Eye, future Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist, then 
a low level party worker in Arizona, challenged minority voters utilizing caging lists (Wang 
2012; p. 58).  Caging was a voter suppression tactic that involved sending mailings to minority 
or Democratic-leaning communities.  These mailings often included incorrect elections 
information or requested a reply.  Citizens who did not respond to the mailings would then have 
their residency or eligibility challenged.   
 Classic institutional explanations suggested turnout should increase when motivation was 
high and demobilization was low; while also assuming citizens were engaged by the political 
process – a condition that was not often met in contemporary U.S. elections (Avery 1989, p. 15).  
These frameworks offered three mechanisms by which demobilization efforts might suppress 
participation:  
1. The decline of party-based mass mobilization. 
                                                          
2
 This study does not contend that Democratic elites did not participate in voter suppression or targeted 
demobilization.  However, this study confirms Wang‘s (2012) finding that the Republican Party engaged 
in a widespread and concerted effort to pass a wave of recent voter suppression legislation. 
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2.  High burdens imposed on citizens due to administrative and registration hurdles. 
3.  Racially-based disfranchisement. 
The first research line stressed the decline in partisan competition and mobilization; 
pointing to the ―party system of 1896‖ and subsequent declines in turnout (Burnham 1970, p. 71; 
1987, p. 113).  Many of these original works argued that electoral reforms and rule changes were 
essential to understanding participation.  Consistent with this view, American voter turnout 
exhibited clear patterns of mobilization and demobilization with corresponding swings in 
participation (Keyssar 2000, xxv-xxvi).  Both mobilization and demobilization diminished 
overall, making the two difficult to parse.  As Avery (1989) explained ―locations with high 
turnout tend to have both high mobilization and low demobilization while those with low turnout 
have both low mobilization and high demobilization‖ (Avery 1989, p. 37).   
 The second research tradition blamed cumbersome registration rules and elections 
administration (Burnham 1989, p. 108).  The research and activism of Piven and Cloward (1989) 
was an integral part of the push for the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 or ―motor-voter‖ 
reforms that produced noticeable gains in registration.  Although total registration increased, the 
effect of these reforms on turnout was less clear (Knack 1995, p. 25; Wang 2012; p. 69).   Piven 
and Cloward (2000) concluded that the political parties had not incorporated the issue-concerns 
of potentially new voters, nor embraced mobilizing their potential interests (Piven & Cloward 
2000, p. 265). However, the increased participation of previously less active voting groups 
suggests we take into account the long term and unintentional consequences of electoral reforms, 
especially the potential for backlash. 
 The third approach examined voter suppression and active demobilization of voters by 
race (Piven et al 2009, p. 9; Overton 2006, p. 153; Alexander 2010, p. 187).    Efforts to target 
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African Americans have a protracted history in American politics (Keyssar 2000, p. 45; 2012, p. 
30).  The Voting Rights Act of 1965, along with subsequent court and federal actions, curbed the 
worst abuses.  Despite the success of the VRA‘s provisions, many state officials developed more 
subtle methods geared toward diluting the power of African American voters using redistricting.  
These methods included ―cracking, stacking, and packing‖ minority voters into districts tailored 
to weaken their voting strength (Parker 1990, p. 51; Grofman et al 1992, p. 23.)  Both voter 
dilution and voter suppression measures targeted African American voters.  The former did so by 
gerrymandering districts so that blacks may vote, but were seldom able to elect representatives of 
their choosing (Lublin, Brunell, Grofman & Handley 2009, p. 3).  The latter methods attempted 
to discourage or suppress voting by raising the price of participation or otherwise restricting 
access to the ballot.  The 2013 Supreme Court reversal of the Voting Rights Act‘s preclearance 
provision in Shelby County v. Holder may provide additional opportunities for the adoption of 
both. 
 
Realignment and Critical Elections 
 Realignment theory in its classical construction suggested that cyclical patterns play a 
decisive role in American politics.  Proponents argued that partisan realignments were marked by 
watershed elections, usually the result of partisan switchers, an influx of new voters, or political 
and economic cleavages (Key 1955, p. 4; Sundquist 1983; p. 35-36).  Critical elections theorists 
described a dramatic event or new issue cleavage that signaled sharp, significant, and durable 
shifts in partisan attachments and electoral fortunes (Nardulli 1995, p. 11).  Under this model, 
majority parties enjoyed long periods of stability until the environment changed producing crisis.   
Realignments occur when one critical election arises that abruptly transferred power to a new 
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majority (Key 1955, p. 3).  This realignment could produce transformation across candidates, 
issues, and at times even entire political parties.   
Burnham (1970) concluded that realignment patterns were the result of larger class 
cleavages (p. 71).  In response to populist and socialist pressure, political elites instituted 
electoral reforms to weaken the voting power of lower class ethnic groups in U.S. northern cities 
while also disfranchising all African Americans, and many poor whites, in the South.  These 
reforms and restrictions resulted in significant declines in American turnout (Burnham 1970, p. 
84).   
Despite disagreements, many scholars agreed that the elections of 1860, 1896, and 1932 
were prime examples of the theory (Sundquist 1983, p. 13; Key 1955, p. 11).   A smaller group 
included the period from the late 1960‘s through the 1980‘s as a separate, partial, or regional 
realignment termed as the post civil rights, post New Deal, or ―Reagan‖ realignment (Black & 
Black 2002, p. 24).  Under this model, the 1980 election marked the dissolution of the New 
Deal/Great Society coalition that dominated U.S. electoral politics since the 1930‘s.  That this 
alignment fractured in great part due to the partisan incorporation of racial issues is of great 
importance to this current study.  As Edsall and Edsall (1992) argue, the tumultuous events of the 
1960‘s ―set the stage for the Democratic and Republican parties to diverge sharply on the issue 
of civil rights.  1964 marked the beginning of a fundamentally new partisan configuration, based 
in large part on the politics of race‖ (Edsall & Edsall 1992, p. 35). 
This dissertation frames voter suppression in this context.  More simply formulated, I 
argue that cyclical recurrences of racial demobilization were closely connected to broader 
partisan realignments.  Just as the New Deal/Great Society alignment held the seeds for its own 
downfall, the contemporary push for stricter voting laws exhibited evidence of a similar feedback 
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process.  By appealing to racial conservatives, even if not exclusively, the southern strategy 
incorporated racial and anti-democratic attitudes that persisted and took expression in today‘s 
voter suppression laws.    
 
Issue Evolution 
Critical elections and realignment theorists faced many criticisms, most notably for their 
inability to predict de-alignment and the weakening of partisan attachments (Phillips 1983, p. 
220-223).  Scholars disagreed over the duration, causes, intensity, and terminology associated 
with the theory.  Sundquist (1983) argued that alignments were uneven, rough, and messy.  Even 
with dramatic realignments, large sections of the electorate remain uninvolved and many citizens 
retained their prior ideological allegiances (Sundquist 1983, p. 17).  Others found the theory 
insufficient because it failed to measure more subtle shifts and focused too heavily on critical 
elections which were infrequent and unusual events (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. 12).  
Finally, the approach may also be challenged for over emphasizing turning point elections and 
ignoring longer term developments. 
Despite these criticisms and the at times vagueness of the realignment concept, 
reiterations of the theory have proven very useful, if imperfect, at explaining American political 
and partisan shifts. Researchers are working to better define this phenomena.   Several revise 
realignment theory to include processes that were not so sudden.  Key argued that ―secular‖ 
shifts may occur over longer periods of time and occur due to slow-moving mechanisms like 
population change (Key 1959, p. 198).  Realignments may also be partial or regional, impacted 
by political events, or delayed (Black & Black 2002; p. 24). 
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Carmines and Stimson (1989) offered an alternative construct describing ―issue 
evolution‖ as a fluid process where critical elections punctuated longer processes (p. 157).  
Unlike the dramatic and abrupt changes associated with critical turning points, realignments may 
be brought about via long term mechanisms like generational replacement.  The issue evolution 
framework expanded upon the standard realignment model, specifically on the role new issues 
play in generating movement.  Early realignment models emphasized how new issues disrupted 
equilibrium, compelling political parties to choose sides and upsetting alliances.  In contrast, the 
issue evolution model stressed demographic change, which reversed the focus.  Old and new 
issues interact.  At times, new issues emerge that generate crisis.  At others, old issues evolve 
because the electorate or circumstances have changed.  This model suggested a broader 
perspective was required to capture these dynamic processes. 
Carmines and Stimson (1989) postulated that racial cleavages generated by the civil 
rights era fractured the New Deal coalition beginning a new realignment.  In their example, 
traditional realignment theory assumed that racial integration represented an emergent new issue 
that caused conflict leading to realignment.  On the issue of racial cleavage, standard models 
suggested that ―racial changes were crucially important for a few years in the 1960‘s, not very 
much before or since, and that the issue mattered then, not before and not after‖ (Carmines & 
Stimson 1989, p. 196).   
This description failed to account for developments outside of the narrow time frame 
assumed by critical elections theory.  With an evolutionary approach, careful attention is paid to 
changes in issues and the environment.  The 1960‘s post civil rights realignment reveals an 
evolving process.  Racial issues were not new, even if the dramatic events of the civil rights 
movement made them seem to be.  Instead, racial politics gradually developed and merged with 
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partisan politics (Edsall & Edsall 1992, p. 3). That political elites in the Republican Party made 
calculated decisions to exploit racial cleavages is a vital point.  As Phillips (1969) argued, the 
new political alignment allowed Republicans to disregard African American voters.  However, it 
also meant that ―maintenance of Negro voting rights [would then be] essential to the GOP‖ 
(Phillips 1969, p. 287).  In 1969, Phillip‘s ―maintenance‖ meant that the GOP should encourage 
African American voting rights in the South to quicken the flight of whites from the Democratic 
Party.  By 2012, with the racial realignment complete, the GOP was less enthusiastic about 
encouraging African American participation.  Finally, this process revealed that political 
decisions were made in the context of, and interacted with, past decisions.   
Issue Evolution (1989) contends: 
As recently as 1960 it is arguably the case that issues of race were not partisan issues.  
Advocates of racial liberalism were to be found almost equally among northern 
Democrats and Republicans.  Hostility to the aspirations of black Americans was almost 
exclusively the province of the southern wing of the Democratic Party.  For the mass 
electorate, race was a regional concern; on this question the union halls and country clubs 
were in easy agreement.  Neither party found it advantageous to stake out distinctive 
activist positions on this potentially volatile issue, and citizens responded accordingly.  
Except for the Dixiecrats, race was an irrelevant cue for the development of party 
attachment […]  
All of this has now changed. […]  Racial attitudes are now linked to prevailing political 
ideology.  Once separable, it is now all but inconceivable to be a liberal and not a racial 
liberal or to be a conservative and not oppose activist racial policies (Carmines & 
Stimson 1989, p. 185). 
 
Many scholars identify this shift with the failed 1964 presidential campaign of Barry 
Goldwater, which featured a state‘s rights message that resonated in the South and with working 
class white Democrats across the country.  This campaign attempted to tap into the major shift 
that was emerging in American voting patterns.  Goldwater‘s ―southern strategy‖ of catering to 
disaffected median white voters, was pivotal in helping to facilitate this transition and make race 
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a partisan issue.  The logic behind the strategy was simple math.  The campaign reasoned that the 
electoral gain in white votes far outweighed the risk of offending blacks (Goldfield 1997, p. 248-
249; Fauntroy 2007, p. 131-132).  Additionally, subsequent conservative presidential campaigns 
like that of George Wallace in 1968 would employ the technique with considerable electoral 
success (Phillips 1968, p. 466).  Although Wallace ran originally as a Democrat and later 
independent, his vocal appeals to white working class voters foreshadowed the transitioning of 
conservative Democrats to the GOP. 
Appeals to racial prejudice were not novel to American politics.  Historians note the 
longstanding tactic of exploiting racial attitudes to win elections.  The term ―southern strategy‖ is 
employed to reference any appeal to whites that employs race as a wedge issue.  Some scholars 
dated usage of the term back to the Reconstruction period (Fauntroy 2007, p. 129).  Others traced 
the tactic of exploiting racial division even earlier to the colonial era (Morgan 2003, p. 130).  
However far back you date the origins of the phenomenon, scholars argue that race is essential to 
understanding American political development (Goldfield 1997, p. 13). 
Goldwater rejected federal government involvement in desegregation, without directly 
appealing to race.  This in turn allowed many of the pro-segregation politicians and voters, to 
ultimately shift allegiances or be replaced by southern Republicans who were now more 
conservative than liberal Democrats.  Generational replacement was a major contributor to the 
issue evolution or realignment (Carmines & Stimson 1989, p. 71-72).   
Similar to Burnham‘s argument that class was integrated into two-party politics with the 
―system of 1896‖; Carmines and Stimson argued that race was incorporated via the political 
parties in the late 1960‘s through the 1980‘s.   Ultimately, racial and social policy fractured the 
New Deal coalition that comprised the Democratic Party.  Many southerners, including both 
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those that favored the party‘s racially discriminatory policies and those that did so for ideological 
or class-based reasons, fled the Democratic Party becoming independents or Republicans.  
African American voters integrated the electorate, gravitating to the new and now more diverse 
Democratic Party further entrenching race inside of the partisan framework.  Not only did the 
Democrats redefine themselves as a party open to ethnic and racial minorities, Republican elites 
adopted a platform that actively, but discreetly, cultivated white racial resentment and 
discouraged African American participation. 
One direct consequence of realignment was a shifting of partisan attitudes on a range of 
issues.  Most importantly for this study, the two parties swapped positions on the issue of racial 
disfranchisement.  Before the 1960‘s, the Democratic Party was more closely associated with 
efforts to prevent blacks from voting.  As the Republican Party courted white racial resentment, 
they also feared the potential consequences of high black turnout.  As a result, Republican elites 
began supporting elections integrity measures; many of which placed increasing burdens on 
African American voters (Davidson, Chandler, Dunlap & Wise 2004, p. 5).  
Goldwater‘s candidacy helped to define racial conservatism as a new strand of American 
political thought.   Traditional racial conservatism was defined as, ―an ideological philosophy 
held by whites that seeks to shape the racial status quo to their benefit and resist any changes in 
the social, political, and economic status quo that benefit minorities.  Racial conservatives 
oppose policy changes that would result in an enhanced position for African Americans or a 
perceived diminution of status for whites, or both‖ (Fauntroy 2007, p. 49). 
This new configuration of conservatism pushed by Goldwater, and later by a string of 
conservatives including president‘s Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, avoided racially 
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offensive language, instead appealing to more subtle racial cues (Craig and Austin 2008, p. 56; 
Edsall and Edsall 1992, p. 198).  As Carmines and Stimson (1989) contended: 
Although racial conservatism had considerable appeal to outright racists, its origins in 
western Republican conservative doctrine was altogether different in situation, culture, 
and ideology from southern white racism […] Although it would  and did appeal to 
bigots, the new conservative position was advocated without open bigotry and espousal 
of segregationists goals‖ (Carmines & Stimson 1989, p. 190-191). 
 
 
This modified strand of conservatism hastened realignment, and marked the rise of the 
―new right‖ culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Sundquist 1983, p. 425; 
Black & Black 2002, p. 25; Phillips 1982, p. 224).  Scholars disagree about the role of race in 
shaping this transformation.  Abramowitz (1994) placed more emphasis on ideology and class, 
arguing that race played an ancillary role (Abramowitz 1993, p. 23).  Carmines and Stimson 
(1989) gave race more weight.  This dissertation is agnostic between these two interpretations; 
both class and race played important roles in shaping American political development.  
Moreover, access to the franchise continues to be restricted along both dimensions.  A number of 
scholars chart the complicated relationship between U.S. racial and class politics (Goldfield 
1997, p. 13-16; Edsall & Edsall 1992, p. 7).  However, this study focuses on racial effects 
because of the documented connections between political realignment and racial 
disfranchisement. 
Classical realignment theory suggested that realignments should occur every 40 years or 
so.  As new cohorts of voters come of age, they bring with them new issues and political 
alliances that disrupt the old order and alter party fortunes (Burnham 1970, p. 8-10; Sundquist 
1983, p. 35).  I argue that the 1968 – 2008 alignment, in part founded on the politics of white 
resentment and opposition to the civil rights platform, is being challenged by a new multi-racial 
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configuration.  The increasing number and intensity of voter suppression laws were attempts to 
forestall these threatening political and demographic changes. 
Although realignment theory attributed shifts to critical elections, this study adopts the 
issue evolution model which accounted for issue displacement.  Rather than positing clearly 
demarcated absolute changes in one direction, an evolutionary model suggested pitched battles 
that are historically connected.  Social and economic upheaval, immigration, migration, and a 
range of demographic factors impact partisan attitudes by introducing new issue cleavages.  
However, new issues are not written onto a clean slate (Sundquist 1983, p. 304). Old issues, 
alliances, and cleavages shape the incorporation of new issues.  To the point, context matters.   
This dissertation claims that contemporary voter suppression measures are the product of 
the secular realignment or issue evolution described by Carmines and Stimson (1989).  The 
conjunction of race and partisan identification produced several interesting dynamics.  First, it 
resulted in dramatic partisan realignment in the South.  Second, it played a major role in 
conservative electoral victories and the ascendance of contemporary post-racial politics.  Third, 
the merger of conservatism and racism, even if under the banner of race neutrality, created a 
perverse incentive to disfranchise racial minorities.  Under a partisan alignment that thoroughly 
incorporates race, the suppression of voters by strictly partisan metrics will produce racial 
effects.  As partisan polarization and voter suppression increase, so too should minority bloc 
voting.  As minorities gravitate to one-party, this further tempts members of the opposition party 
to restrict the franchise.  Proponents of voter suppression find themselves in a self re-enforcing 
cycle.   
As Lublin (2004) warned, ―The African-American and Latino share of the southern 
electorate continues to rise at a rapid pace. […]  Unless Republicans can capture a greater share 
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of the minority vote, Democrats will need a smaller and smaller share of the region‘s relatively 
shrinking white vote to win southern elections‖ (Lublin 2004, xviii). 
What Lublin (2004) avoids was the potential for a third option: reducing the size of the 
minority electorate.  If this construction seems implausible, I point to the ―redeemer‖ 
governments following Reconstruction; the segregationist movements of the early 1900‘s that 
resorted to strict disfranchisement to displace the electoral power of biracial Republican and 
Fusionists coalitions; and later efforts to uphold Jim Crow (Keyssar 2000, p.  206-207; Kousser 
1974, p. 187; Luebke 2000, p. 6-7).   American history more generally is replete with examples 
of elites instituting racial disfranchisement in the face of threatening demographic or political 
changes.  The same was true for both cases. 
 
Contemporary Demobilization 
Recent voter suppression efforts are best viewed in this context.  The language, 
techniques, and motivations are rooted in the history described.  Today‘s restrictions are not as 
effective as the near total disfranchisement of previous eras.  However, battles over access to the 
franchise displayed similar processes and patterns of action.  The literature identified three 
primary contemporary voter suppression techniques; photo-ID laws, felon disfranchisement, and 
administrative maneuvering (elimination of same-day and early voting, caging, purging, unequal 
distribution of election resources, and long lines).   
 
Voter Identification 
 Researchers are developing a sizeable body of empirical data on the impact of voter 
photo-identification laws.  A 2006 study estimated that around 13 million or seven percent of 
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U.S. citizens reported lacking ―ready access‖ to proof of citizenship documentation (Citizens 
Without Proof 2006, p. 3).  In Indiana, which adopted the toughest photo identification 
requirements, Barreto, Nuno, and Sanchez (2009) estimated that among voting age adults around 
72% of blacks reported meeting the state requirement, compared to 83% for whites (p. 20).  This 
study verified prior research that showed that access to photo identification was unevenly 
distributed.  African Americans, Latinos, elderly citizens, the less educated, and the less wealthy 
were the least likely groups to possess a photo-ID (Hood & Bullock 2008, p. 19; Hershey 2009, 
p. 89; Barreto et al. 2009, p. 5; Mack 2012, p. 55).  
 Despite convincing evidence that minority, along with other groups of, citizens 
disproportionately lacked photo-ID; studies measuring the law‘s impact on turnout produced 
contradictory findings. For example, some aggregate-level studies revealed a modest effect 
(Alvarez, Bailey, & Katz 2008, p. 2).  However, individual-level research was mixed.   One 
school of thought found that strict photo-ID laws displayed a small but significant negative 
impact on turnout (Hershey 2009, p. 90; Hood & Bullock 2008, p. 17).  A second grouping of 
scholars found no statistically significant negative relationship (Lott 2006, p. 11; Mycoff, 
Wagner, & Wilson 2007, p. 18).  A third argued that the effects varied across cases (Alvarez et al 
2008, p. 2; Vercelotti and Anderson 2006, p. 13).  Finally a fourth suggested voter suppression 
increased turnout (Milyo 2007, p. 5; Lott 2006, p. 12).    
 Researchers attempted several approaches to square these competing findings.  A number 
argued for identifying legal differences across states.  Some states, like North Carolina, adopted 
moderate photo-ID statutes where voters could prove their identity using school-ID, employee 
badges, paychecks, bank statements, and other documentation.  Other states passed more 
stringent regulations requiring official government-issued photo-ID without exception.  Alvarez, 
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Bailey, and Katz (2008) found that strict-ID regulations depressed voting among registered 
voters (p. 3).  Erikson and Minnite (2009) challenged these findings arguing for a more cautious 
approach.  They warned that Census-based data analysis may yield results, but social scientists 
should be careful in reaching broader conclusions on turnout.  They stressed the need for 
additional ―within and between state analysis‖ (Erikson & Minnite 2009; p. 98).  The current 
study builds on this recommendation.    
 
Felon Disfranchisement 
 Although estimations of the impact of photo-ID offer mixed results, the raw numbers for 
felon disfranchisement were easier to calculate.  Felon disfranchisement represents the last 
remaining significant restriction on the franchise.  With the exception of children and the 
mentally insane, no other sizeable group of citizens faced an outright ban.  In 2010, felon 
disfranchisement laws excluded over three million U.S. citizens.  Around an additional two and 
half million citizens remained ineligible to vote while on parole and probation (McDonald 2012).   
 Felon disfranchisement laws were further complicated by America‘s racial legacy.  
Historical efforts to conflate issues of crime, race, and voting are well documented (Keyssar 
2000, p. 246-251).  W.E.B. Dubois (1903) predicted, over a century ago, that the dual system of 
justice established under Jim Crow to support racial dominance would be difficult to undo 
(Dubois 1903, chp. 4).  Contemporary studies point to the ―war on drugs‖ and its noticeable 
racial disparities, which have a chilling effect on the electoral participation of young minority 
males (Alexander 2010, p. 59; Mauer 2004, p. 17; Raskin 2005, p. 1).  The disproportionate 
incarceration rates of African Americans, Hispanics, and the poor; combined with felon 
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disfranchisement laws, further exacerbate existing inequalities in resources that facilitate 
political participation (Lippke 2001, p. 554).   
Other studies found that attitudes toward crime and restrictions on voting continue to be 
influenced by racial attitudes.  Manza and Uggen (2008) explicated the relationship between 
racial group threat and restrictions on the right to vote.  They found that racial threat was a 
significant predictor of restrictive attitudes, especially in the southern United States where the 
association was the strongest (Manza & Uggen 2008, p. 64).  A more recent study found that 
racial imagery alone could evoke increased support for photo identification laws among whites 
(Wilson, Brewer, & Rosenbluth 2014, p. 369).  
Although proving how felons would vote was difficult, scholars conservatively estimated 
that these laws produced a small, but at times important, advantage for Republican candidates 
(Uggen & Manza 2002, p. 796).  Others suggested that the impact was limited because felons 
belong to low turnout demographic groups (Miles 2004, p. 85).   
 
Administrative Maneuvering 
 A conspicuous feature of American elections is the partisan nature of their 
administration.   The head of elections is often the Secretary of State, an elected partisan 
position.  Critics suggest that this creates a strong incentive for political operatives to bend the 
rules for partisan advantage; and election administrators have devised creative ways for doing so 
(Bassetti 2012, p. 147-148; Hasen 2012, p. 21).  Administrative maneuvers include caging, 
purging, rule changes, lines, ballot-design, reductions in early voting access, and restrictions on 
interest group registration drives. 
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 One demobilization strategy was caging, and/or the deployment of poll watchers to 
selectively challenge voters (Piven et al. 2009, p. 174-179).  Caging involved sending out 
mailings to minority or Democratic-leaning communities with confusing or incorrect elections 
information.  Often these mailings asked for a return reply.  Citizens who failed to reply to these 
mailings could have their eligibility challenged at the polls or were notified of a potential 
challenge.  This strategy operated by creating confusion or intimidating voters (Minnite et al 
2009, p. 170).  However, caging was a rough and inefficient mechanism prone to backlash.  
Many voters angrily resented challenges and caging often inspired counter-mobilization (Piven 
et al. 2009, p. 178).  Although it was unclear how many votes were suppressed, caging has 
largely been replaced by the more advanced and less confrontational technique of purging. 
 With this mechanism, election administrators purged voter rolls to disqualify targeted 
voters.  For example, in recent elections Florida officials attempted to remove thousands of 
potential illegal aliens or former felons from the state‘s voter rolls (Bassetti 2012, p. 151-153).  
Purging may be limited in scope because purged voters may appear at the registrar, re-register, 
and then later vote (assuming they realize the error in time).  Its impact was also likely negated 
by the inefficiency of targeting citizens who were already unlikely to participate. 
 Along with caging and purging, political operatives often attempted to bend 
administrative rules to make voting more arduous.  Included among these maneuvers were the 
uneven distribution of polling places, voting machines, and resources.  Combined with 
reductions of early voting, these reforms resulted in long lines on election-day.  A study of the 
2012 Florida election estimated that reductions of early voting hours resulted in around 200,000 
voters being discouraged from voting (Powers & Damron 2013).
3
   Another which examined the 
state‘s elimination of early voting on the Sunday before the election, or the ―Souls to the Polls‖ 
                                                          
3
 Powers and Damron. Orlando Sentinel.  Jan. 23, 2013. 
28 
 
 
 
reduction, found that specific Democratic leaning groups were more likely to cast Sunday ballots 
in 2008 (Herron & Smith 2012a, p. 30).  Most notable among those targeted were African 
American churches who initiated the high profile ―Souls‖ program to encourage their members 
to vote upon leaving Sunday service. 
 Finally, many states placed burdens on outside party or interest group voter registration 
drives.  The resource model of voting, or civic voluntarism model, suggested that civic and 
voluntary associations were essential for individuals in helping them overcome the natural 
disparities created by inequalities of wealth and resources (Verba et al 1995; p. 384).
.  
Lacking 
natural resources and skills, low resource voters rely on religious and civic organizations to 
handle the technical and informational aspects of voting.  Transactional models of democratic 
politics offer a similar assessment, allowing a role for interest groups and political entrepreneurs 
in reducing the costs of collective action (Lowery & Brasher 2004, p. 30). These groups, along 
with the political parties, attempted to bend institutional rules for partisan advantage.  They also 
challenged voter suppression laws with counter-mobilization and media campaigns.   
 Registration groups received considerable attention in recent years.  In 2008, much of 
that focus was on the controversial group the Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now or ACORN.  The organization, which was a prominent promoter of the 1992 
NVRA, was the target of multiple congressional and legal investigations.  Despite the media 
uproar, which resulted in the demise of the group, little evidence of actual voter fraud was 
uncovered (Bassetti 2012, p. 169).  In addition to attacks on ACORN, some states, like Texas 
and Florida targeted all voter registration groups.  In these cases, bureaucratic rules discouraged 
registration drives by imposing hefty fines for technical violations.  Herron and Smith (2012) 
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found that restrictions in Florida dramatically impacted registration rates in the state (Herron & 
Smith 2012b, p. 30).  
 
Discussion 
Voter suppression efforts developed in conjunction with forces that compelled larger 
political realignments.  Periods of mobilization and demobilization produced expansions and 
retractions of the franchise.  Today‘s voter suppression is best understood in the context of 
partisan realignment.  These measures have evolved directly from how the two main political 
parties chose to resolve the racial and ideological conflicts of the 1960‘s.  Although less 
draconian than earlier occurrences, contemporary suppression represented a push back against 
the successes of the Voting Rights Act and larger civil rights era.  
Policy, class, and the standard model of voting explain much, if not most, of the factors 
that shape partisan politics.  However, race continues to play an important, but evolving, role in 
American political life.  High levels of African American partisanship reflected the mix of 
historical and policy factors that influenced current voting patterns. Voter suppression, like 
realignment, arises in waves.  A review of American history reveals a broad but progressive 
trend of expanding rights to a near complete franchise for all adults.  A more nuanced 
examination reveals both a constant battle over voting procedures and distinct periods of 
mobilization or demobilization (Keyssar 2000, p. 296-298; Avery 1989, p.  17). The most 
egregious of these racially-based abridgements have been removed by Constitutional 
amendments, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and other legislation.   
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Despite the success of these efforts to build a more inclusive American democracy, 
contemporary voter suppression and targeted demobilization continue to threaten the voting 
rights of many citizens. 
  
31 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter details the research approach and methods employed in this dissertation.  
First, I summarize the systematic steps taken to assess rival explanatory theories of targeted 
demobilization.  Second, I explain my choice of historical institutionalism and its place in the 
broader context of the qualitative method.  Third, I describe the specifics of the case study and 
process analysis techniques.  Fourth, the chapter details various voter suppression hypotheses 
and explains how this study assesses them.  Next, I record and defend other methodological 
choices including my selection of cases, time-period, and my focus on African American 
electoral participation.  Finally, this section reports my data sources and collection procedures. 
 
Procedures 
To conduct a thorough investigation of the selected cases, a number of critical steps were 
taken.  The process began with an in depth review of scholarly works on American voting, voter 
suppression, southern politics, the history of racial disfranchisement, demobilization, and related 
topics.  This review included classic works by V.O. Key and Walter Dean Burnham, but also 
incorporated more recent literature on American voting like those of Alexander Keyssar and 
Bernard Grofman.  I surveyed literature on historical and contemporary Florida and North 
Carolina politics, including Paul Luebke‘s extensive scholarship on North Carolina politics and 
David Colburn‘s research in Florida. 
I sought out, organized, and consolidated data from multiple sources for the time period 
1988 to 2012.  First, I examined state voting laws and changes with the potential for mobilization 
or demobilization.  Next, I gathered U.S. Census demographics and elections estimates of voter 
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registration and turnout rates. Finally, I collected county level registration data reported by each 
state‘s election administration to attain a more reliable measure of registration and test 
alternative explanations for participation patterns.  
This methodological approach provides two valuable contributions to the field.  First, this 
dissertation project conducts and reports in-depth process analysis of legislative activity with a 
focus on election reforms.  Process tracing involves the careful inspection of cases to assess 
competing explanations of an outcome.  Although voter suppression may be perpetuated by the 
executive and judicial branches, legislative records were consistent, comparable across states, 
and amenable to this method.  This study finds that the most egregious voter suppression 
measures required high levels of political dominance to sustain.  Second, this work develops a 
new conservative measure of registration that provides a more sober assessment of the political 
activity of African American voters.  These data reveal that African American participation 
increased since the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, with additional increases for the 
2008 and 2012 elections.  However, state reported registration data indicates that these gains 
were uneven across states and likely smaller than popular accounts suggest.  This is vitally 
important because Census based participation data is often cited in prominent election law cases. 
 
Historical Institutionalism 
Historical-institutional analysis has a long and rich tradition in political science.  Often 
traced to preeminent figures like V.O. Key, the macro-level study of political institutions has 
cultivated many productive research lines.  This approach examines dimensions that are difficult 
to assess via survey methods; permits political scientists to present data in geographical and 
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historical context; and involves the use of precinct and county level data for comparative 
purposes (Key 1966, p. 127).   
Additionally, historical comparisons allow for the investigation of phenomena that do not 
match the assumptions necessary for regression analysis including independence of causal 
variables (Hall 2003, p. 382).  In the case of voter suppression, the relationship with voter 
participation is likely reciprocal, involves complex interaction effects, and/or requires an 
understanding of path dependence effects.  I do not argue against other traditions, but rather that 
these methods should work in conjunction with careful process tracing of cases. 
Rueschemeyer (2003) defends this methodological approach:   
―In this confrontation of theoretical claims with empirical evidence, analytical history 
enjoys two significant advantages compared to all but the most exceptional quantitative 
research: it permits a much more direct and frequently repeated interplay between 
theoretical development and data, and it allows for a closer matching of conceptual intent 
and empirical evidence‖ (Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 318). 
 
 
All research methods, paradigms, or traditions, feature strengths and weaknesses; further 
encouraging social scientists to develop a diverse toolkit.  Political science, as a discipline, has 
fostered interdisciplinary, cross-fertilization, and mixed methods, approaches.   Skocpol (2003) 
argues that historical-based methods avoid the push for over-specialization in favor of 
―methodological and theoretical eclecticism‖ (Skocpol 2003, p. 411).   
I incorporate the historical-institutional method by examining state level institutional 
rules and legislation and their impact on African American participation.  Time, or history, is an 
essential component of the voting process.  In a partisan system, voters must often rely on 
political parties and their history of behavior.  Voting rules, regulations, and administration are a 
part of this record.  Responsible party theory assumed that well defined political parties should 
increase participation.   
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Political ecology has its disadvantages.  Most notably, researchers must contend with the 
threat of ecological fallacy and difficulties interpreting aggregate level data.  This type of fallacy 
occurs when aggregate level data is employed to make inferences about relationships at the 
individual level.  This study avoids this fallacy by processing tracing state level electoral reforms 
and their impact on county level turnout.  This study finds that voter suppression proponents 
targeted individual voters using group markers (i.e. minorities, African Americans, Hispanics, 
etc.).  This means that the aggregate mechanism can be directly tied to, and translated into, 
individual level processes.  
Small-n methods pose several challenges including threats of endogeneity, or omitted 
causal variables leading to spurious results; too few cases matched with too many causal 
variables; and problems establishing external validity.  Although some argue that these threats 
are insurmountable (Lieberson 1991, p. 318); I concur with a sizeable segment of the scientific 
community involved in addressing these concerns (Goldfield 1989, p. 1260; Rueschemeyer and 
Stephens 1997, p. 57; Mahoney 2002, p. 390).   
Historical methods are being developed to mitigate some of these deficiencies.  
Researchers introduced a range of methodological responses including ―combinations of within-
case and across-case comparisons‖ (Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 324).  Furthermore, these tools are 
increasingly being applied to the study of American politics.  Recent institutional approaches 
were employed to assess the relationship between institutional rules and actor agency in the U.S. 
House of Representatives (Sheingate 2009, p. 199); test the impact of network coverage on 
turnout in Florida (Brady 2010, p. 237); and explain the longevity and stability of Social Security 
(Jacobs 2009, p. 123-124).   
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Qualitative Method - Case Studies 
Qualitative researchers typically attempt to explain, describe, or understand ―why‖ 
political phenomena and processes occur as they do.  A key strength of this approach is that it 
stresses in-depth knowledge of a small number of cases over minimal information across many 
cases, as is done with most quantitative methods.  The case study approach involves closely 
exploring a small number of cases to assess whether they match predictions; and comparisons 
across cases are then employed for theory development and testing (Van Evera 1997, p. 29; p. 
53).  George and Bennett (2005) define the approach as the ―detailed examination of an aspect of 
a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other 
events‖ (p. 5). 
Due to the underlying ontological assumptions of each, historical case studies are 
differentiated from the other two major research traditions prominent in the discipline - 
behavioral or statistical methods and formal modeling.  Statistical models attempt to quantify 
causal relationships between independent and dependent variables; these estimates then allow for 
theory testing as statistical correlations are matched against theory and observation.  With a 
quantitative approach, often associated with regression techniques, researchers would examine 
specific voter suppression variables across a large number of states, or cases.  When successful, 
this approach statistically estimates the general strength of competing causal variables, possible 
interaction effects, and their impact on voter turnout.   
Formal modeling methods, often associated with economics, develop abstract models of 
social behavior which emphasize individual choice and causal mechanisms (George & Bennett 
2005, p. 5).  Frequently involving game theory, formal models examine the micro-foundations of 
human behavior to test theory.  Both statistics and formal methods contribute significant 
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discoveries to the discipline.  However, each methodological approach suffers limitations.  The 
former requires statistical assumptions that are not often met in the social world, while the latter 
can lack realism and discount processes at the macro-level. 
Ultimately, this study argues that social and political phenomena should be described 
from multiple vantage points.  To do otherwise, would be to intentionally confine ourselves to a 
limited, and thus incomplete, perspective.  Competing paradigms and research traditions can 
work collaboratively to produce scientific progress. 
These, and the following, factors led me toward a historical-institutional approach:   
First, states were not independent of each other.  Although each American state 
determined its election‘s regulations, all must conform to national standards.  Changing societal 
attitudes, amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and judicial rulings, influenced how institutional 
rules develop.  Additionally, the relationship between voter suppression and participation was 
reciprocal.  Institutional rules impacted participation, but the reverse was likely true.  When 
successful, voter suppression laws excluded opposition voters with minimal publicity and 
backlash resulting in electoral victory.  The resulting electorate could then be more heavily 
packed with supporters, allowing for more intensive voter suppression measures.  However, 
democratic politics enables the possibility for backlash.  Targeted citizens, along with their 
sympathizers, could mobilize against voter suppression on the state and national level.  Most 
importantly, backlash in one election could affect subsequent elections, and suppression in one 
state could affect other states.  More simply stated; institutional rules and voting behavior were 
dynamic, not static, processes.    
Second, political participation is influenced by many causal factors that may not operate 
evenly or deterministically.  As the realm of likely causal variables is indeterminable, ruling out 
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potentially spurious relationships becomes difficult across all methods.  Political scientists 
identify a diverse variety of factors thought to influence turnout ranging from the theoretical to 
the incidental; including institutional rules, partisan mobilization, economic considerations, or 
even weather or candidate personality.  Individual voter participation is certainly contingent 
upon some diverse mix of factors interacting with the specific local context of elections.   
Goldstone (2003) argues that social scientists who use historical case methods: 
[…] generally face a finite set of cases, chosen against a backdrop of theoretical interests, 
and aim to determine the causal sequences and patterns producing outcomes of interest in 
those specific cases.  Generalization is certainly a goal, but that generalization is sought 
by piecing together finite sets of cases, not by sampling and inference to a larger 
universe.  […] [This research] does not start out assuming the existence of, or by seeking, 
universal causal or other patterns; rather, it assumes that the degree of generality of any 
particular causal mechanism or pattern is variable and is part of what the investigation 
needs to determine (Goldstone 2003, p. 43-44). 
 
Third, the relationship was likely contingent within cases – meaning that voter 
suppression measures were not universal.  Each state developed its own political culture, history, 
and norms. For example, an unmotivated electorate might be less likely to overcome minor 
institutional barriers than a motivated electorate.  The standard economic and socio-behavioral 
models of voting both agreed that barriers to voting should, all else being equal, decrease 
turnout.  The former by increasing the cost of voting for individuals, the latter by frustrating 
social organizations that assist disadvantaged groups.   
The problem unfortunately, was that things were seldom equal.  Institutions provide 
context.  This is especially important when analyzing the political behavior of individuals.  Hero 
and Tolbert (1996) argue that state political culture correlates with measures of demographic 
diversity; and levels of minority inclusion shaped how political battles are fought (p. 867).  Due 
to the unique standing of African Americans as a minority group, researchers found that studies 
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of African American political behavior required special attention to political context.  
Historically, black political life has been highly dependent upon ―external stimuli‖ and 
explanations should address the particular time period, setting, and circumstances (Fauntroy 
2007, p. 24).   
Finally, some postmodernists contend that these problems make concrete knowledge of 
the social world impossible. I disagree, believing that we can achieve real scientific progress by 
integrating careful process analysis with statistical and formal models.  In-depth focus on a small 
number of cases prioritizes explanatory detail over parsimony allowing for both thick description 
and the examination of causal mechanisms. 
 
Process Tracing 
Process tracing appears in the discipline under a range of monikers including process 
tracing, process analysis, pattern matching, and causal process observations – to name a few.  
Despite the diversity of terms, the technique belongs to the much larger tradition of causal 
narration, analytic narrative, or the comparison of chronological patterns of evidence (Mahoney 
1999; p. 1164).  Akin to detective work, the researcher compares patterns of evidence to 
distinguish between competing explanations of an event, or sequence of events.  Outside cases, 
theory, logic, and common sense are all available metrics with which to assess a current case, or 
set of cases. 
Like a detective, researchers identify and prioritize evidence to narrow down their search 
to the most plausible of explanations (or suspects).  The most promising leads are then pursued 
until, under the best circumstances, all but one are eliminated.  Unlike with police detectives, the 
social world rarely provides smoking guns or outright confessions.  Instead, the good 
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investigator must combine theory, past experience, and empirical evidence together; to choose 
which explanations are most plausible.  This approach adopts the recommendations of Goldfield 
(1997) who argued that broad political theories may be evaluated via historical comparisons 
(Goldfield 1997, p. 32). 
Goldfield argues: 
I would suggest the following criteria, which are in principle not dissimilar from the 
approach taken by physical scientists when evaluating broad theories and hypotheses: (1) 
Does the explanation present a reasonable model that accounts for the most important 
out- comes and inputs, that is, does it fit the structure of the situation? (2) To what degree 
does the explanation lead its adherents to gloss over, omit, or distort important aspects of 
reality, that is, does it do violence to the facts? (3) How does it fare in regard to its 
competitors? (Goldfield 1989; p. 1260) 
 
 
Table 3.1 reveals the diversity of process analysis terminology, but also indicates a good 
deal of agreement over the basic principles involved. 
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Table 3.1 Process Analysis Terminology Comparison Table 
Author – 
Terminology 
Definition 
Daniels (current 
study): 
process tracing 
―I conceive of process tracing as the close observation of political 
phenomena across time with careful attention to sequence and events.  
These observations are then employed to create or test specific research 
questions and hypotheses.‖ 
Collier (2011): 
process analysis, 
diagnostic evidence 
―...the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the 
investigator‖ (Collier 2011, p. 823). 
Campbell (1975): 
pattern matching 
―Pattern matching‖ (qtd. in Hall 2003, p. 391). 
Bennett (2010): 
detective work, 
sleuthing 
―...the researcher looks for the observable implications of hypothesized 
explanations, often examining evidence at a finer level of detail‖ (Bennett 
2010, p. 208).  Bennett argues it is akin to detective work which assesses 
evidence, actors, and motives. 
Brady, Collier, and 
Seawright (2010): 
causal process 
observations 
―causal-process observations‖ as ―observations about context, process, or 
mechanism provide an alternative source of insight into the relationship 
among the explanatory variables, and between these variables and the 
dependent variable‖ (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2010, p. 24). 
Goldstone (2003): 
process tracing, 
sequence analysis 
―The study of a single case or small number of cases with the goal of 
identifying causal relationships in those cases in order to test (and 
potentially shake) strong prior beliefs‖ (Goldstone 2003, p. 46). ―Process 
tracing consists of analyzing a case into a sequence (or several 
concatenating sequences) of events and showing how these events are 
plausibly linked given the interests and situations faced by groups or 
individual actors‖ (Goldstone 2003, p. 47). 
Hall (2003): 
systematic process 
analysis 
―...systematic process analysis examines the processes unfolding in the 
cases at hand as well as the outcome in those cases.  The causal theories to 
be tested are interrogated for the predictions they contain about how 
events will unfold.  The point is to compare these predictions with 
observations drawn from data about the world‖ (Hall 2003, p. 393-394). 
Mahoney (1999): 
narrative analysis, 
causal narration 
―...that narrative can be a useful tool for assessing causality in situations 
where temporal sequencing, particular events, and path dependence must 
be taken into account‖ (Mahoney 1999, p. 1164). 
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For this study, I conceive of process tracing as the close observation of political 
phenomena across time with careful attention to sequence and events.  These observations are 
then employed to create or test specific research questions and hypotheses (Collier 2011, p. 823).  
This approach concurs with Hall‘s (2003) formulation of the method: 
―The systematic process analyst then draws observations from empirical cases, not only 
about the value of the principal causal variables, but about the processes linking these 
variables to the outcomes.  Because each theory is being tested against others, the 
investigator should focus on special attention on phenomena about which predictions of 
the theory diverge […] The point is to see if the multiple actions and statements of the 
actors at each stage of the causal process are consistent with the image of the world 
implied by each theory‖ (Hall 2003, p. 394). 
 
 
This dissertation utilizes process tracing to chart the development of electoral rules in 
Florida and North Carolina to assess competing theories of voter suppression.  I construct a 
historical case comparison employing analytic narrative to offset some of the weaknesses of the 
case study design (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003, p. 47; George & Bennett 2005, 228; 
Gerring 2007, p. 134).  These include the following: (1) additional across-case and within-case 
comparisons; (2) comparing voting processes and participation in both states; and (3) gathering 
county level data.  I utilize matching procedures to compare analogous counties, voting 
processes, and outcomes to increase observations (King, Keohane, & Verba‘s 1994, p. 127).   
Although the overall approach is qualitative, this study employed quantitative empirical 
data to measure voting turnout, demographics, and registration.  This study adopted Van Evera‘s 
(1997) recommendation to combine various case study techniques.  This type of hybrid design 
should ―provide decisive evidence in cases with sharp variance on the IV [independent variable]‖ 
(Van Evera, 1997, p. 63-66).  This approach is also consistent with King, Keohane, and Verba‘s 
(1994) recommendation to select cases based on extreme values of the explanatory variable 
(King et al. 1994, p. 143).  Placed in terms of variables, the independent variable is the presence 
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of voter suppression mechanisms during the period under study.  A voter suppression regime 
was identified by a number of turnout depressing measures including photo ID laws, felon 
disfranchisement, administrative maneuvering, the manipulation of registration rules, and 
election-day impediments.  All states adopted a combination of measures that could be classified 
as mobilizing or demobilizing.  Therefore, electoral reforms were best assessed by carefully 
comparing these measures across states over time. 
 
Case Selection 
Comparative state politics takes advantage of the fifty laboratories of democracy that 
comprise the United States.  The federalist design provides excellent opportunities for social 
scientists to evaluate general propositions about politics.  Variations between states allow 
researchers to test whether ―different structures and institutional arrangements produce different 
political outcomes‖ (Cooper & Knotts 2008, p. 3).  Despite a general trend in the field away from 
state-level analysis in the past half century, a number of researchers are returning to the states for 
hypothesis and theory testing (Morehouse & Jewell 2004, p. 177; Cooper & Knotts 2008, p. 1; 
Gray & Hanson 2008, p. 2).  
Although all of the states shared a basic federal voting framework, each developed its 
own locally administered elections system particular to its political circumstances.  During the 
time period under review, Florida and North Carolina employed vastly differing voter 
suppression levels providing the opportunity for a loose but naturally occurring experiment.  
Florida was included because of its restrictive voting system and traditionalistic political culture 
(Gray & Hanson 2008, p. 21).  As of 2012, the deadline for registration was 29 days before the 
election, registration was the responsibility of the voter, and the state was recently the site of 
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high profile partisan conflicts over voting (Rosenfeld 2008, p. 73).  Florida featured the most 
restrictive felon disenfranchisement statute effectively banning most felons for life. In 2010, the 
state banned an estimated 250,000 Floridians due to imprisonment, parole, or other related 
statutes (McDonald 2012).  Totaling around five percent of total votes cast in 2008, the number 
of felons easily surpassed the margin of victory in statewide and federal elections.   
The pro-voting interest group Rock the Vote, sponsored by MTV,  ranked Florida 34th out 
of the 50 states on the effectiveness of its voting system in 2011 (Bassetti 2012, p. 189).  Florida, 
as an extreme case of a voter suppression regime, presents a crucial test of theory.  More 
succinctly formulated; if voter suppressions measures impacted black participation, we would 
expect them to have done so in recent Florida elections. 
Like Florida, North Carolina was also a southern state with a traditionalistic state political 
culture.  Typified by conservative politics and elitist notions of political participation, citizens 
and elites who live in traditionalist state cultures often viewed politics as a means to uphold the 
status quo (Gray and Hanson 2008, p. 21).  However, unlike most other southern states which 
transitioned to state-level Republican dominance during the 1990‘s; North Carolina remained 
under divided partisan control until 2012.  Even in the midst of the Jim Crow era, the state was 
lauded as more ―progressive‖ than other southern states (Key 1949, p. 206).   For example, North 
Carolina was one of the first states to accept school desegregation following Brown v. Board of 
Education; and the state had the highest turnout of African Americans among those states 
originally covered by the Voting Rights Act (Davidson & Grofman 1994, chp. 6). 
 North Carolina was included for its lack of aggressive voter suppression efforts during 
the period under review (Wang 2012, p. 91).  In part due to violations by the Jesse Helms U.S. 
senatorial campaign in 1990, the state Republican Party was under a consent decree not to 
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institute elections integrity measures from 1992 to 1996.  All ballot security programs in the state 
were subject to court approval during this period (Wang 2012, p. 58).  Most importantly, high 
levels of partisan competition kept North Carolina state government divided until 2012.   
Beginning in the 1980‘s, general and African American political participation rose 
dramatically in the Tar Heel state.  This was due in large part to state leader‘s efforts to make 
voting and registration easier.  As of 2012, the state‘s elections system ranked fifth on voting 
advocate scorecards (Bassetti 2012, p. 189).  North Carolina featured no excuse absentee and 
―One Stop Early Voting.‖  Up to 19 days before the election, eligible citizens could register and 
vote at the same time (Rosenfeld 2008, p. 97).  The state practiced a milder felon 
disenfranchisement statute, allowing felons to vote upon the completion of their punishment. 
Furthermore, in 2012 North Carolina allowed provisional ballots to be counted if cast at the 
wrong polling place but same precinct; Florida did not.   
From 2000 to 2012, Census reported black turnout in presidential elections spiked 21 
percentage points in North Carolina (from 62 to 83 percent).  In 2008, the Obama candidacy, or 
other factors, inspired national African American turnout to rise to 64 percent; just behind whites 
at 66 percent.  By 2012, these numbers were reversed as black turnout estimates outpaced whites 
for the first time in U.S. elections (C.P.S. 2014, p. 3).  However, this study tempers findings 
based on Census data concluding that African American participation in North Carolina 
increased, but less dramatically than Census generated data suggested.   
Both states recently emerged as swing states in presidential elections.  Recent contests in 
Florida were extremely close and rife with controversy.  Most notably, the 2000 election was a 
statistical tie that was ultimately broken by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In 2012, Democratic 
incumbent Barack Obama carried Florida by less than one percent.  The past six presidential 
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elections in the state were evenly divided between the two parties.  North Carolina has been 
similarly competitive.  In 2004, North Carolina went for Republican George W. Bush.  In 2008, 
Democrat Barack Obama narrowly carried the state.  In 2012, the state edged back into the 
Republican column.  Most importantly for this study, Republicans made historic gains on the 
state level, achieving a sweep of North Carolina‘s legislative and executive branches in 2012.  
Consistent with the argument presented in this study, this change in partisan control was swiftly 
followed by the passage of voter suppression laws in 2013.  Although outside the scope of this 
study, this pattern of events was consistent with the general thesis presented in this dissertation. 
 
Time Period 1988-2012 
 This study focuses on the post civil-rights (1950‘s - 1960‘s) and post backlash (1970‘s - 
1980‘s) era of 1988 to 2012.  The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and subsequent court rulings 
brought about significant increases in African American registration and political power, 
particularly in the South.  The entire region underwent partisan realignment hastened by the 
Act‘s passage as the once one-party South transitioned to two-party competition or Republican 
dominance throughout the 1980‘s and 1990‘s.  This process varied across the states depending 
largely on contextual variables specific to each.  This is important because Florida transitioned to 
Republican dominance sooner, adopting voter suppression measures while North Carolina 
developed a more open elections system.  This sequence allowed for the evaluation of the impact 
of targeted demobilization within and across states. 
 The time period also supplied several other important distinctions.  First, the 2013 
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which overturned the preclearance 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act, marked a bookend for the post-civil rights or backlash 
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period.  Second, the election and reelection of the nation‘s first African American president in 
2008 and 2012 provided a good test of the role of voter motivation versus institutional voter 
suppression.  This study assumes that African American motivation was high for the 2008 and 
2012 elections.  Third, minorities continue to make up an increasing share of the American 
electorate and the U.S. is on a trajectory to become a majority nonwhite nation.  Fourth, 
American politics are increasingly ideologically and racially polarized.  For example, in the 
United States Congress in 2013, minority and women representatives comprised a majority of 
elected Democrats; while Republican representatives were nearly 90 percent white Christian 
males (Jacobson 2014, p. 167).  Moreover, in recent presidential elections minority citizens 
voted overwhelmingly for the Democratic Party.  In 2008, 95 percent of African Americans, 67 
percent of Latinos, and 65 percent of Asian Americans voted for the Democratic presidential 
candidate (Walton and Smith 2012, p. 194-195).  If these trends persist, demographic changes 
could significantly alter the political landscape. 
 
Focus on African American Participation 
American partisan elites exhibit a lengthy history of appealing to racial prejudice and 
enacting racially predicated disfranchisement.  These trends were most notable in the southern 
United States which developed a racially segregated economic, political, and social system 
dedicated to the near complete removal of African Americans from the electorate until the mid 
1960‘s and later (Keyssar 2000, p. 211-215).  This was true for both Florida and North Carolina 
which disfranchised most of their African American citizenry.  Although all southern states 
moved considerably away from the strict racial disfranchisement regimes of the ―redeemer‖ and 
Jim Crow periods, the region continues to grapple with its racial tradition. Additionally, the pace 
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of black participation was inconsistent across states.  Scholars attribute this uneven development, 
in part, to voter dilution and voter suppression (Parker 1990, p. 195; Grofman et al 1992, p. 23.)   
Although racial disfranchisement is the focus of this study, contemporary voter 
suppression measures targeted a broad range of citizens.  African American, student, young, 
elderly, Hispanic, and poor voters are all believed to be impacted by various voter suppression 
laws (Hasen 2012, p. 6-7).  This study focuses on African American voters because of the 
historical importance of race in motivating disfranchisement, the consistency of data records 
across time, and the theoretical importance of race established by prior research (Goldfield 1997, 
p. 9; Hero & Tolbert 1996, p. 851; Carmines & Stimson 1989, p. 13). 
 Contemporary voter suppression was not exclusive to the southern states, but the 
literature suggests the region makes an obvious starting point for this study.  The South, as a 
region, consistently displayed lower levels of voter participation than other regions.  Scholars 
argue that three primary factors influenced historically low southern turnout; legal restrictions, 
political culture, and lack of party competition (Woodard 2006, p. 216-217).  For the cases 
featured in this study, political culture and lack of party competition were less salient.  The 
former was similar across cases, while the latter was replaced by two-party competition across 
the region.  Differences in electoral law and administration remain at issue.   
 
Rival Hypotheses 
This dissertation project tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.  ―Discouraging Voter Hypothesis‖ – Voter suppression laws target and impact the 
participation levels of African American voters.  Thus, black voter participation should be lower 
in states with voter suppression regimes than those without. 
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Rationale for Hypothesis 1:   
Demobilization and voter suppression measures target groups least likely to vote for the 
party who proposes them.  The historical tradition of racial demobilization and the election of the 
nation‘s first ―black‖ president, present an opportunity to test long held assumptions about the 
impact of voter suppression.  African Americans overwhelmingly vote Democratic, thus 
providing Republican Party elites with incentive to suppress black turnout.  As states transitioned 
to Republican control and enacted voter suppression laws, we should witness an accompanying 
depression in the political participation levels of African Americans. 
 
Operationalization for Hypothesis 1:   
This study assesses turnout and registration for two racial groups (blacks and whites) by 
employing two data sets.  First, data reported by the U.S. Census is utilized to calculate self-
reported turnout and registration rates during presidential elections for black and white voters in 
Florida and North Carolina from 1988 to 2012.  Second, I pair Census population estimates with 
county-level registration reports to create a new measure of voter registration.  These estimates 
are more accurate than previous ones because they avoid a major source of error associated with 
self-reported survey data. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  ―Ensuring Integrity Hypothesis‖ – Voter suppression laws only target illegitimate 
voters and thus they increase confidence in elections resulting in increased participation.  This 
model also rejects race as a motivating factor behind voter suppression reforms.  States with 
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strong voter suppression regimes should display higher levels of participation among all citizens 
than those without. 
 
 Rationale for Hypothesis 2: 
Proponents of this approach argue that each fraudulent ballot counted neutralizes the 
ballot of a legitimate voter.  Therefore, voter suppression laws reduce fraudulent ballots and 
strengthen legitimate ballots.  Strong voter suppression regimes reflect a commitment to fair and 
honest elections.  This hypothesis assumes that more secure elections increase confidence, and 
that participation increases as voters feel more assured only lawful votes will count. 
 
 Sub-Rationale for Hypothesis 2: Proponents of increased integrity measures often rely 
on voter fraud and impersonation as a justification for these efforts.  Voter suppression 
advocates, in an effort to win elections, charge that either political parties or individuals attempt 
to vote, more than once or in the name of fictional or deceased voters.  Although voter 
impersonation or repeat voting is not unheard of in the history of American politics, 
contemporary U.S. elections provide scant evidence of its widespread occurrence.  Voter fraud 
was unlikely for several reasons.  First, multiple voting and impersonation would be difficult to 
execute in significant numbers during locally administered elections.  Second, economic models 
of voting suggest that the act of casting a ballot is itself irrational due to the low chance that one 
vote will decide an election.  Thus, stealing individual votes would likely be ineffective, except 
for in the case of small local races decided by a handful of votes.  Third, stiff penalties for voter 
fraud serve as a strong deterrent.  In sum, voter fraud presents little chance of success; a high 
chance of getting caught; and severe penalties for perpetrators.  Prior research strongly indicates 
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that charges of voter fraud were deliberately publicized as a cover for voter suppression 
(Minnite 2010, p. 153; Piven et al 2009, p. 202). 
 
Operationalization for Hypothesis 2:   
 I examine the primary data sets to assess whether participation was higher in Florida 
than North Carolina.  Both self reported turnout and registration rates, and state reported 
registration reports are compared to assess the plausibility of this hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3.  ―Minimal Effects Hypothesis‖ – assumes that voter suppression measures are 
ineffective because they targeted voters who were the least likely to vote.  This model predicts 
that African American participation was not noticeably impacted by voter suppression.  
Therefore black participation rates should be consistent across cases. 
 
Rationale for Hypothesis 3: 
This approach accepts the basic assumption that the primary causal factor for voting is 
motivation.  When voters are motivated and involved, they are likely to overcome all but the 
strictest of voter suppression efforts.  This hypothesis assumes that contemporary voter 
suppression laws have a modest impact on African American participation because their effects 
are mitigated by inefficiency, the risk of provoking backlash or violating mass public attitudes, 
and the targeting of citizens least likely to participate.   
 
Operationalization for Hypothesis 3:   
Again, turnout and registration data are employed to test this hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 4.  ―Voter Suppression Backlash Hypothesis‖ – suggests that African American 
participation will be more robust under voter suppression regimes than those without.   
 
Rationale for Hypothesis 4: 
As states adopt more extreme restrictions, targeted voters increasingly reject 
demobilization efforts resulting in increased participation among those groups.  In this study, 
African American participation should increase faster in Florida than North Carolina.  This 
hypothesis assumes that backlash effects are most pronounced inside of states, meaning that 
backlash should be stronger in Florida than North Carolina. 
If true, we would also expect to see signs of counter demobilization efforts.  Backlash 
effects would likely be produced by two sources.  The first would occur among the general 
population of African Americans in response to media reporting.  The second would involve 
increased activism by interest groups opposed to voter suppression. 
 
 Operationalization for Hypothesis 4:   
To assess the possibility of backlash among the general African American population this 
study relies on the primary data on turnout and registration.   
 
Data Sources 
This dissertation conducts process analysis on all election law changes occurring in 
Florida and North Carolina from 1988 to 2012.  Legislative records from the North Carolina 
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Board of Elections, Florida Division of Elections, the National Council of State Legislatures, and 
both states‘ congressional archives are employed to chart the development of voter suppression. 
Although the main thrust of this project involves qualitative analysis, I also employ 
quantitative measures to assess the impact of institutional reforms. 
My primary quantitative data is derived from two sources.  The first is constructed using 
the U.S. Census Bureau‘s Current Population Survey and Statistical Abstract of the United 
States.  This data is utilized to calculate population and participation rates. Census survey data 
records self reported turnout and registration rates, an issue that is discussed at length below.  
The second source employs state elections and voter registration data from presidential election 
years from 1996 to 2012.  By dividing the number of registered voters of each race by the total 
population of each race of a county, I calculate a more reliable measure of registration rates for 
each state‘s white and black citizens.  
 
Current Population Survey 
The U.S. Census Bureau‘s Current Population Survey, or C.P.S., claimed to provide ―the 
nation‘s most reliable information on the social and economic characteristics of voters and 
nonvoters, as well as on the number of persons registered to vote‖ (C.P.S. 1988, p. 1).  The 
C.P.S. elections data was derived from surveys of non-institutionalized U.S. citizens over 18 
years of age.  This measure was commonly referred to in the literature as the VAP, or Voting 
Age Population.  The VAP measure did not include members of the military, citizens in nursing 
homes, or those in prison or other institutional settings (C.P.S. 1988, p. 1).  The survey asked one 
household respondent to report the voting patterns of entire households as ―yes‖ or ―no‖.  
Additionally, the C.P.S. asked and reported data on registration and demographic responses.   
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 Census data allowed for a preliminary estimate of American patterns of participation for 
white and black voters.  This study employed population estimates to calculate the population, 
turnout, and demographics of Florida and North Carolina for presidential election years between 
1988 and 2012. As data collection and aggregation procedures varied across Census reports, this 
study adopted the ―Five racial categories‖ and ―one-race only‖ responses to retain consistency 
across years.  Numbers reported using ―mixed race‖ classifications were excluded.  However, on 
the county level the differences were slight and would not significantly affect the results.  Due to 
similar problems concerning inconsistencies with the way Hispanics were counted, this study 
only utilizes white and black ―alone‖ population data.4 
 Census turnout data was limited by several factors.  Most importantly, respondents 
tended to overstate their political participation.  For example, respondents over-reported voting 
in presidential election years by as much as 10 to 20 percent (C.P.S. 1988, p. 8).  The Census 
Bureau offered several explanations for these over estimates.  First, Census data understates the 
total votes cast by excluding respondents who fail to vote for the highest office.   Many voters 
choose or mistakenly do not cast a ballot for president.  Second, some respondents misreported 
participating.  Third, survey questionnaires required a ―yes/no‖ response instead of allowing ―do 
not know‖ as an option to avoid social desirability response bias. Fourth, Census coverage was 
limited; including problems covering communities where nonvoting was high like those with 
large populations of young adult African American males.  Finally, the C.P.S. interviewed only 
one household respondent, when interviewing each member individually would produce more 
accurate estimates of voting behavior (C.P.S. 1988, p. 6-11). 
 C.P.S. estimates provided a rough estimate of population and voting patterns, but self 
reported turnout and registration data were unreliable. To mitigate this serious threat to internal 
                                                          
4
 See appendix A for details. 
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validity, this dissertation employed additional registration data from each state‘s elections 
administrators. 
 
State Department of Elections Registration Data 
 This study compiled state election returns and registration data from Florida‘s Division of 
Elections and North Carolina‘s State Board of Elections for presidential elections from 1996 to 
2012.  I employed county level registration data paired with population data to estimate racial 
registration rates by county.
5
  This data was aggregated and employed to assess the plausibility 
of competing voter suppression hypotheses. 
 The registration data, gathered for this study, were more reliable than Census estimates 
because they avoided the problem of over-reporting.  With self reported voting, respondents may 
be socially pressured into reporting that they voted, when they had not.  Voter registration data 
was much more reliable because registration rolls more accurately reflected the entire population 
of potential or eligible voters, barring fraud or registration errors.  Of course, many who register 
do not vote and some voter suppression measures specifically targeted the registration process.  
Although the measure is imperfect, voter registration rates can tell us a great deal about 
participation levels.   
 Finally, this study utilized several secondary data sources.  These included presidential 
election returns, gubernatorial results, state level SES measures, and data reflecting the partisan 
control of important political offices in each state. 
 
  
                                                          
5
 See Appendix B for details. 
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CHAPTER 4:  North Carolina 
“He [the black man] regards the ballot as the one thing in life worth having above all 
others.  And now it is sad that he’s about to have it taken away […].  Take away from the 
colored man this privilege, and he will never again consider you his friend.” Isaac Smith, 
black Republican representative from Craven County, North Carolina arguing against the 
1898 Suffrage Amendment (Christensen 2008, p. 28).   
 
Introduction 
 This chapter serves several important purposes.  First, the chapter introduces the political 
culture of North Carolina.  The state‘s political history reveals a deeply anti-democratic past 
followed by a moderate-to-progressive approach to democratization in the modern era.  Second, 
to assess the role of realignment, partisan control of the state‘s legislative and executive branches 
is reported along with the outcome of presidential elections.  Finally, this section chronologically 
traces major electoral rules changes, legislation, and reforms from 1988 to 2012.  The record 
indicates that North Carolina officials took several steps to promote higher voter participation.  
Most importantly for this study, voter suppression efforts were muted in the state.  This chapter 
offers two chief explanations for this, including the Jesse Helms voter suppression incident in 
1990 and delayed partisan realignment. Finally, I summarize the chapter‘s primary findings. 
 
Background 
North Carolina was described as a paradox or puzzle, a conservative southern state with a 
resilient progressive streak.  Key (1949) depicted the state as ―a progressive plutocracy‖ in his 
classic review of southern state politics (p. 205). Other scholars touted North Carolina‘s record 
of mixing business progressivism and social conservatism with minor fits of populism 
(Christensen 2008, p. 2-3).  Tar Heel politics traditionally involved a struggle between two 
conservative minded groups, modernizers and traditionalists.  Not strictly partisan by the 1990‘s, 
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the groups roughly aligned with the former being conservative Democrats and the latter 
conservative Republicans (Luebke 1998, p. 47).  By 2012, these groups were more strongly 
identified by party.  The partisan realignment of the region, although slower developing in North 
Carolina, strengthened the bonds between party identification and ideological issue orientations 
(Prysby 2008, p. 70).    
Modernizers preferred an activist government that promoted business interests and 
growth, while traditionalists focused on social issues and defended the status quo.  Both catered 
to an elite-led political system with modernizers favoring banking, media, and commercial 
interests.  Traditionalists received support from the older business sectors of textiles and tobacco.  
Both agreed on the importance of business dominance, finding disagreement largely over which 
business leaders would control the public sector.  Historically, elites from both camps have 
aligned together against populist efforts to make state government more responsive to non-
business or egalitarian interests (Luebke 1998, p. 1-3).   
State leaders have shown a strong commitment to pro-growth government policies 
including transportation and education.  Despite this tradition, the state‘s commitment to 
progressive and populist politics has often been contradictory.  For example, some historians 
questioned the strength of the state‘s commitment to progressive causes, pointing to a conflicting 
record on racial issues.  North Carolina voters ―will elect liberals who look like the average man‖ 
as long as they do not violate the racial order or transfer progressive principles across that do so 
(Christensen 2008, p. 3).  
 This seemingly strange mix of political sub-cultures designated North Carolina a paradox 
because it was one of few southern states with a strong tradition for progressive and populist 
politics.  The state was unique in that it was the only post-Reconstruction southern state to come 
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under the control of a biracial coalition of black and poor white farmers, albeit briefly.  The 
Fusionists, a coalition of Republicans, African Americans, and white farmers, dominated state 
politics for a very short period in the 1880‘s and 1890‘s.  Most notable among their 
achievements were several laws that made it easier to vote (Kousser 1974, p. 187).  Ultimately, 
the fragile coalition was undone by the racially charged segregationist movements that emerged 
across the region.  In North Carolina, business elites teamed with segregationists to regain 
control of the state government by restricting access to the franchise (Luebke 1998, p. 26).   
The Tar Heel state exhibited a strong tradition of racially inspired demobilization and 
disfranchisement.  Beginning with the ―redeemer‖ governments following Reconstruction, later 
with the turn of the century response to the success of the biracial Fusionists, and finally, again 
during the modern civil rights movement; political elites employed racial appeals to defeat 
egalitarian and populist appeals (Luebke 1998, p. 6).  North Carolina, like the region, established 
a one-party political system in concert with a racial caste system used to maintain political and 
economic control.  The Democratic Party achieved this dominance by almost complete 
disfranchisement of African Americans, but also most poor whites.   
Luebke (1998) argues that elite Democrats placed restrictions on the franchise excluding 
a large segment of the population and freezing political thought in North Carolina.  This process 
produced several profound effects.  First, disfranchisement kept politics artificially conservative 
in the state.  Second, this ideologically-based voting system intentionally limited the political 
power of African Americans and labor.  Third, the system designated these groups as 
―illegitimate political actors‖ (Luebke 1998, p. 15).  When combined with a system of white 
supremacy, the configuration achieved one-party control for decades.  Ultimately, any candidate 
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sympathetic to populism or racial liberalism was defeated via violent appeals to race reinforced 
by electoral disfranchisement (Luebke 1998; p. 17).   
Historical efforts to restrict the franchise were not unique to North Carolina.  Widespread 
racial disfranchisement could be found across the region.  However, these efforts were very 
successful in the Tar Heel state.  In 1896, when Daniel Russell was elected governor on the 
Fusionist ticket, turnout in the state was 87%.  Following the Suffrage Amendment of 1900, 
ratified by state wide vote, turnout cratered to only 50% (Luebke 1998, p. 8; Link 2009, p. 276).  
The Suffrage Amendment included literacy tests, poll taxes, and a grandfather clause.  These 
measures passed federal constitutional muster because the statutes were race neutral on their 
face.  The poll tax was repealed in 1920 and then ultimately banned by the 24
th
 Amendment in 
1964.  Literacy tests were not eliminated until passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.  As a 
sign of the Suffrage Amendment‘s effectiveness, five members of the white supremacy 
campaign to restrict black suffrage won the governorship starting with Charles Aycock in 1901 
(Christensen 2008, p.  30).   
Despite this record, North Carolina elites took considerable steps to eliminate active 
racial disfranchisement following the modern civil rights movement.  Compared to other states in 
the region, observers agree that North Carolina modernizers moved swiftly away from blatant 
racially-based voter disfranchisement beginning in the 1970‘s.   
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 ended the worst abuses and produced dramatic, but 
uneven, increases in turnout across the South.
6
 The VRA outlawed literacy tests and 
reestablished a basic standard for access to the franchise consistent with the Fifteenth 
Amendment.  It made illegal any elections requirements that denied ―the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color‖ (Grofman, Hanley, & Niemi 1992, p. 16).  
                                                          
6
 For review of the VRA and its impact see (Grofman et al 1992; p. 15-23). 
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The law also empowered the Department of Justice and the federal courts to monitor elections, 
bypass local election officials, and take extraordinary measures to curb voting abuses.  Equally 
important, the law applied a triggering formula to counties suspected of disfranchising African 
American voters.  Any county with low black registration before passage of the VRA was 
required to obtain ―pre-clearance‖ by the Justice Department before changing or passing new 
election laws.  In 1964, 40 of North Carolina‘s 100 counties fell under this provision (Luebke 
1998, p. 143). 
The Voting Rights Act produced immediate gains in African American participation.  
Nationally, black registration rose nearly 30 percent from 1964 to 1969 (Woodard 2006, p. 157).   
Despite dramatic gains across the country as a whole, progress was mixed in the South.  The 
region would continue to report lower turnout rates than the nation well into the 1990‘s.  In 
North Carolina, black registration rates continued to lag behind whites.  From 1965 to 1971, self 
reported black registration rates in the state actually declined from 47 percent to 44 percent 
(Luebke 1998, p. 161; Christensen 2008, p. 264).   
Although a range of factors delayed the overall impact of the Voting Rights Act, 
Woodard (2006) argues that legal restrictions and the absence of party competition were the 
primary causes of low political participation in the southern states.  Both served to strengthen 
each other as disfranchisement was employed to advance partisan control – and vice versa 
(Woodard 2006, p. 159).  As the Voting Rights Act dismantled the former, partisan competition 
slowly emerged across the region.  The same political conflicts that drove regional partisan 
realignment are now central to understanding the recent push for anti-democratic voter 
suppression measures. 
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Partisan Realignment 
 Contemporary voter suppression retained a partisan character, as generally the 
Democratic Party sought electoral reforms seeking broader participation while the Republican 
Party sponsored measures to make voting more secure (Hasen 2012, p. 8).  With the exception of 
the basic rights protected by constitutional amendments and the courts, American federalism 
vests most election administration power in the hands of state and local officials.  Control of the 
election machinery is achieved by securing the top offices in the state, most notably in the 
executive and legislature.  The current study finds that partisan realignment was an essential pre-
cursor to voter suppression.  Since contemporary voter suppression measures were decided at the 
state level and these processes were highly political; this chapter begins with an examination of 
the partisan control of political offices in North Carolina. 
 Prysby (2010) detailed the regional realignment explaining that the Democratic Party 
dominance of the 1960‘s was replaced by a competitive two party system via a rough and uneven 
process.  For decades prior, the ―solid South‖ consistently elected Democrats to all levels of 
government (Prysby 2010, p. 157).   In the wake of the Voting Rights Act, this began to change 
in 1968 as North Carolinians cast a majority of votes for a Republican president.  However, 
Democrats would continue to remain competitive at the state level controlling the legislature and 
often winning the governor‘s office into the 1990‘s. 
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Table 4.1 Political Control of North Carolina State Legislature by Party (number of seats) 
 
        House       Senate 
       Democrats    Republicans  Democrats Republicans 
 
2012 43 77 
 
17 33 
2010 68 52 
 
30 20 
2008 68 52 
 
31 19 
2006 63 57 
 
29 21 
2004 59 61 
 
28 22 
2002 60 60 
 
28 22 
2000 62 58 
 
35 15 
1998 59 61 
 
30 20 
1996 59 61 
 
30 20 
1994 52 68 
 
26 14 
1992 78 42 
 
39 11 
1990 81 39 
 
36 14 
1988 74 46 
 
37 13 
 
Source:  1988-2012.  Statistical Abstract of the United States (Tables 395, 400, 418, 479), Bureau of the 
Census. 
 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes partisan control of the North Carolina state legislature from 1988 
to 2012.  It reveals the partisan realignment or transition described by researchers.  In line with 
most states in the southern United States, the Republican Party achieved huge gains on the local, 
state, and federal levels.  Starting in the mid to late 1990‘s, the GOP secured slim advantages in 
the North Carolina House of Representatives achieving divided government.  In 1994 
Republicans broke the long one-party rule of Democrats and gained control of the state House.  
A shocking, albeit brief, reversal of fortunes for a party excluded for decades.  Although 
Democrats regained control of the state House by 2000, GOP victories in the early 1990‘s 
foreshadowed the eventual Republican breakthrough in 2012.   
 Despite significant gains by the Republican Party in North Carolina, the Democrats 
remained competitive.  From 1988 to 2012, the Democratic Party held the state Senate until 
2012.  By that year, the parties had swapped positions.  In 2012, the GOP secured control of both 
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chambers of the state legislature winning 110 seats (to Democrats 60).  In the state House, 
Republicans won 77 out of 120 seats – a swing of 15 seats.  In the Senate, Democrats fell to only 
18 seats, a loss of 13 seats.  From 1988 to 2012, the Republican Party converted a 74 – 46 seat 
deficit in the state House into a 77 – 43 seat advantage.   
 Despite short lived successes by the GOP in the 1990‘s with victories in the North 
Carolina legislature, the Democratic Party was more difficult to displace in gubernatorial 
contests. 
 
Table 4.2 Votes cast for and North Carolina Governor elected by Party (in percentages) 
     
             Democrats Republicans        Party - Winner  
 
2012 43 55 R- P. McCrory 
2008 50 47 D- B. Perdue 
2004 56 43 D- M. Easley 
2000 52 46 D- M. Easley 
1996 56 43 D- J. Hunt 
1992 53 43 D- J. Hunt 
1988 45 55 R- J. Martin 
 
Source:  1988-2012.  Dave Leip's U.S. Election Atlas  
 
 
 Table 4.2 reflects the outcome of the last seven gubernatorial elections in the state.  As 
the GOP was making it first gains in the early 1990‘s, their victories in the state legislature were 
offset by the election of Democrat Jim Hunt to the governor‘s office in 1992.  Hunt‘s victory 
began a string of five Democratic terms reinforcing the paradoxical designation noted by V.O. 
Key.  Democratic governors; Hunt, Easley, and Perdue governed in line with the state‘s 
conservative modernizer tradition, similar to the approach taken on the presidential level by Bill 
Clinton.   
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 The election of Rory McCrory in 2012, along with GOP majorities in the state legislature, 
marked the completion of a long contested realignment of the state.  McCrory‘s 55 percent 
winning share of the electorate was the highest showing of a Republican gubernatorial candidate 
in North Carolina since the GOP last won the office in 1988.  The switch from Democratic to 
Republican control was hard fought.  However, the remaining high levels of political 
competitiveness render the current equilibrium unstable.   It is currently unclear if the 
Republican sweep of 2012 will be a lasting victory for the GOP or whether high levels of 
partisan competition may continue between the two parties.   
 Similar to Democratic resilience on the state level, North Carolina‘s partisan 
competitiveness was most clearly reflected in the state‘s presidential races.     
 
Table 4.3 Votes cast for President and winner of North Carolina by Party (in percentages) 
     
             Democrats Republicans    Party - Winner  
 
2012 48.4 50.4 R- M. Romney 
2008 49.8 49.5 D- B. Obama 
2004 44 56 R- G. W. Bush 
2000 43 56 R- G. W. Bush 
1996 44 49 R- B. Dole 
1992 42.7 43.4 R- G. Bush 
1988 41.7 58 R- G. Bush 
 
Source:  1988-2012.  Dave Leip's U.S. Election Atlas  
 
 
Table 4.3 displays the winner of the state‘s electoral votes in presidential contests since 
1988. Stretching back to Reagan‘s victory in 1980, the GOP won North Carolina‘s presidential 
electors in every election except 2008.  With the exception of Bill Clinton‘s narrow 0.7 percent 
loss in 1992 and Obama‘s razor thin victory in 2008, the Republican candidate carried the state 
despite higher levels of political competition for state and local offices.   
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Table 4.3 reveals that recent presidential contests were increasingly competitive.  In 2008 
and 2012, North Carolina‘s presidential electors were decided by a total of 2.3 percent.  
Democrat Barack Obama won the state in 2008 by only 0.3 percent of the vote, with Republican 
Mitt Romney carrying the state by two percent in 2012. 
Two-party competition remained strong enough in North Carolina to delay the process of 
partisan realignment typical of the region.  By postponing the eventual transition to Republican 
control, Democratic resistance prevented the GOP from building a more aggressive voter 
suppression regime.  Tables 4.1 - 4.3 reveal that Democrats did not cede undivided control of the 
state political machine until 2012.   
As further evidence of this claim, North Carolina state officials implemented a range of 
voter suppression measures in 2013.
7
 These included a reduction of early voting hours, the 
elimination of polling places on college campuses, and the end of pre-registration for under 18 
year olds.  These voting system changes supported the contention that voter suppression 
measures were directly tied to partisan realignment.   As the partisan transition in North Carolina 
developed more slowly than in Florida and other southern states, North Carolina officials 
refrained from vigorous voter suppression efforts for the period under study. 
 
State Voting System Development 1988-2012 
 This section begins by highlighting the 1990 Helms versus Gant race for one of North 
Carolina‘s U.S. Senate seats.  This race is included for two important reasons.  First, the contest 
provided perspective on the development of racial politics in the state.  Second, allegations of 
voter suppression and the subsequent legal settlement by the state GOP agreeing to forgo voter 
                                                          
7
 North Carolina North Carolina HB 589: 2013.  North Carolina Laws 2013, Chap. 163. Legislation 
Search Database 2010-2012.  General Assembly.    
65 
 
 
 
suppression techniques were germane to the subject of this project.  With this background 
information established, I then trace major legislative election reforms in North Carolina with a 
focus on demobilization.
8
   
 
Helms vs. Gantt 1990 
 The 1990 contest for U.S. Senate between incumbent Republican Jesse Helms and 
Democrat Harvey Gantt, the first black mayor of Charlotte, illustrates the evolution of racial 
politics in the state.  In a tightly contested race, Jesse Helms was able to eke out a close victory 
by appealing to white racial resentment (Luebke 1998, p. 182; Prysby 2010, p. 164).  The Helms 
campaign, trailing in the polls in the final weeks of the campaign, aired the now infamous 
―Hands‖ commercial.  The ad featured a pair of white hands crumpling up a job application as a 
narrator intoned, ―You needed that job, and you were the best qualified, but they had to give it to 
a minority, because of a racial quota. Is that really fair? Harvey Gantt says it is‖ (Helms 1990).   
 Helms‘ direct appeals to race were reminiscent of an era that many assumed had passed.  
Although Helms‘ race-baiting paid off with a close (52 – 47 percent) electoral victory, Gantt‘s 
loss foreshadowed a potential winning coalition of white women, white liberals, and African 
American voters (Luebke 1998, p. 187).  This formula would yield some success in the state on 
the presidential level, Clinton‘s close loss in 1992 and later for Obama‘s victory in 2008.  
However, these Democratic victories would compete with the larger processes of realignment 
that were typical of the region and state.  Although the Democrat Party proved resilient in North 
Carolina, as more of the state‘s voters shifted to the Republican Party, realignment could only be 
delayed not halted. 
                                                          
8
 See Appendix D for detailed listing and table of electoral reforms in North Carolina 1988 to 2012. 
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 Along with appealing to racial attitudes, the Helms campaign resorted to voter 
suppression techniques including caging.  During the race versus Gantt, the GOP mailed 125,000 
post cards into black communities warning about the criminal penalties for voter fraud and 
providing misleading voter registration information (Christensen 2008, p. 277).  In response to 
these violations, the North Carolina state Republican Party agreed to a four-year ban on voter 
integrity or voter suppression measures.  From 1992 to 1996, all ballot security or election 
integrity programs required court approval (Wang 2012, p. 58).  Although the ban did not apply 
to outside groups or the national parties, it further contributed to low levels of voter suppression 
in North Carolina – a trend not broken until 2013. 
 
Election Law Reform Act of 1991 
 Perhaps in response to the Helms incident, the North Carolina legislature enacted broad 
legislative reforms in 1991 with both mobilizing and security enhancing features.
9
  A reform bill 
passed that year which updated the state‘s criminal penalties for voter fraud, intimidation of 
election administration, administrative electoral fraud, and violations of registration rules.  The 
bill also protected voters from intimidation and made it illegal, ―for any person, directly or 
indirectly, to misrepresent the law to the public through mass mailing or any other means of 
communication where the effect intimidates, harasses, or discourages potential voters from 
exercising their lawful right to vote." 
 The omnibus elections reform legislation required polls to be open from 6:30 a.m. to 7:30 
p.m. for all primaries, elections, and referenda held in North Carolina.  Additionally, the law 
provided for the extension of polling hours to 9:30 p.m. under the following circumstances: 
                                                          
9
 North Carolina SB 485: 1991.  North Carolina Laws 1991, Chap. 163. Legislation Search Database 
1989-2012.  North Carolina General Assembly. 
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1.  Insufficient ballots or polling books. 
2. Multiple voting equipment breakdowns. 
3. Poll openings are delayed. 
4. In the case of ―other irregularities.‖ 
In the above examples, any registered voter could request an extension of the polling period 
by appealing to their local county Board of Elections.  If denied, citizens could then appeal to the 
state Board of Elections or the local superior court where appeals were mandated to be heard ―de 
novo‖ or considered as new cases. 
The extension of polling hours as a remedy for irregularities presented a clear rejection of 
voter suppression mechanisms.  In effect, this provision allowed local and state officials to 
correct for potential disfranchising complications with the local judiciary as an additional 
safeguard.  In addition to these protections, the law proscribed strict guidelines for poll watchers. 
The reform act designated clear roles for partisan observers.   Poll watchers, two per political 
party, must be provided voting lists. Poll watchers could observe and take notes, but they were 
not permitted to electioneer, impede, interfere, communicate with voters, or observe the casting 
of ballots.  Partisan observers could only quietly take notes and were removed at the discretion of 
local election officials for misconduct. 
Along with these provisions, the law offered a generous interpretation of residency. In North 
Carolina an eligible residence was defined as any fixed habitation that a citizen intended to 
return to.  For example, voters who worked in D.C. were allowed state residency unless they had 
voted in D.C. or otherwise established permanent residence.  Most importantly, North Carolina 
allowed college students to claim their school residence if they had no intention of returning to 
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their state of origin.  Since this designation was left up to the student, it effectively enfranchised 
any college student that desired to participate in the state. 
Finally, the legislation offered an early version of what would become the state‘s ―one-stop‖ 
voting law.  Under a provision titled ―Absentee Voting Made Easier‖, the Election Reform Act 
of 1991 enabled voters who cast absentee ballots to do so at the same time as registering.  This 
form of ―one-stop‖ voting was the precursor for the state‘s voting laws that expanded into early 
voting in 2008.  Both ―one-stop‖ and early voting developed out of the absentee ballot program.  
In effect, absentee voters could submit or mail their ballots before Election Day.  Since these 
ballots can be mailed or picked up in person, absentee voters could register, request a ballot, and 
submit the ballot all in one visit.  Once no-excuse absentee ballots were adopted, any voter could 
choose to vote absentee. Same day registration and early voting periods extended this 
convenience to all voters. 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
According to Fleer (1994), by the 1990‘s North Carolina shed its restrictive past and 
adopted voting rules consistent with national norms.   Federal laws and court decisions 
eliminated many of the state‘s regressive voting laws including lengthy residence requirements 
and literacy tests.  Although registration was the responsibility of the voter, The National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 expanded registration to a range of governmental offices including 
libraries, schools, motor vehicle offices, and other convenient locations.  Progress enough ―so 
that this simple but significant administrative requirement is not a barrier to participation for 
most people‖ (Fleer 1994, p. 153). 
The National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), or ―Motor Voter‖ law, was perhaps the 
most significant alteration of national election and registration rules since passage of the Voting 
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Rights Act. The NVRA‘s major provisions included active registration at motor vehicle and 
public agency offices, universal standards for registrations by mail, and a prohibition against 
purges of nonvoters for inactivity.  Although implemented unevenly across states, the NVRA 
removed significant impediments to registration (Bassetti 2012, p. 118-119).  More importantly, 
the law eliminated some of the ambiguities surrounding registration thereby removing one 
avenue for election administrators to suppress turnout.   
The NVRA‘s final impact on voter turnout was less clear.  In some states, registration 
increased but turnout did not.   One study found that citizens who registered under the NVRA‘s 
provisions were much less likely to vote than traditional registrants (Knack 1995, p. 25).  Despite 
some disagreement over the law‘s effect on turnout rates, the NVRA‘s provisions were 
consistent with establishing a more convenient voting process. 
 To comply with the NVRA, North Carolina legislators rewrote the state‘s registration 
rules in 1993.
10
  Consistent with the national legislation, North Carolina expanded registration to 
a broad range of state offices.  These included the department of motor vehicles, but also all 
public assistance, military, and other state agencies.  The law prohibited these officials from 
displaying preference for political parties, verbally discouraging participation, or attaching 
delivery of services to a citizen‘s voter registration status. 
Other provisions included the establishment of a statewide registrar, rules for removing 
voters, and procedures for ballot challenges.  The state‘s Voter Registration Rewrite Act of 1993 
reaffirmed the right of qualified voters to participate in ―one-stop‖ voting and clarified rules for 
voters who moved between precincts.  In the former case, the law allowed citizens to resolve 
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 North Carolina HB 1776: 1993.  North Carolina Laws 1993, Chap. 769. Legislation Search Database 
1989-2012.  North Carolina General Assembly. 
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registration disputes by ―oral or written affirmation before a precinct official at that voting 
place.‖   
This seemingly minor adjustment of administrative rules was important because in some 
states (like Florida), citizens who moved between precincts were required to cast a provisional 
ballot in 2012. 
 In addition to implementing the NVRA‘s main provisions, two other election measures 
were enacted in the wake of the federal reforms.  First, in 1993 the North Carolina legislature 
passed a bill waiving electioneering rules for the Kids Voting Project.  This program allowed 
under-age participants to participate in mock polls during live elections.  These ―simulated‖ 
elections were designed to promote participation and educate future voters.
11
  These programs, 
along with subsequent reforms like pre-registration, demonstrated the state‘s commitment to 
voter education.  Second, the Voter Testimony Act of 1995, prohibited ineligible voters from 
testifying at elections hearings, and proscribed conditions for overturning elections when the 
number of ineligible voters surpassed the margin of victory.
12
  This measure, although intended 
to increase security, stands in stark comparison to subsequent proposals like provisional ballots.  
This law provided the ultimate protection against electoral fraud without placing additional 
upfront or post-election burdens on voters.  A remedy would only be applied in cases where 
fraud jeopardized democratic intent.  However, the overturning of elections remains an extreme 
and unattractive alternative.  In 2004, the North Carolina legislature exercised this option in a 
race for agricultural commissioner when over 4,000 ballots were lost due to computer error 
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 North Carolina SB 684: 1993.  North Carolina Laws 1993, Chap. 163. Legislation Search Database 
1989-2012.  North Carolina General Assembly. 
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 North Carolina SB 1162: 1995.  North Carolina Laws 1995, Chap. 163. Legislation Search Database 
1989-2012.  North Carolina General Assembly. 
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(Keyssar 2000, p. 271).  In that case, the Republican candidate who led the original election 
results went on to win again in the re-vote (Fund 2008, p. 138). 
 
Minor Provisions of 1996-2000 Sessions 
In the immediate years leading up to the election controversies of 2000, the North 
Carolina state legislature was less active in the area of electoral reform.  A number of campaign 
finance and other technical issues were debated, but electoral rule changes were less prominent.  
In 1997, the legislature passed a provision banning family members of candidates from serving 
as election administrators.
13
  Immediate relatives were prohibited from serving on county boards 
of elections.   
A number of legislative proposals during this (1996 to 2000) lull in activity were sent 
back to the Committee on Election Law and Campaign Finance Reform.  These included a bill 
requiring a voter registration or photo identification requirement, another rewriting the rules for 
absentee ballots, and one proposal to restrict access to the ballot by minor or expired parties.
14
  
In 1999, the Election Law Changes Act designated it a misdemeanor for election officials 
to alter a voter registration record without the written permission of the voter.  Additionally, the 
law tightened restrictions on independent registration groups requiring that voter registration 
forms be delivered to the Board of Elections within five days.
15
  The law prohibited payment for 
the collection of registrations forms, making this act a felony.   
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Although restrictions on independent registration groups were often associated with voter 
suppression attempts, an important distinction must be made.  Not all election security measures 
were forwarded in bad faith.  The regulation of the collection of registration forms can be 
justified on efficiency, as well as security, grounds.   A potential arbiter might be found by 
examining the law‘s effect on interest group registration drives.  For example, following the 
passage of registration collection regulations in Florida many leading registration groups 
suspended activity in the state.  No such controversy was reported in North Carolina.  
Additionally, compare North Carolina‘s five day rule to the ―48 hour‖ rule passed, but ultimately 
blocked in the courts, in Florida. 
Perhaps the most important measure promoting turnout might be North Carolina‘s ―one-
stop‖ voting program.  By 1999, the legislature expanded ―one-stop‖ voting statewide by 
mandating that each county Board of Elections provided at least one location for ―one-stop‖ 
voting.
16
  This expansion, and support for ―one-stop‖ voting in general, represented a clear 
commitment to easier voting.  However, convenience and security are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.  The ideal voting system would make voting both easier and more secure. 
One potential alternative might be to focus security measures on electoral, instead of 
voter, fraud.  In 2000, North Carolina legislators again passed restrictions on election 
administrators.  Along with banning the family members of candidates from serving as officials, 
new rules were passed limiting the political activity of Board of Elections members.
17
  Election 
administrators were prohibited from making public statements supporting or opposing political 
candidates or referendum proposals; and were no longer allowed to solicit political contributions. 
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The Elections Law Revision Commission of 2001 
 In 2001, North Carolina legislators passed a range of election reforms intended to avoid 
the controversies that occurred in other states in 2000.  With an eye toward events in Florida, 
they banned butterfly ballots and punch card machines.  They also set new standards for the 
certification of election results.
18
  State officials established a four week training program for 
election supervisors including an examination and strengthened their ability to remove 
supervisors for misconduct.
19
  The state adopted the recommendations of the Elections Law 
Revision Commission; rewriting procedures for ballot design, counting, challenges, and the 
announcement of results.
20
  These reforms addressed controversial sticking points from 2000, 
including issues of voter intent, citizen protests, and rules for recounts and canvassing.
21
 
 Along with addressing administrative problems, the legislature sought to ease voter 
access.  First, state officials mandated Spanish language ballots in all counties with over a six 
percent Hispanic population covering 19 of the state‘s 100 counties.22  Next, they affirmed that 
military voters should receive the ―utmost consideration and cooperation‖, allowing them to 
make one yearly request for absentee ballots, as opposed to requiring multiple requests per 
year.
23
  State officials even strengthened their own voting rights.  They eliminated the 
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requirement that representatives who moved to the state capital change their residency, allowing 
them to vote in their home county.
24
 
Next, state leaders passed legislation which implemented registration by fax, expanded 
the once yearly absentee request provision to cover ill and disabled voters, removed excuse 
requirements establishing no-excuse absentee ballots, and allowed voter‘s to vote by mail for any 
reason.
25
 This package of provisions reflected the thorough commitment to more convenient 
elections in North Carolina.  Each measure alone was minor, but together they revealed a 
concerted effort to lower the costs associated with voting.   
Further strengthening efforts to foster voter education, officials allowed children under 18 
years old to enter the polling booth with their parents.
26
 
In 2001, North Carolina amended its early voting period.  The legislature passed a bill 
shortening the then 22-day early voting period by three days, but also extending early voting to 
the Saturday before the election.
27
  Although the law actually shortened the total early voting 
period, the extension of voting to Saturdays indicated that voter suppression was unlikely the 
primary motivation.   
 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 
 The 2000 election controversy in Florida exposed the weakness and inconsistencies of 
local voting systems and provided the impetus for a larger federal role in locally-administered 
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elections.  The Help America Vote Act, or HAVA, passed by the U.S. Congress in 2002 as the 
culmination of efforts to fix problems exposed in 2000.  HAVA included provisions for updating 
voting machines, registration lists, and established a modest role for the federal government in 
standardizing divergent state voting systems.   
 The six main provisions of HAVA were: 
1. Statewide voter registration system and lists. 
2. Polling machine standards. 
3. Guidelines for provisional ballots. 
4. Voter identification for first-time voters. 
5. Detailed processes for complaints and challenges. 
6. Standardized rules for military, overseas, and uniformed absentee ballots. 
Although results were mixed, some of HAVA‘s provisions promoted mobilization, while 
others did not (Minnite 2010, p. 135; Overton 2006, p. 49).  HAVA funded the switch to 
electronic voting machines and alleviated some of the concern over punch card ballots.  
Moreover, the legislation included ballot design standards to prevent confusing ballots. 
However, several provisions come under scrutiny.  For example, HAVA exposed new 
avenues for voter suppression by mandating the creation of statewide voting lists.  Florida 
officials utilized these lists to purge voters or otherwise challenge their eligibility; and many 
states exploited them to implement voter identification laws.   Statewide lists were not inherently 
suppressive or demobilizing, much like other state records they were benign on their face.  This 
presented several challenges.  First, it created room for disagreement over specific measures.  
Second, it indicated that voter suppression was not deterministic but instead contingent.  Third, it 
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explains why empirical findings were scattered.  Only through careful process analysis can 
investigators distinguish how some elements of contemporary voter suppression operated.   
In 2003, the North Carolina legislature passed several measures to bring the state‘s 
elections code in compliance with HAVA.   The legislature started by establishing a special 
election fund to implement the act‘s requirements.28  They then mandated that all North Carolina 
elections, not just federal ones, complied with the main provisions of the law.
29
  Consistent with 
previous citizen education efforts, state officials adopted pre-registration of 17 year olds and 
allowed high school students to serve as election administration assistants.
30
 
 
Election Administration Amendments Act of 2005 
In 2005, the legislature followed with several amendments to soften some of the Help 
America Vote Act‘s requirements.  First, they established a forgiving standard for provisional 
ballots and provided protections against voter purges.  This law continued the HAVA policy of 
removing voters from registration lists when they move from a county.  However, it allowed 
those citizens to confirm their new residency via personal affirmation.  The law also allowed for 
the correction of minor errors on registration forms, and extended the period for recasting 
provisional ballots up to two weeks after the election.
31
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Almost without exception, when confronted with a choice between making voting more 
convenient or more challenging, North Carolina officials adopted the more lenient approach to 
electoral reform. 
Another bill, originating out of the state Senate, explicitly reaffirmed the right of innocent 
voters to be protected from minor and administrative errors.
32
  The bill, which required that 
provisional ballots be fairly counted, also established a legislative committee to study the issue 
of ballots cast out-of-precinct.  This bill quoted North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Samuel J. 
Ervin Jr. remarking on an elections case from 1948: 
We can conceive of no principle which permits the disfranchisement of innocent voters 
for the mistake, or even the willful misconduct, of election officials in performing the 
duty cast upon them. The object of elections is to ascertain the popular will, and not to 
thwart it. The object of election laws is to secure the rights of duly-qualified electors, and 
not to defeat them. 
 
 In addition to these protections, two more pieces of legislation were advanced in 2005.  
First, the Public Confidence in Elections Act or PCEA sought to allay public concerns 
surrounding the use of electronic voting machines.  The legislation mandated paper receipts, 
verifiable by voters immediately prior to casting their ballot and available for usage in recounts.   
Moreover, electronic voting machines were required to undergo regular testing including 
examination of the voting software and source code.  Machines were also mandated to guard 
against over votes by providing warning prompts to voters who failed to mark a ballot selection 
or made extra selections.  The State Board of Elections was empowered to reject or discontinue 
using voting machines that failed to meet the PCEA‘s requirements.33 
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 Second, the Orange County Super Precinct Act or ―One-Stop‖ Voting Act established a 
voting center pilot program in Orange County to assess the effectiveness of ―one-stop‖ voting 
super centers.
34
  At these polling locations, citizens could register and vote at ―one-stop‖ voting 
sites during the state‘s early voting period.   Super precinct voting centers maintained an online 
connection to the state registrar allowing for real time updates and confirmation of registration 
status.   
 
Election Administration Amendments of 2007 
 In 2007, the state followed with additional amendments to the elections code.  These 
measures again included balanced efforts to make voting easier and more secure.
35
  First, the 
reforms allowed former felons to vote upon completion of their sentences.  Second, the 
legislature strengthened one-stop voting by allowing citizens to cast ballots in their home county 
at a one-stop voting center.  To take advantage of one-stop voting, voters were required to 
provide proof and attestation of residence.
36
 
On the security side, election officials were required to verify identification and double 
check for duplicate ballots across the state.  Additionally, the law proscribed criminal penalties 
for breaching ballot secrecy, violating voter registration procedures, and instructing or 
facilitating non-citizen voting.  The legislation strengthened voter identification requirements by 
applying the rule to voters whose registration information did not match the computer database.  
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Additionally, the law expanded the buffer zone rule, prohibiting campaign speech near polling 
locations, to cover ―one-stop‖ voting centers. 
 Again applying the rules to themselves, lawmakers instituted a former felon policy for 
political candidates.  When they file for elections, candidates in North Carolina were required to 
disclose past felony convictions including the name, date, and location of offense.  Although 
former felons were not precluded from holding office, these records were open to public.
37
 
 
Election Administration Amendments of 2009 
 In 2009, the state legislature advanced a bill expanding ―pre-registration‖ to 16 year olds.  
The legislation called on local high schools and election administrators to encourage student 
registration and pre-registration.  It clarified regulations for using public buildings as one-stop 
voting sites; equalized rules for political and commercial advertising near polling locations; and 
prohibited attorneys from profiting in cases brought against election administrators.
38
 
 The expansion of pre-registration to teenagers represented another important movement 
toward increased democratization.  Ideally, pre-registration increases civic interest and 
knowledge.  These programs prepare future voters for entry into the polity and may perhaps one 
day, even produce calls to further reduce the minimum voting age. 
 
Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2009 
 Building on the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) of 
1986, which reinforced the franchise rights of overseas service members, the U.S. Congress 
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passed the Uniformed Military and Overseas Voter Act or ―MOVE‖ Act in 2009.39  The law 
sought to expand the UOCAVA‘s provisions and further assist military members and others 
living overseas.  The five main provisions of the MOVE Act were: 
1. The removal of notarization and registration requirements. 
2. Required registration and absentee ballot information to be available in electronic 
form. 
3.  Extended the re-registration requirement from every election cycle to every two 
election cycles. 
4. Obligated states to deliver requested absentee ballots within 45 days of a federal 
election. 
5. Military ballots were to be mailed without postage. 
6. Established military and overseas voter outreach and information programs.   
In 2011, North Carolina passed its own version of the Move Act.
40
  The state law allowed 
military voters to use the federal postcard application or an electronic equivalent to apply for 
registration.  It also extended these rights to overseas ballots.  Increasing military and overseas 
participation were both consistent with other efforts to eliminate barriers to participation. 
 
Summary 
 This chapter presented the historical development of voter suppression in North Carolina, 
its relationship with partisan control, and traced major state level elections legislation from 1988 
to 2012.  An in-depth review of state voting legislation revealed a mixture of efforts to make 
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voting easier and safer. North Carolina officials on the whole, adopted many reforms considered 
to make voting easier, but they also instituted many others to make voting more secure.  It is no 
wonder that voter suppression was so difficult to measure.  Its effects were likely lost in the 
complex interaction between mobilizing and demobilizing institutional settings.  However, a 
nuanced inspection revealed that during the period under study, state officials leaned more 
heavily toward the side of promoting, versus suppressing, participation.  
 For example, North Carolina‘s adoption of ―one-stop‖ voting significantly lessened the 
burden placed on voters by registration.  By merging registration and balloting, citizens made 
only one physical trip to the polling location.  The logic of voter suppression dictates that a 
legislature seeking to depress the turnout of specific groups would not expand ―one stop‖ voting 
or other programs like early voting that extended the voting period and removed barriers.  
Compare this to the 2013 Voter Information Verification Act or VIVA, passed in the wake of the 
Shelby County v. Holder Supreme Court decision which overturned section four of the Voting 
Rights Act.  Following the partisan transition of the state, one of the first agenda points for the 
new Republican majority was omnibus legislation to curtail voting rights, entitled by the North 
Carolina legislature as: 
AN ACT to restore confidence in government by establishing the voter information 
verification act to promote the electoral process through education and increased 
registration of voters and by requiring voters to provide photo identification before voting 
to protect the right of each registered voter to cast a secure vote with reasonable security 
measures that confirm voter identity as accurately as possible without restriction.
41
 
 
Although this bill did call for the ―education and increased registration of voters‖, the 
shift in emphasis toward security was apparent.  In addition to instituting a photo identification 
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requirement for 2016, VIVA reversed many of the pro-democratic reforms examined in this 
study.  Included in the omnibus elections reform were measures that reduced the period of early 
voting to one week; ended pre-registration for 16 and 17 year olds, and eliminated same day 
registration during the early voting period.  Other provisions removed the option of counting 
provisional ballots cast outside of a voter‘s home precinct, and the ability to correct address 
changes in person while voting.  The statute increased the number of partisan poll observers and 
allowed any citizen to challenge the status of other voters, reversing a prior rule requiring these 
challenges to come from citizens who resided in the same county.  To round out the sweeping 
reform bill, legislators terminated straight ticket voting and required that polling location time 
extensions be approved by state, rather than local, officials (Election Law Changes 2013, p. 1).  
Finally, similar to election rule changes in Florida the law terminated early voting on the 
Sunday before elections, limiting ―one-stop‖ voting centers to the hours of 1 p.m. to 5 p.m. the 
Saturday before elections.  These Sunday reductions of early voting in both states offer strong 
supporting evidence for the case that voter suppression proponents targeted African Americans. 
In summation, process tracing the development of election laws in North Carolina from 
1988 to 2012 revealed a state voting framework that lacked aggressive voter suppression efforts.  
Although reforms during this period were balanced between mobilization and security, the 
overall assessment of this study is that government officials adopted institutional conditions 
favorable to democratization.  This is not to suggest that voter suppression was absent, the Helms 
incident of 1990 clearly indicated that efforts to suppress the vote continued to play a role in 
North Carolina politics.  However, high levels of partisan competition and the subsequent delay 
in partisan realignment kept voter suppression to a minimal. 
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CHAPTER 5: Florida 
“We conclude that Florida has failed to sustain its burden of proving that… [reductions 
in early voting in 2012], would not impose a material burden on – and therefore a 
retrogressive effect with respect to – African-American voters’ effective exercise of the 
electoral franchise.  […] This dramatic reduction in a form of voting disproportionately 
used by African-Americans would be analogous to (although certainly not the same as) 
closing polling places in disproportionately African-American precincts.  Although such 
an action would not bar African-Americans from voting, it would impose a sufficiently 
material burden to cause some reasonable minority voters not to vote” (three judge panel 
ruling on 2012 reductions in early voting, U.S. District Court D.D.C., p. 54-55).
42
 
 
“ …what happened this weekend in Florida is simply unacceptable. According to a local 
election official interviewed by CBS News' Phil Hirschkorn, the last "early voter" in line 
for Saturday's truncated early voting in Palm Beach County finally got to cast a ballot at 
2:30 a.m. Sunday morning, which means that voter waited in line for more than seven 
hours” (Cohen 2012, The Atlantic).  
 
Introduction 
 This chapter reports the development of Florida‘s state voting institutions and culture, 
with a focus on demobilization. To do so, I chart several important processes.  First, I defend the 
selection of Florida as a contemporary voter suppression regime.  Although political elites in the 
state followed national trends which favored more convenient voting, this study identified a 
strong counter current of targeted demobilization.  Second, I report the pace of partisan 
realignment in the state.  This study argues that changes in partisan control were a necessary 
precondition for the development of a voter suppression regime.  Third, this chapter traces 
national and state election law changes from 1988 to 2012 and their implementation in Florida.  
The data indicates that Florida officials took several steps consistent with a voter suppression 
model like adopting new demobilizing regulations and retracting previously instituted pro-voting 
reforms.  Finally, I review important findings presented in this chapter. 
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Background  
Florida, like North Carolina, exhibited a history of strict racial disfranchisement followed 
by a moderate approach to desegregation (Hill and Moreno 2008, p. 88).  In the wake of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Florida officials moved away from blatant racial disfranchisement.  
The 1970 elections marked a turning point for southern politics, as moderates won out over 
segregationist candidates for governor as occurred in both Florida and North Carolina (Colburn 
2007, p. 86).  As legal reforms dismantled black disfranchisement laws, changing societal 
attitudes and norms opened up American society to African Americans.  For the most part, 
blatant racism and extreme racial attitudes were eliminated from ―polite‖ mainstream American 
politics.  This was also the case in Florida.   
Despite these advances, the re-emergence of voter suppression in the state gives cause for 
concern.  Contemporary Florida politics presents a good test of voter suppression theory for 
several reasons.  First, as the South shifted away from one-party Democratic rule, various states 
transitioned unevenly.  The Florida Republican Party achieved parity throughout the 1980‘s, 
culminating in huge statewide and federal gains in the 1990‘s.  By 2000, voters in the state 
preferred the GOP for most state-level offices including president, governor, and cabinet (Craig 
and Austin 2008, p. 69).  They also elected Republican majorities to the U.S. and state 
legislatures.  The GOP secured control of Florida politics reversing the Democratic Party‘s long 
reign.  Despite these trends favoring the GOP, the Democratic Party remained competitive in 
presidential and U.S. Senate races in the state.    
Second, two-party competition in Florida was accompanied by acrimonious partisan 
conflict including disputes over institutional voting rules.  The 2000 Bush v. Gore election fiasco 
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exposed our nation‘s disjointed elections system.  Hanging chads, butterfly ballots, and the 
outcome of the nation‘s highest political contest decided in the courts revealed the rough edges 
of the democratic process.  All of which placed Florida‘s elections administration system under 
serious scrutiny.  Additionally, these elections controversies prompted significant reforms on the 
federal and state levels. 
Tough competition combined with hyper-partisanship encouraged those who seek to 
restrict the franchise or dampen turnout by increasing the payoff involved. As partisan 
competition increased, each party attempted to mobilize the last of their potential supporters or 
alternatively to demobilize their opponent‘s supporters.  More importantly, the framework 
offered by Carmines and Stimson (1989) suggested that the initial decision to appeal to white 
resentment was successful in triggering a regional realignment.  By blending racial and 
ideological conservatism, the GOP was able to win, first in the South and then nationally.  
However, embracing racial conservatism was not without risks in an increasingly diverse society. 
This is not to argue that all American political contests were essentially racial conflicts, 
instead it contends that racial issues were folded into the partisan framework so thoroughly that 
we can predict liberal and conservative positions knowing racial content alone.  This dynamic is 
interesting in that it spanned public and elite opinion (Carmines and Stimson 1989, p. 184-185). 
Additionally, researchers confirmed a similar linkage between support for voter suppression laws 
and racial attitudes (Manza & Uggen 2008, p.  64).   
Third, Florida owns a long history of racial disfranchisement.  Although all southern 
states moved away from the total disfranchisement reminiscent of Jim Crow, efforts to suppress 
voting, continue to carry racial undertones, at times, explicitly expressed (Alexander 2010, p. 47; 
Walton 2000, p. 23).  This history, or tradition, is vital to understanding contemporary voter 
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suppression.  On an institutional level, we should be questioning why ethnic and racial exclusion 
are such reoccurring themes in American politics.  This current study, explores the potential for 
conflict between this ascriptive tradition and demographic change.   
Fourth, Florida experienced massive growth.  An influx of out-of-state newcomers, 
foreign immigrants, and home grown population growth quickened the ethnic and racial 
diversification of the state (Scicchitano & Scher 2010, p. 245).  Again, as the state becomes more 
diverse, racially motivated or executed voter suppression becomes a riskier electoral strategy.  
However, diversification of the electorate may also increase the need for voter suppression.  
Finally, from 1988 to 2012 Florida officials instituted a range of contemporary voter 
suppression measures.  These included felon disenfranchisement, photo identification, long lines 
and administrative delays at the polls, purge lists, and restrictions on interest group and outside 
party registration drives.  To justify these reductions in voting rights, lawmakers cited an 
increased concern over voter fraud. 
 To explain why the push for voter suppression emerged in Florida before North Carolina, 
this study again looks first to partisan realignment. 
 
Partisan Realignment 
Under a one-party system, Florida political culture was one of loose party affiliation.  
Key (1949) described it as, ―every man for himself‖ (p. 82).  Contemporary Florida politics are 
now much more guided by partisan cohesion, although name recognition and money remain 
important for state wide electoral success. 
 Like other states in the region, Florida developed a one-party political system dominated 
by the Democratic Party.  ―Rooted in native white resistance to Republican Reconstruction and 
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to a biracial society, Floridians embraced the Democratic Party when federal troops were 
removed from the state following the Compromise of 1877‖ (Colburn 2007, p. 12).  For over one 
hundred years, the Democratic Party dominated the region.  The party flourished by appealing to 
racial attitudes gaining support from ―Yellow Dog‖ Democrats, thusly named for their 
commitment to racial segregation.  The moniker derives from the saying that these voters would 
rather vote for a ―yellow dog‖ than pull the lever for a Republican candidate, due to that party‘s 
historical support for racial equality (Colburn 2007, p. 15). 
Colburn (2007) described this transition:   
―As in other states and particularly in neighboring states, Florida politics were influenced 
significantly by developments at the federal level and by the policies of the two national 
parties.  Both Democratic and Republican parties in the state, for example, felt the effects 
when the national Democratic Party opted to support civil rights reforms in the 1950s and 
1960s, and later, in the 1980s and 1990s, when the national Republican Party championed 
a rights, responsibilities, and values ideology.  Significantly, both these political 
developments were linked to one another, with Republicans capitalizing on public 
concerns over integration, school busing, and the social discord of the 1960s to reach out 
successfully to [white] middle class voters‖ (Colburn 2007, p. 8).43 
 
 
 Florida‘s contemporary realignment was most evident on the state level where the GOP 
controlled both chambers of the Florida legislature since 1996. 
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Table 5.1 Political Control of Florida State Legislature by Party (number of seats) 
 
        House        Senate 
       Democrats  Republicans   Democrats  Republicans 
 
2012 45 75 
 
14 26 
2010 44 76 
 
14 26 
2008 42 78 
 
14 26 
2006 36 84 
 
14 26 
2004 39 81 
 
14 26 
2002 39 81 
 
14 25 
2000 43 77 
 
15 25 
1998 57 63 
 
17 23 
1996 59 61 
 
17 23 
1994 63 57 
 
19 21 
1992 71 49 
 
20 20 
1990 74 46 
 
22 18 
1988 73 47 
 
23 17 
 
Source:  1988-2012.  Statistical Abstract of the United States (Tables 395, 400, 418, 479), Bureau of the 
Census. 
 
 
 Table 5.1 lists partisan control of the Florida state legislature from 1988 to 2012.  This 
data indicates that the rise of the contemporary Republican Party in Florida was swifter than in 
North Carolina.  Florida‘s GOP achieved a 20-20 deadlock in the state Senate as early as 1992, 
winning the smaller chamber in the next election cycle in 1994.  By 1996, Republicans secured 
the state House of Representatives to go along with small advantages in the state Senate.  
Although Democrats remained competitive, between 1996 and 2012 the Republican advantage 
was evident in races for the state legislature.  The GOP secured double digit leads in each 
chamber beginning in 2000 (+ 10 seat leads in the Senate and +30 seats in the House). 
 Despite Republican dominance in the Florida legislature, the GOP ascendance was 
tempered by Democratic resilience in statewide elections.   
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Table 5.2 Votes cast for and Florida Governor elected by Party (in percentages) 
     
             Democrats Republicans        Party - Winner  
 
2010 48 49 R- R. Scott 
2006 45 52 R- C. Christ 
2002 43 56 R- J. Bush 
1998 45 55 R- J. Bush 
1994 51 49 D- L. Chiles 
1990 57 44 D- L. Chiles 
1986 45 55 R- B. Martinez 
 
Source:  1986-2012.  Florida Department of State – Division of Elections 
 
 
Table 5.2 reflects the votes cast for Florida governor from 1986 to 2010.  Similar to a 
string of Democratic North Carolina chief executives in the mid 1990‘s, Lawton Chiles secured 
Florida‘s top office for two consecutive terms.  In 1990, Chiles a long serving and popular U.S. 
Senator from the state, returned from retirement and unseated incumbent Republican Bob 
Martinez by 13 points.  By 1994, he narrowly defeated Jeb Bush by two points before passing 
away in office from a heart attack in 1998 (Colburn 2007, p. 154-155).  Jeb Bush would go on to 
win the state‘s executives position that year beginning a line of four consecutive GOP victories.  
Most importantly, the election of Bush in 1998 marked the GOP‘s undivided acquisition of state 
government and control of its electoral machinery. 
The GOP held the Governor‘s mansion for the next four terms, winning comfortably until 
very close victories in 2010 and 2014.  They effectively reversed Democratic dominance of state 
politics. As Colburn (2007) described:  
For the first time in state history, Floridians not only helped elect a Republican president, 
they also voted in a Republican congressional majority, a Republican governor, a 
Republican cabinet, and significant majorities in both houses of the state legislature.  
Republicans, in fact, enjoyed such a huge majority in the House of Representatives that 
Democrats had little voice in committee deliberations or in drafting legislation.  The 
Democratic Party had not experienced anything like it previously, and it was unclear 
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when the party would be positioned to challenge the Republican Party again (Colburn 
2007, p. 199). 
 Despite these electoral gains, the Republican Party‘s ascendance in Florida was frustrated 
by increasingly close competition in recent presidential contests.   
 
Table 5.3 Votes cast for President and winner of Florida by Party (in percentages) 
     
             Democrats Republicans   Party - Winner  
 
2012 49.9 49 D- B. Obama 
2008 51.0 48.0 D- B. Obama 
2004 47.0 52.0 R- G. W. Bush 
2000 48.8 48.8 R- G. W. Bush 
1996 48.0 42.0 D- B. Clinton 
1992 39.0 41.0 R- G. Bush 
1988 38.5 60.9 R- G. Bush 
 
Source:  1988-2012.  Dave Leip's U.S. Election Atlas  
 
 
Table 5.3 displays state level outcomes for presidential elections from 1988 to 2012.  In 
Florida, presidential results indicate that realignment either ended, or generated a political 
stalemate.  Outside of George H. Bush‘s 22 point victory in 1988, the six subsequent presidential 
contests were decided by an average of three percent.  These include two statistical ties.  First, 
there was the controversial Bush versus Gore race in 2000; and then again, a razor tight contest 
in 2012.   
 Although Democrats remained competitive in national and statewide contests in Florida, 
the realignment to Republican control of the state‘s election machinery created conditions 
conducive for voter suppression.  Unlike North Carolina where state-level partisan competition 
kept government divided, thus preventing the rise of intense targeted demobilization; Florida 
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officials adopted a range of voter suppression mechanisms and retracted previously granted 
conveniences beginning in the late 1990‘s.  
 
State Voting System Development 1988-2012 
Hasen (2012) argues that Florida‘s officials and institutions developed broad support for 
the ―democracy canon‖ – a legal tradition that believes electoral rules should be interpreted in 
favor of openness (Hasen 2012, p. 23).  This approach is in contradiction to historical efforts to 
disfranchise voters, and should promote increased participation.  Along this line, many states 
adopted measures intended to make voting easier including registration at government offices, 
early voting, and voting-by-mail.  Florida adopted many of these pro-voting reforms.  However, 
Florida officials began implementing a range of voter suppression measures following the 
partisan transition of the state in 1998.  Therefore, this chapter reports a tale of two stories.  The 
first half of this narrative reports a noticeable commitment to incorporate pro-voting reforms.  
The second reveals retractions from this commitment consistent with a voter suppression 
approach. 
Two federal laws greatly influenced state elections systems, the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) and the Help American Vote Act of 2001 (HAVA).  The 
NVRA or ―motor-voter‖ reform of 1993 extended voter registration to public offices.  HAVA, 
passed in 2001 in the wake of the 2000 election controversy, provided funding for electronic 
polling machines and established a number of electoral reforms including statewide registration 
lists, provisional ballots, and voter identification.  Additional federal reforms, like the Military 
and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2009 (MOVE) eliminated other barriers to voting. 
These measures strongly indicated that the general trend in American politics supported 
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increased democratization; or at least favored reducing technical and administrative barriers to 
voting.  Open voting laws may not eliminate deeper structural inequalities inherent to 
participatory democracy, but they are certainly a pre-requisite to optimal participation.  As long 
as significant voter suppression remains, existing inequalities will be much more difficult to 
address. 
Despite positive national sentiment, a review of the development of Florida elections 
legislation from 1988 to 2012 revealed the fluid back-and-forth nature of electoral reform.
44
  
This process involved constant partisan struggle over elections administration.  Historically true 
for both Florida and North Carolina, these contests have at times extended beyond the bounds of 
legitimate partisan conflict including appeals to targeted and racial demobilization.  Although it 
is evident that contemporary voter suppression lacked the aggressive appeals to racial bigotry of 
previous eras, questions remain as to whether blacks were disproportionately impacted by these 
laws. 
Process tracing in Florida revealed a variety of voter suppression measures.  These 
included felon disfranchisement, manipulation of early voting hours, an overemphasis on 
security, and other suspicious reversals of pro-voting reforms.  These efforts began to gain steam 
following the partisan realignment of the state legislature in 1998.  In that year, state officials 
adopted photo identification and increased their focus on elections integrity measures.
45
   
 
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
 For review of NVRA of 1993 see Chapter 4.
46
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Florida Voter Registration Act of 1995 
 To comply with the NVRA, Florida passed its own version of ―motor-voter‖ legislation 
in 1995 titled the Florida Voter Registration Act (FVRA).
47
  This law instituted broad changes to 
the state‘s registration procedures.  The law allowed registration at many state agencies, public 
assistance offices, and by mail.  These offices included the Department of Motor Vehicles but 
also a range of public assistance offices like those that served Medicaid and welfare recipients.  
Other included agencies like libraries, senior assisted living centers, and military recruitment 
offices were required to provide and handle registration applications.  Citizens could update or 
correct their registration status at any of these locations.  In addition, public assistance agencies 
which service people with disabilities at their residence were required to provide in-home 
registration services. 
 Florida‘s ―motor-voter‖ law, in line with the federal legislation it was fashioned after, 
represented movement toward easier and more convenient voting. 
 
“No excuse” absentee balloting of 1996 
 In 1996 the state abandoned the requirement that voters casting absentee ballots must 
show cause.  Prior to this bill, voters were required to attest to several conditions including 
medical illness, physical disability, or absence from the state.  This reform allowed any eligible 
voter who was unable to attend their normally scheduled polling location to participate via 
absentee ballots.
48
 This move was also known as ―no excuse‖ absentee balloting. Convenience-
affirming absentee ballots allowed any voter to mail in their ballot for a period of time up until 
the close of normal elections.  Once restrictions were removed allowing for in-person registration 
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and ballot casting, this program foreshadowed the early voting system later adopted in many 
states.  
 
Omnibus Elections Reform of 1998 
 Following the partisan transition of the Florida legislature in 1998, Florida officials began 
moving toward a voter suppression model.  In that year, the Florida legislature passed sweeping 
electoral reforms.
49
  The Omnibus Elections Reform Bill of 1998 included a heightened focus on 
elections security measures.  For example, the bill mandated photo identification for all elections.  
Voters in Florida were required to show a Florida driver‘s license, state ID card, U.S. passport, 
credit card, or other forms of ID at the polls.  Citizens who lacked the appropriate form of 
identification could cast a provisional ballot.  Next, the law required absentee or mail-in voters to 
vote in person before mailing absentee ballots in future elections.  A third provision mandated 
the matching of social security card and registration identification numbers, and required election 
administrators to verify voter registration data.  For example, the state‘s supervisors of elections 
were required to check the homestead status of all voters.  Under this reform, minor errors were 
enough to warrant rejection of registration.   A legislative summary described the law as 
―designed to enhance voter registration information and identify incidents of voter fraud.‖50 
 To further stress the shift toward stricter election laws, Florida officials instituted a range 
of criminal penalties for ―offenses related to absentee ballots and voting.‖  These included 
increased criminal penalties for the corruption or disturbance of registration applications, voter 
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fraud or impersonation, duplicate voting, pressure on workers by their employees, and otherwise 
interfering with a person‘s legal right to vote. 
Additionally, legislators reversed the no-excuse absentee ballot re-instituting the ―for 
cause‖ rules that were previously eliminated in 1996.  The legislative staff analysis of a similar 
bill argued that the reversal was done ―in an effort to combat voter fraud and abuses in the 
absentee balloting process.‖51  The research suggests that a legislative shift in focus from voting 
convenience to concerns over ―voter fraud‖ was consistent with a voter suppression approach. 
The 1998 omnibus package did include an important pro-voting measure which allowed 
for in-person absentee voting.  As in North Carolina, in-person absentee voting represented a 
strong commitment to democratization.  This was especially true as these procedures 
subsequently developed into early voting in Florida and ―one-stop‖ voting in North Carolina.  
Thus, expansions, and retractions, of early voting are a good way to assess legislative intent.  
In addition to legislative electoral reforms, another noteworthy adjustment was made in 
1998.  Every twenty years, the Florida Constitution provides for a Constitutional Revision 
Commission to review the state‘s laws.  In 1998, among the amendments adopted was a 
reorganization of the cabinet system.  Beginning in 2002, the Secretary of State, the head of the 
state‘s elections system, would be appointed by the Governor.  Prior to this amendment, the 
office was decided by popular vote via statewide election.
52
  This change was even more 
noteworthy due to Florida‘s unique cabinet system.  The state constitution divides executive 
power between the governor and six cabinet members.  Cabinet positions, including the 
Secretary of State, wielded their own authority allowing for considerable independence.  As this 
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office is responsible for administering elections, it becomes an important prerequisite for the 
advancement of voter suppression measures.   
Removing the Secretary of State‘s office from direct popular control enabled voter 
suppression in several ways.  First, it shielded the office from public backlash and outcry.  
Although the governor may suffer politically, individual Secretaries of State were protected from 
the electorate.  Second, some demobilizing measures (like purging) were directly carried out by 
the Secretary of State‘s office.  A pro-voting advocate could eliminate these voter suppression 
measures altogether; or conduct them in an even-handed manner.  Third, it prevented voters from 
installing a new office holder in response to controversial decisions.  If voters disapproved of a 
voter suppression regime, they could largely disrupt the process by electing a proponent of more 
open voting procedures.  A secretary could not completely override the wishes of the governor or 
state legislature, but they could mitigate the worst effects of voter suppression.  At minimum, 
they would be in a position to publicize unfair election practices.  Voter suppression measures 
were most effective when they were discreet. 
 
Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 
In response to the controversial 2000 election, Florida enacted another series of electoral 
reforms the following year.  The Elections Reform Act of 2001 addressed many of the problems 
that plagued the state in 2000 like hanging chads, disparate recount procedures across counties, 
and butterfly ballots.  The legislation banned punch card machines and provided $24 million for 
counties to switch to optical-scan or electronic voting systems.  The law established a uniform 
statewide ballot design and proposed a study to assess the feasibility of uniform polling hours.  
The Secretary of State was required to distribute to election officials basic standards for: 
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registration; in-person, overseas and absentee ballots; voter rights and responsibilities 
procedures; poll worker training; and public announcements.
53
   
Along with standardizing state election laws, the overhaul designated funding to educate 
voters and election administrators.  Although some elements like the establishment of a voter 
registration database and rules on provisional ballots could be abused, overall the package made 
a strong effort at addressing many of the problems that arose in Florida in 2000. 
Once again, legislators modified the ―no excuse‖ absentee ballot rules.  This law reversed 
the ―for cause‖ revision of 1998 and re-instated ―no-excuse‖ absentee balloting.  To summarize, 
the state adopted ―no excuse‖ absentee ballots in 1996, went back to a ―show cause‖ system in 
1998, and then restored the ―no excuse‖ system in 2001.  Perhaps these vacillations reveal intra-
party disagreements over the effectiveness or appropriateness of voter suppression laws. 
 
Florida Reforms of 2002 
Building on the larger reforms of 2001, Florida officials continued passing elections 
revisions into 2002.  Legislation passed allowing for late registration at the Supervisor of 
Elections office and elaborating provisional ballot procedures when voter records or the precinct 
register were inaccurate.  Most importantly, the bill affirmed voting rights by providing that 
voters waiting in line at the close of polls must be allowed to vote.
54
 This reform took on 
increased importance as Floridians faced long lines and delays in subsequent elections. 
In addition to making voting more convenient, Florida officials sought to bolster the 
security of elections.  They strengthened protections covering criminal violations of election 
regulations.  In a law passed in 2002, the legislature designated that any person who ―conspires‖ 
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with, or assists, persons engaged in violations of election code were themselves guilty.  The law 
criminalized not only participation and planning of election crimes, but also attempts to cover up 
the crime.
55
 
Another statute clarified rules for purging ineligible voters from the statewide registry.  
The supervisors of elections were empowered to remove citizens who passed away, moved to 
another precinct, and those with felony convictions.  The latter provision was the most 
controversial because state officials utilized inaccurate felon lists to conduct voter purges.
56
 
 
Florida Help America Vote Act of 2003 
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 was the federal response to the 2000 
elections controversy in Florida.  HAVA provided $3 billion in federal funding for states to 
update voting equipment and fulfill other technical specifications.  In 2003, Florida received $83 
million dollars to implement HAVA‘s requirements. 
For a review of HAVA of 2002 see Chapter 4.
57
 
In 2003, state leaders passed several pieces of legislation to complete implementation of 
HAVA.
58
  The federal law mandated the state provide: provisional ballots, an opportunity for 
voters to privately check ballot accuracy, and access for disabled voters.
59
  The state legislation 
modified the statewide registration database to comply with HAVA requirements.  Florida 
maintained a digital list of every citizen legally registered to vote in the state. 
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Along with including funds for voting equipment, training, and staff; the national 
legislation included measures that could be employed to suppress the vote.  HAVA‘s 
requirement that states compile a central voter registration list and its adoption of voter 
identification for first time voters, were the subject of criticism from pro-voting advocates.  
Again, state officials exploited registration databases to compile purge lists.   
Although this study focuses on legislative changes, a brief review of recent voter purges 
in Florida illustrates this process.  Bassetti (2012) and Hasen (2012) recorded these various 
efforts.  In the last four presidential elections, the state‘s Republican Secretaries of State targeted 
citizens with felony convictions and suspected non-citizens.  In 2000, Kathleen Harris paid four 
million dollars to a private firm to compile a felon purge list.  State officials instructed the firm 
to take a strict approach to name-matching.  As a result, around 12,000 legally qualified voters 
were placed on the list (Hasen 2012, p. 28-29).  Harris‘s replacement in 2004, now appointed 
directly by the Governor, Glenda Evans Hood created a purge list which incorrectly included 
over 45,000 citizens.  In 2008, Kurt Browning adopted new rules requiring perfect name-
matching before a citizen could register to vote.  The rule, called ―no match, no vote‖, resulted in 
a list of 12,000.  In 2012, Ken Detzner compiled a purge docket of 180,000 voters suspected of 
being non-citizens (Bassetti 2012, p. 151-152). 
Florida‘s HAVA legislation expanded provisional ballots to include, not only those 
whose eligibility was in dispute, but also those counted as ―late‖ voters.  In cases where polling 
hours were extended by court orders, late voters were required to vote by provisional ballots that 
must be kept separate from all other provisional ballots.  This provision was vote-affirming in 
that provisional ballots were available to be counted in close races.  However, the consistency of 
the provisional balloting system and the high rate of rejected ballots caused concern.  
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Furthermore, the practice of segregating ―late‖ voters, particularly in cases where the delays are 
caused by administrative error, was suspect. 
Adjudicating these disputes is difficult.  For example, the revised rules for provisional 
balloting could be interpreted both ways.  When provisional ballots are counted at high rates then 
the system should empower voters.  When these ballots are not counted, then the provisional 
balloting system provides additional avenues for mischief. 
 
Absentee and Early Voting of 2004 
 Early voting, perhaps the best indicator of the push toward more convenient access was 
signed into law by Republican Governor Jeb Bush in 2004.
60
  The early voting measures were 
passed with large bi-partisan support (100 yes to 12 no in the state House) in legislation that 
allowed absentee ballots to be cast at early voting sites.  For up to 15 days before the election, 
absentee voters could take advantage of what has come to be known as early voting. 
 This study suggests that researchers investigate changes in early voting as an obvious 
point of conflict in the struggle over voting laws.  Generally, expansions were consistent with 
increased mobilization while retractions should be investigated for demobilizing effects.  So, 
Florida officials should be credited with instituting early voting in 2004.  However, subsequent 
retractions of the early voting period beginning in 2006 call into question the depth of state 
officials‘ commitment. 
 
Felony Disenfranchisement Revisions of 2004 
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 Porter (2010) estimated that Florida‘s felon disenfranchisement laws impacted nearly 
nine percent of the state‘s adult population.  In 2004, this included nearly 1.2 million Floridians 
who were incarcerated in prison, paroled, on probation, or otherwise discharged into a post-
sentencing program.  Of this number, over 290,000 were African American (Porter 2010, p. 10).  
Using the county level estimates compiled for this study, this means that around 10 percent of 
the estimated 2.9 million potential black Floridians were disqualified due to felon 
disfranchisement statutes in that year. 
 Florida‘s felon disfranchisement regulations vacillated in recent years.  The general 
outlines of the policy required that convicted felons be stripped of many civil rights including the 
right to vote, serve on a jury, and hold public office.  These rights were suspended unless 
restored by the executive branch.  Florida‘s Constitution granted felons the right to appeal to the 
state Clemency Board which consisted of the Governor and two cabinet members.  Restoration 
was solely up to this partisan committee.
61
    
 The Clemency Board has, at times, adopted rules allowing some felons to appeal for 
restoration without a hearing, while others were required to appeal directly to the Board.  As an 
illustration, in 2004, Governor Jeb Bush revised the executive clemency rules to eliminate 
administrative delays.  This rule change allowed some former felons to apply for restoration 
without a hearing.  In order to bypass an official hearing, the felon must have been a non-violent 
offender with a clean criminal record for five years after their release. Persons convicted of 
violent crimes were required to wait 15 years without re-offending to apply for reinstatement of 
their civil rights (Porter 2010, p. 9-10). 
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Even with these revisions, Florida‘s felon disfranchisement statutes remained one of the 
nation‘s strictest.  Furthermore, later retractions of previously granted relief were consistent with 
a voter suppression approach.  An important distinction between historical and contemporary 
voter suppression can be made.  Historical efforts were much more blatant and sought new and 
creative measures to achieve near total disfranchisement of black voters.  Contemporary voter 
suppression often involved the retraction of previous pro-voting reforms, in addition to the 
introduction of subtle new mechanisms.  This development can be likely tied to changing 
societal norms and attitudes toward racial discrimination.   
 
Electoral Reforms of 2005 
Although the broader trend nationally has been to make voting more convenient; 
mobilization and demobilization are constantly interacting or evolving.  The American voting 
framework is fluid, making description and measurement difficult.  Careful process tracing 
revealed competition between various forces that influence participation, most notably involving 
conflicts over the institutional rules of the game.   
This study catalogues a number of laws passed in 2005 that retracted previous pro-voting 
reforms.  Florida‘s leaders reduced early voting, emphasized voter fraud, and tightened technical 
requirements.  The most pronounced improvement in Florida elections was the institution of 
early voting.  In response to long lines and delays, Florida adopted an extended election 
schedule.  Local supervisors of elections were empowered to establish early voting periods with 
a great deal of discretion.  Beginning in 2005, the early voting period begins to recede.  State 
officials shortened early voting by designating the Sunday of the election as the end date and 
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limited daily sessions to eight hours per day, and eight hours per weekend.
62
  A legislative write-
up, prepared by the Ethics and Elections Committee, describes the first intended effect of HB 
1567 as clarifying ―that early voting is a convenience, not a right.‖ 
Whatever the merits of debating the appropriate length of early voting periods; when a 
legislature finds it necessary to clarify to voters that easier access is only a convenience, this 
does not bode well for democratization.   
Additionally, the legislation established monetary penalties for third party registration 
organizations and their members.  Individuals, who failed to submit timely registration forms, 
including executive officers, were subjected to costly fines and penalties for cases where foul 
play was not suspected.
63
  For cases where foul play was suspected in connection with the 
submission of absentee ballots, another reform set forth a third degree felony.
64
  However, these 
rules would be stymied by court challenges and not resolved until 2009.  Another round of 
similar restrictions followed in 2012. 
Consistent with the provisional balloting system established by HAVA, Florida 
legislators eliminated the opportunity for voter‘s to verify their identity by signing an affidavit.  
Instead, voters without proper idea were required to cast a provisional ballot.  Provisional voters 
were required to return within three days after the election and present documentary verification 
of their eligibility.   
 In addition to these security enhancing features, other legislation tightened registration 
requirements.
65
  Applications would not be counted unless all boxes were filled out including 
those that indicated citizenship and felon status.  In previous years, local elections officials 
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allowed minor technical mistakes – like unchecked boxes.  However this privilege was applied 
unevenly across counties.
66
     
This legislation transferred control of the statewide voter registration system from the 67 
county supervisors to the Department of State‘s Division of Elections.  Additionally these 
reforms altered the rules for poll watcher challenges.  The law allowed the franchise rights of any 
voter to be challenged up to 30 days before an election.  Although the law established a 
misdemeanor criminal penalty for frivolous challenges, poll watchers were indemnified for 
actions taken in good faith.
67
  
 
Voter Registration Expansions of 2006 
 In 2006, the legislature expanded the state‘s ―motor-voter‖ law to include places that sold 
hunting, fishing, or trapping licenses.  Stores and shops were required to display registration 
forms, actively ask customers if they would like to register, and submit completed applications to 
the Division of Elections. Not only did this legislation expand access, it did so with a 
forcefulness usually reserved for fraud or misconduct.  Store owners were required to offer 
registration forms or face civil penalties ranging from five hundred to twenty-five hundred 
dollars.  These same penalties applied to local elections administrators who failed to adequately 
supply registration forms to businesses.
68
   
 Although supporters of pro-voting reforms do not object to expanding registration to 
businesses, this study notes the partisan implications of targeted expansion.  In this case it was 
assumed that one party gained an advantage from citizens in rural areas having expanded 
opportunities to register.  As the NVRA, along with its Florida versions, expanded registration to 
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public assistance agencies – thought to advantage Democrats, this law attempted to balance this 
perceived imbalance by expanding access at locations thought to lean towards the Republican 
Party.  This type of expansion was consistent with a pro-voting approach, but it is important to 
look for a broader commitment to democratization. Where that commitment was absent, even 
targeted expansions can be consistent with a voter suppression approach.  Most importantly, a 
quantitative assessment of all states would not reveal these types of imbalances.  Only careful 
process tracing can identify these relationships. 
 
Felon Disfranchisement Revisions of 2006 and 2007 
In 2006 and 2007, state officials lightened the state‘s strict felon disfranchisement 
regulations.  First, in 2006, county jail officials were tasked with assisting discharged felons with 
the restoration process.   Legislation required that county officials provide Restoration of Civil 
Rights applications to prisoners with felonies housed in county jails.  The law excluded the 
Department of Corrections.
69
 
Next, in 2007, the state adopted new rules to automatically restore the voting rights of 
non-violent offenders upon completion of their punishment.  Signed by Republican Governor 
Charlie Christ, the move represented a significant retreat from the state‘s unforgiving felon 
disfranchisement statues.  Violent offenders were still required to apply to Florida‘s Office of 
Executive Clemency for reinstatement (Porter 2010, p. 4). 
The lifting of felon disfranchisement laws represented a significant movement toward 
democratization.  As these restrictions represented the largest segment of excluded adult citizens, 
revisions that ease the reinstatement process, or remove the ban altogether, remained a quick way 
to expand the franchise.  These efforts suggested that the Republican Party elites did not hold 
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uniform views concerning voter suppression.  This study argues that inter-party disagreements 
among Republicans on this issue were likely to mirror the historical divide between ideological 
and racial conservatism (discussed in literature review p. 20).  One way to demarcate this line 
might be to employ survey data to measure support for voter suppression measures to identify 
differences among conservatives. 
 
Pre-registration of 17 year olds in 2007 
Legislation passed in 2007 that allowed for the pre-registration of 17 year olds, and 
reversed the prior decision to strictly enforce minor errors on registration applications.  This law 
ordered that applicants who failed to correctly mark all boxes would be given the option of 
providing the information at the polls.  The law also lowered some of the civil penalties imposed 
on third party registration drives.
70
   
 
Omnibus Elections Reform of 2008 
 In 2008, the legislature passed another omnibus legislation containing another wave of 
electoral revisions.
71
  This package lowered the pre-registration age to 16 and removed buyers 
club and employee badges from the list of acceptable photo identification.  Finally, the 
legislature mandated that voter challenges be issued by a poll watcher from the same county as 
the voter. 
Expansions of pre-registration and similar measures would count as mobilizing reforms; 
however Florida officials would repeal these programs after a few years.  The elimination of pre-
registration is curious, if only because it is hard to imagine how these procedures risked voter 
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fraud.  It seems unlikely that anyone intent on committing voter fraud would go through the 
trouble of pre-registering ineligible voters several years in advance. 
 
Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2009 
 For review of MOVE Act of 2009 see Chapter 4.
72
 
 
Florida’s Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act of 2010 and 2011 
In response to the federal Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (Move) Act which 
expanded the rights of absentee voters, Florida officials adopted their own version in 2010.  The 
state‘s MOVE law allowed voters to request and receive absentee ballots by mail, or 
electronically.  It also required that election administrators deliver ballots within 45 days of the 
election.  The law established an electronic tracking system that enabled voters to monitor the 
status of an absentee ballot, similar to what was used with commercial mail carriers.  Voters 
were able to track receipt of ballot request, an estimated date of ballot delivery, and confirmation 
of the final submission.
73
    
 Subsequent legislation passed in 2011, allowed military voters in the state to utilize the 
federal write in absentee ballot, or FWAB, system.
74
  Under the federal system, mandated by the 
UOCAVA of 1986, military voters may cast a FWAB ballot if they have not received, or 
experienced problems with the regular ballot. This legislation provided Florida‘s military voters 
with three different forms of absentee ballot; the official state absentee ballot, a backup state 
write-in absentee ballot, and the FWAB ballot.  
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 It is important to note the support of Florida officials for the number of pro-mobilizing 
reforms adopted between 2004 and 2011.  From early voting to retractions of felon 
disfranchisement laws, Florida‘s GOP led government should receive credit for these reforms.  
However, by 2011, state officials would reverse many of these previously granted conveniences. 
 
Omnibus Elections Reform Bill of 2011 
 In 2011, consistent with a wave of similar voter suppression efforts in other states, 
Florida adopted a 128 page bill with significant restrictions and retractions.
75
  First, the bill 
included administrative hurdles like eliminating the option for voters to update their address 
information at the polls when moving between Florida counties; and a requirement for strict 
signature matching on absentee ballots (Weiser & Norden 2012, p. 3).  This provision exempted 
voters who moved inside of the county and active military members and their families.  All 
others were required to cast a provisional ballot. 
 Second, the elections revision reduced the early voting period from 14 days to eight, 
shortened the number of hours that early voting locations could be open, and prohibited early 
voting on the Sunday before the election (Weiser & Norden 2011, p. 21).  Although the total 
number of early voting hours was kept, these revisions specifically banned early voting on 
Sunday. 
Critics charged that the cancellation of the Sunday session was a direct response to the 
effectiveness of the ―Souls to the Polls‖ mobilization efforts employed by the state‘s African 
American churches (Levin 2012; Herron and Smith 2012a, p. 346).  Researchers argue that 
important Democratic-leaning constituencies were likely impacted.  African Americans, 
Hispanics, young, and first time voters, were the most likely groups to participate in early voting; 
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a trend that was even stronger on Sundays.  In 2008, African American and Hispanic turnout was 
high on the Sunday before the election.  That year, despite constituting a small minority of the 
total population, African Americans accounted for nearly 40% of all ballots cast during the two 
Sunday sessions of early voting in Florida (Herron & Smith 2013a, p. 342).   
Any reductions in previously established early voting hours were suspect, but targeted 
reductions lend support to charges of racial discrimination.  Although the motivation may be to 
depress Democratic Party turnout, it is important to explore the logic or thinking process 
involved.  Ultimately this process developed in the following, or similar, pattern: 
1.  Process begins with a desire to depress opposition party voters. 
2. Next, elites recognize that African Americans vote overwhelmingly for the 
Democratic Party. 
3. Then, party leaders adopt measures that impede black voting (for example, the Souls 
to the Polls reductions in early voting). 
4. Black participation is reduced; and in effect, Democratic Party votes are reduced. 
Whatever the intent, this process involved the use of racial markers to construct voter 
suppression measures.  As proof, this study points to lengthy delays in Florida for the 2012 
election.  A 2013 report by Republican Florida Secretary of State Ken Detzner described the 
cause of these delays as: 
However, despite the variety of voting methods in Florida, many voters found themselves 
waiting in line for hours to cast a ballot both during the early voting period and on 
Election Day. These lines can be attributed, in part, to county supervisors of elections 
underestimating the turnout of voters in certain precincts. But most, if not all, counties 
experienced longer wait times than in previous elections due to factors including the 
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record number of voters, a shortened early voting schedule, inadequate voting locations, 
limited voting equipment and a long ballot.
76
  
 
 Along with reductions in early voting, this legislation stiffened the penalties for third 
party registration violations.  Voter registration drives are employed to mitigate economic and 
racial disparities in voting.  Racial and ethnic minorities, disabled, and low-income citizens tend 
to respond well to registration drives at churches, malls, and other public venues (Weiser & 
Norden 2011, p. 20). 
Florida displays a lengthy history of high profile conflicts over registration drives. Weiser 
and Norden (2011) traced the origins of these disputes to the 2004 controversies surrounding the 
community group ACORN.  In short, the organization was accused of various misdeeds related 
to its ballot initiative and voter registration activities.  In 2005 the Florida legislature responded 
by passing restrictions on third-party registration groups.  New regulations required registration 
forms to be submitted within ten-days subject to hefty fines for violations.  The law was 
challenged in the courts by the League of Women Voters and other groups and ultimately 
blocked.  Again in 2007, the legislature offered a similar piece of legislation that faced legal 
challenges.  The matter was settled in 2009 when the Florida Division of Elections adopted a 
compromise rule that satisfied both sides (Weiser & Norden 2011, p. 22). 
 Absent any new allegations of problems with third-party voter registration drives, 
Florida‘s legislature took up HB 1355 in 2011 with the stated goal of increasing the difficulty of 
voting (Weiser and Norden 2011, p. 23).  State Senator, Mike Bennett (R- Bradenton) argued:  
We all want everybody to vote. But we want an informed voter.  Many people don‘t even 
know where and when they‘re supposed to go vote. Voting is a privilege.77 How easy 
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should it be? […]How much more convenient do you want to make it? […] This is a 
hard-fought privilege.  This is something people die for. You want to make it convenient? 
The guy who died to give you that right, it was not convenient. Why would we make it 
any easier? I want ‗em to fight for it. I want ‗em to know what it‘s like. I want them to go 
down there, and have to walk across town to go over and vote (qtd. In Pillow 2011).
78
 
 
 
This study notes the devolving importance of access to the franchise.  First, early voting 
was declared a ―convenience‖ and ―not a right‖ by the state legislature in 2005.  Next, voting 
itself was designated as a ―privilege‖ in 2011.  By 2012, long lines and delays provided many 
Floridians the opportunity to prove how much they valued the franchise.  Many waited up to 
seven hours for the privilege to cast their ballots.  Unfortunately, as many as an estimated 
200,000 other voters were unable to wait and left, presumably, without voting (Powers & 
Damron 2013).
79
   . 
HB 1355 placed several burdensome requirements on registration groups.  First, these 
organizations were required to pre-register with the state before conducting registration drives.  
Second, drive organizers, volunteers, and employees were required to sign sworn affidavits 
reporting criminal penalties for false registration.  Third, registration forms were mandated to be 
submitted within 48 hours of the collection of signatures or third party registration groups risked 
civil penalties and fines (Weiser and Norden 2011, p. 21).  This final ―48-hour‖ provision proved 
the most controversial element of the law as it created an imposing technical hurdle for 
registration groups. 
In response to this law, several independent organizations suspended all registration work 
in the state.  Rock the Vote ended its activity permanently, while the League of Women Voters 
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and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored people suspended all registration 
initiatives while appealing the decision in the courts (Herron and Smith 2012b p. 7-8). 
HB 1355 was impeded on two fronts.  First, several legal challenges delayed the most 
burdensome requirements.  Second, a handful of Florida counties remained under the VRA‘s 
preclearance provision allowing the Department of Justice to challenge the changes.  Ultimately, 
the legal suits were successful in muting the law.  In 2012, a Florida judge overturned the ―48 
hour‖ rule which required third party registration groups submit forms within 48 hours or suffer 
heavy fines and penalties (Herron and Smith 2012b, p. 8).   
Despite the legal victory, HB 1355 was implemented for over a year in most of Florida‘s 
counties.  In a study of daily registration reports, researchers found that even this brief 
interruption impacted registration patterns (Herring & Smith 2013b).  In 2004 and 2008, an 
average of around 210,000 new Democrats registered between July 1 of the year before and July 
31 the year of the election.  In both years, new Democrat registrants outpaced new Republican 
registrants.  In 2012, Republicans outpaced Democrats ten to one (128,039 to 11,365).  In this 
case, it appears that restrictions on outside registration had a noticeable impact.
80
 
 
Reversal of Felony Disfranchisement Reforms of 2011 and 2012 
 Finally, in 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott reversed a 2007 decision that made it 
easier for former nonviolent offenders to have their rights restored.  As a result, all felony 
offenders, even nonviolent ones, were subjected to a minimum five year waiting period 
upon completion of their sentences.  Some offenders must wait seven years before applying.  
In order to have their rights restored all felons must apply to the Governor or appeal to the 
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state legislature to pass special legislation specifically restoring their rights (Bassetti 2012, 
p. 175). 
 
Summary 
This chapter highlighted the long and complicated web that comprised Florida‘s elections 
code.  Reforms like the NVRA, HAVA, and MOVE generally eased restrictions and 
standardized election laws.  However, process tracing of legislation indicated that lawmakers in 
Florida instituted a range of measures suspected of suppressing turnout.  State officials restricted 
registration drives, eliminated early voting hours, strengthened felon disfranchisement 
regulations, purged citizens from registration rolls, and experienced long lines and difficulties at 
the polls. Although this study focused on legislative action, a number of additional voter 
suppression measures were recorded by scholars including attempts at other levels of 
government. 
This chapter reports the following findings.  First, Florida officials adopted a mixture of 
voter suppression and pro-voting measures from 1988 to 2012.  However, a broad examination 
of these laws suggests that officials implemented targeted efforts to depress African American 
participation.  Florida officials have taken the following actions consistent with voter 
suppression measures including: 
1.  Reversed felony disfranchisement reforms. 
2.  Ended same day registration during the early voting period. 
3.  Eliminated early voting on Sundays.  
4.  Reduced the amount of available early voting hours. 
5.  Purged voters utilizing erroneous lists of former felons and non citizens. 
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6.  Adopted strict matching requirements for registration forms. 
7.  Caused long lines at the polls in 2012, partly due to early voting reductions. 
8.  Suspended pre-registration of 16 and 17 year-olds. 
9.  Allowed Secretary of State to be appointed by Governor. 
 
Second, the data supports the argument that voter suppression laws displayed a partisan 
bias.  Despite broad support for the ―democracy canon‖, officials of both parties were willing to 
sacrifice this principle for partisan gain.  During the legal battles following the contested 2000 
presidential race, supporters of Bush and Gore both offered arguments that increased their 
chances of winning a recount over the idea that all votes should be counted equally (Hansen 
2012, p. 24).  However, Republican Party officials proposed and provided support for almost all 
of the voter suppression legislation passed into law since 2000.  Additionally, this study 
identifies a rise in voter suppression legislation and language beginning in 1998 in Florida and 
2013 in North Carolina.  These developments closely followed partisan transition.  Third, despite 
the highly partisan nature of these efforts, this study finds that not all Republican elites supported 
voter suppression.  Particularly early in the period under study, legislators passed and retracted 
voter suppression measures frequently.  For example, Florida‘s ―no-excuse‖ absentee balloting 
rules and felon disfranchisement regulations have vacillated.  Disagreements among Republican 
elites likely marked differences between ideological and racial conservatism. On one side sit 
ideological conservatives who might be willing to compromise to attract minority voters.  On the 
other, racial conservatives remain committed, at great potential costs, to anti-democratic policies 
that limit the political power of minority voters. 
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CHAPTER 6: African American Participation 
“Color blindness may be politically correct, but it isn’t politically accurate. […] race is 
important largely because of the differences in voting patterns between whites and people 
of color […].  And these differences do not merely stem from racial disparities in class.  
On average, people of color and whites of the same socio-economic status have vastly 
different political preferences” (Overton 2006, p. 69). 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter explores political participation in North Carolina and Florida from 1988 to 
2012.   To assess each state‘s level of participation this study compared three measures of voter 
turnout and registration.  These data are employed to test competing theories of voter 
suppression.  Next, state demographic and county level registration data are utilized to rule out 
alternative explanations.  Finally, I summarize and defend the central findings of this chapter. 
 
Voter Registration and Turnout by Race in North Carolina 
 Historically, African American turnout in North Carolina fluctuated in response to 
several periods of intense demobilization.  Pre-Voting Rights Act, the state led the region with 
around a 40 percent black registration rate in 1960.  By 1980, that increased to 47 percent 
(Luebke 1998, p. 144-145).  However, North Carolina fell behind all of its southern neighbors as 
other states in the region made larger gains throughout the subsequent decades.   Luebke (1998) 
explained that historical African American participation was stunted due the state‘s moderate 
reputation on civil rights, the conservative lean of Tar Heel politics, and the refusal of black and 
Democratic politicians to employ populist appeals (Luebke 1998, p. 146-157).  Others pointed to 
the Tar Heel state‘s blend of conservative progressivism, arguing that elites promoted a 
conservative political culture supportive of pro-business internal improvements while opposing 
higher participation (Eamon 2008, p. 14). 
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 To assess the participation patterns of two racial voting blocs (whites and blacks), this 
study compares Census turnout and registration rates with a new measure of registration.   
Census data reported that African American participation in presidential election years increased 
dramatically over time, spiking in recent elections.  This line of thinking credited the success of 
the Voting Rights Act for historic increases, and the election of the nation‘s first African 
American president for more recent spikes in black participation.  This data fits well with the 
popular narrative of a nation that successfully eliminated racially contrived disfranchisement.  In 
fact, the Census data indicated that self reported black registration in North Carolina surpassed 
that of whites, for the first time outside of the margin of error in 2012.  This trend was confirmed 
across multiple measures of participation. 
 
Table 6.1 VAP Reported registration by Race in North Carolina in presidential elections 1988-2012 
(percent)  
      
  White      African American Gap  
 
2012  70.6 (1.9) 83.7 (3.4) 12.7*       
2008  73.3 (1.8) 71.0 (4.5) -2.3      
2004  69.4 (2.0) 70.4 (2.6) 1.0       
2000  67.9 (2.1) 62.9 (4.7) -5.0       
1996  70.4  (x) 65.5  (x) -4.9      
1992  70.8 (0.9) 64.0 (2.1) -6.8*      
1988  65.6 (1.0) 58.2 (2.5) -7.4*  
 
Note:  Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP). 
Source:  1988-2012.  Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census. 
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval.  X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error. 
 
 
Table 6.1 displays the Census estimated self reported registration rates for black and 
white North Carolinians from 1988 to 2012.  On this measure, blacks in the state made steady 
gains from a seven point deficit in 1988 to nearly a 13 point advantage in 2012.  Beginning in 
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1996, the difference between self reported black and white registration in North Carolina fell 
within the study‘s margin of error.   
In addition to a gradual increase in self reported registration, the pace of black 
registration spiked in the last three presidential elections.  However, only the increase in 2012 
withstood closer scrutiny.  The apparent upticks in 2004 and 2008 fell within the reported 
margins of error, indicating that we cannot be certain of real movement. These concerns 
notwithstanding, the data portrays African American registration as growing dramatically during 
the time period under review. 
In 2012, Census derived data estimated that African American registration in North 
Carolina reached historic highs.  For that election, nearly 84 percent of blacks in the state 
reported registering for the election.  The current study attributes the rise in self reported 
registration in the two most current presidential elections to the Obama campaigns.  For African 
American voters it was likely that the election and reelection of the nation‘s first African 
American president produced increased motivation or enthusiasm.  Although the gains in 2008 
cannot be conclusively confirmed by this data, the general trend supports the view that black 
registration has been on the rise in North Carolina.  
From 1988 to 2012, white registration rates in North Carolina remained more stable.  The 
self reported registration rates for white adults ranged between 65 and 73 percent.   During this 
period, white registration averaged just fewer than 70 percent.  The average of black registration 
for the same period was nearly 68 percent.  In sum, this data signals that black registration in 
North Carolina reached parity with whites by 2012.  Again, these results must be accepted only 
tentatively considering the problems with self reported survey data identified by this study. 
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 A similar measure of self reported turnout indicates that these gains in registration 
resulted in higher black turnout. 
 
Table 6.2 VAP Reported Voted by Race in North Carolina in presidential elections 1988-2012 
(percent)  
     
   White     African American Gap  
  
2012  60.1 (2.0) 78.7 (3.8) 18.6*       
2008  64.6 (2.0) 67.2 (4.6) 3.6      
2004  58.1 (2.1) 63.1 (4.9) 5.0       
2000  55.9 (2.2) 47.6 (4.8) -8.3       
1996  56.4  (x) 48.7  (x) -7.7      
1992  62.4 (0.9) 54.1 (2.2) -8.6*      
1988  55.2 (1.1) 46.6 (2.5) -8.6*   
 
Note:  Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP). 
Source:  1988-2012.  Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census. 
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval.  X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2 presents self reported turnout in North Carolina for presidential elections for 
the period under study.  If Census Bureau self reported turnout data is to be believed, African 
American voters in North Carolina turned out at an astonishing rate of nearly 80 percent of the 
voting age population for the 2012 election.  This suggests that black mobilization was so high as 
to outpace white turnout by 18.6 percent.  If accurate, this would be the first time in 
contemporary North Carolina presidential elections that the gap in racial voting favored blacks 
outside of the statistical margin of error.   This would stand as a significant advancement of 
democratization – a minority group banned from political participation as recently as a half 
century ago, now participating on par with, or perhaps surpassing, the dominant majority. 
 However, similar to Census registration estimates, this data indicates that self reported 
black turnout actually spiked first in 2004.  Between 2000 and 2004, black turnout rose nearly 16 
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points on the Census measure.  When the margin of error for the two years was considered, self 
reported black turnout rose between a minimum of 5.8 and a maximum of 25.2 points.
81
   
 If Census self reported registration and turnout data accurately reflected participation, this 
significant increase would contradict notions that increased participation was caused by the 
candidacy of the first African American president.  One might instead look to other causes like 
the diffusion of mobilizing electoral reforms, or perhaps black dissatisfaction with the outgoing 
Republican administration and its policies.  However, survey data was plagued with over-
reporting and other methodological concerns.   
This study assesses an additional metric, official state reported registration rates, to 
develop a more accurate reflection of registration across racial groups.     
 
Table 6.3 State Reported registration rates by Race in North Carolina in presidential 
elections 1996-2012 (percent)  
     
         White      Black  Gap  
 
2012 67% 69.4% +2.4% 
2008 73.3% 67.6% -5.7% 
2004 66.6% 52.9% -13.7% 
2000 67.9% 52.7% -15.2% 
1996 63.6% 50% -13.6% 
      
Note:  Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates (1996, 2000 to 2008, and 2012) with 
county registration reports.  See appendix A for details. 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau; North Carolina State Board of Elections (1996-2012) 
 
 
 Table 6.3 combines county-level Census population estimates with state registration 
records from 1996 to 2012.  Registration data, reported by the North Carolina Board of Elections 
as the official record of the election, confirmed the general trend of rising African American 
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registration.  However, they also called into question the inflated nature of self reported Census 
estimates.  In 2012, black voters in North Carolina registered at higher rates than white voters for 
the first time in contemporary presidential elections.  In that year, blacks out registered whites by 
just over two percentage points.  Although this was far below the twelve point advantage 
estimated by Census reports, it does support the broader movement measured by self reported 
survey data. 
 From 1996 to 2012 the general trends were clear and all three measures of participation 
concurred.  Black registration in North Carolina climbed steadily over the period, reaching parity 
with whites in 2012.  As late as 1996, the racial disparity in registration was nearly 14 percent.  
In that year, around half of the African American population of North Carolina registered to 
vote.  By 2012, black registration in the state rose to nearly 72 percent.  Moreover, large 
increases occurred for the presidential elections in 2008 and 2012.   
 County level registration data reveals that white registration was much more stable over 
the same time frame.  Since 1996, white registration in North Carolina ranged from 63 to 73 
percent with a mean of 67.6 percent.  White registration in North Carolina was also highest in 
2008, yet not as dramatic as gains made by blacks in the state.  Unlike with black registration 
estimates, the Census self reported measures were much more accurate at estimating white 
registration.  Since 2000, Census estimates of white registration fell within a few points, in some 
years estimating them precisely. 
 To be clear, registration rates do not necessarily indicate higher black turnout.  
Registration can be a poor proxy for turnout.  Specifically in years where voting groups possess 
varying levels of motivation.  However, this study proves that Census reports overestimated 
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black registration in North Carolina by wide margins (by over ten percent in 2012).  Despite 
these errors, the general trend of rising black participation was confirmed. 
 These measures, taken together, may give us reason to temper Census based estimates but 
they strongly support the narrative of ascending black participation in North Carolina.   
 
Voter Registration and Turnout by Race in Florida 
 To evaluate contemporary African American participation in Florida, again this study 
explored the same three measures of registration and turnout.  Census data revealed modest gains 
in self reported registration and turnout in Florida.  According to this data, black participation in 
Florida increased only slightly in 2008 and 2012.  Even with the historic candidacy of the 
nation‘s first African American president, self reported black participation remained anemic.  
Although black participation levels increased somewhat, these gains were much smaller in 
Florida than in North Carolina.  In fact, for both years, black Floridians registered and voted less 
than their white counterparts by statistically significant margins.  This gap, along with the 
general stagnancy of black participation in the state, support claims that voter suppression 
measures were responsible. 
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Table 6.4 VAP Reported registration by Race in Florida in presidential elections 1988-2012 
(percent)  
     
  White     African American Gap  
 
2012  62.3 (1.3) 56.3 (3.8) -6.0*       
2008  64.5 (1.3) 54.3 (4.0) -10.2*      
2004  64.7 (1.4) 52.6 (4.3) -12.1*       
2000  62.5 (1.4) 52.7 (4.6) -10.2*       
1996  63.7  (x) 53.1  (x) -10.6*      
1992  64.5 (0.8) 54.7 (2.6) -9.8*      
1988  64.3 (0.9) 57.7 (2.8) -6.6*    
 
Note:  Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP). 
Source:  1988-2012.  Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census. 
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval.  X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error. 
 
 
Table 6.4 displays self reported registration by race in Florida from 1988 to 2012.  On 
this measure, black participation in the state only increased enough to regain the six point deficit 
that existed in 1988.   Although the data does reveal a modest uptick in 2012, self reported black 
registration remained stable over the entire period.  In fact, there was no statistical difference 
between black registration rates in 1988 than in 2012.  During this interval, blacks self reported 
registering to vote at an average of 54 percent of the voting age population.  For whites in 
Florida, that rate topped 63 percent.  For all years, the racial gap was greater than the statistical 
margin of error. 
Additionally, black registration in Florida was likely lower than Census estimates 
suggested.  Again, Current Population Survey data relied on self reported survey responses.  
These measures overstated black registration, as they did in North Carolina.  These data offer 
strong support for the discouraging voter hypothesis.  One plausible explanation for lower levels 
of black registration in the state might be the presence of voter suppression mechanisms.  
Scholars have long argued that burdensome registration policies depress participation.  Lower 
registration rates were consistent with this view. 
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 Additionally, the absences of any clear spikes in African American registration in 2008 
and 2012 were suspicious.  This study assumed these elections produced high levels of interest, 
excitement, and motivation for black voters, as occurred in North Carolina.  If this Census 
reported registration data were confirmed, this would again provide additional evidence that 
voter suppression measures mattered and exhibited racial effects.  
 
Table 6.5 VAP Reported Voted by Race in Florida in presidential elections 1988-2012 
(percent)  
     
        White    African American Gap  
  
2012  55.7 (1.3) 49.2 (3.8) -6.5*       
2008  58.3 (1.3) 50.1 (4.0) -8.2*      
2004  58.4 (1.4) 44.5 (4.2) -13.9*       
2000  53.8 (1.5) 42.3 (4.6) -11.5*       
1996  52.7  (x) 40.5  (x) -12.2*      
1992  57.9 (0.8) 46.3 (2.6) -11.6*      
1988  57.1 (0.9) 40.8 (2.8) -16.3*   
 
Note:  Percentages are for Voting Age Population (VAP). 
Source:  1988-2012.  Statistical Abstract of the United States (Table 4), Bureau of the Census. 
Significant at .10; 90 percent confidence interval.  X = missing value. * = Outside the statistical margin of error. 
 
 
Table 6.5 lists self reported turnout by race in Florida from 1988 to 2012.  This data, 
which supports the Census based registration numbers, reveals low levels of self reported black 
turnout.  From 1988 to 2012, black Floridians reported turning out at consistently lower rates 
than whites.  In every year, white turnout outpaced black turnout. 
 Despite this disparity, black participation does appear to have risen in 2008 before 
dropping slightly in 2012.  Although the difference between estimated voter turnout for African 
Americans in those years were within the margins of error, in both years blacks in Florida 
reported voting at around 50 percent. Additionally, in the two most recent presidential elections, 
the difference between black and white self reported participation fell within single digits. 
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 Census estimates supported the general narrative of rising black participation in Florida 
with smaller (than North Carolina) spikes in 2008 and 2012.  However, these estimates were 
imprecise and required additional confirmation. 
 
Table 6.6 State Reported registration rates by Race in Florida in presidential elections 
1996-2012 (percent)  
     
         White      Black  Gap  
 
2012 60.6%* 50.5 % -10.1% 
2008 69.2% 51.7 % -17.5% 
2004 67.6% 46.5% -21.1% 
2000 63.9% 39.1% -24.8% 
1996 65.3% 39.4% -25.9% 
      
Note:  Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates (1996, 2000 to 2008, and 2012) with 
county registration reports.  See appendix A for details. 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau; Florida Division of Elections (1996-2012) 
*Due to inconsistencies with data white population of Miami-Dade County is excluded from the 2012 data. 
 
 
Table 6.6 lists state reported registration in Florida by race from 1996 to 2012.  This table 
reveals two interesting narratives.  First, African American voters made noticeable gains at 
narrowing racial differences in participation.  In 1996, white Floridians registered over 25 points 
higher than blacks in the state.  By 2012, that disparity was cut by more than half.  However, 
black Floridians still trailed whites in registration by ten percent.   Again, estimates for white 
registration in 2012 were less reliable due to changes in the way whites and white Hispanics 
were counted by the Census in Miami-Dade County between 2008 and 2012.
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Despite these advances, African American registration regressed for the 2012 election.  
The 50 percent black registration rate in 2012 was lower than in 2008, lagged far behind North 
Carolina‘s black registration of 69.4 percent, and continued to trail considerably behind whites in 
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Florida.  From 1996 to 2012 the average registration rate for blacks in Florida was just over 58 
percent.  For whites the mean for the same period was just over 65 percent. 
Florida‘s state reported registration indicates that Census estimates were biased, in most 
cases over-estimating black registration in Florida.  The development of African American 
voting in the state presents a glass half filled, half empty dilemma.  On one hand, racial 
differences in voting decreased.  On the other, significant disparities persisted. 
 
Comparing Registration 
 An examination of state legislative election reforms from 1988 to 2012 reveals that 
Florida officials adopted voter suppression measures more often than those in North Carolina.  
Both states instituted a range of reforms to make voting easier including early voting, expanded 
registration periods, rule standardization, and voter education.  Despite these efforts, Florida 
leaders adopted a number of voter suppression policies that were absent or weakened in North 
Carolina.  From felon disenfranchisement statutes to retractions of the early voting period, 
Florida officials repeatedly passed legislation thought to suppress turnout.  How did these 
measures impact African American participation? 
 Although the Census data presented larger gains, this study compares state reported 
registration rates between Florida and North Carolina from 1996 to 2012 for a more conservative 
estimate.    
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Table 6.7 State Reported African American Registration in Florida and North Carolina 
presidential elections 1996-2012 (percent)  
     
    Florida      North Carolina Gap  
 
2012 50.5% 69.4% 19.8% 
2008 51.7% 67.6% 16.5% 
2004 46.5% 52.9% 11.8% 
2000 39.1% 52.7% 13.3% 
1996 39.4% 50% 9.8% 
   
Note:  Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates using ―one-race‖ only data for (1996, 
2000 to 2008, and 2012) with county registration reports.  See appendix A for details. 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau; North Carolina State Board of Elections (1996-2012); Florida Division of Elections 
(1996-2012). 
 
 
Table 6.7 displays state reported registration rates for African Americans in Florida and 
North Carolina from 1996 to 2012.  The differences between the registration rates of African 
Americans across the two cases were sizeable.  Black voters registered to vote at much higher 
rates in North Carolina out pacing black Floridians by nearly 20 percent in 2012.  Moreover, the 
gap between the two states grew.   In fact, North Carolina‘s black registration rate of 50 percent 
in 1996 was higher than any reported by Florida between 1996 and 2004.  Beginning in 2008, the 
gap in black registration between the states rose dramatically.  In that year, differences between 
black registrations increased from 11 percent in 2004 to 16 percent in 2008.  For the 2008 and 
2012 elections, black Floridians registered at just 52 and 50 percent.  Significantly lower than 
black registration in North Carolina for the same years. 
 Increases in black registration were much more pronounced in North Carolina for the 
Obama election and reelection campaigns.  In 2008, state reported black registration in North 
Carolina was nearly 68 percent and in 2012 it rose to almost 70 percent.  Although blacks in 
Florida registered at their highest rates in 2008 and 2012, these increases amounted to only a few 
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points difference from 2004.  Compare that to North Carolina where black registration increased 
by 15 points between 2004 and 2008, and by another two percent in 2012. 
 This registration data supports several clear conclusions.  First, African American 
registration was much higher in North Carolina than Florida.  Second, black participation was up 
in both states for the 2008 and 2012 elections.  However, blacks in North Carolina made more 
significant increases.  Third, the disparity across states grew over the time period under study.  In 
sum, black political participation in Florida appears suppressed when compared to the dynamic 
gains made in North Carolina. 
 
Voter Suppression Hypotheses 
What can participation rates tell us about the effectiveness of voter suppression?  When 
assessed in conjunction with the leading voter suppression hypotheses, this data can help to 
eliminate or bolster the assumptions and predictions associated with competing frameworks.   
This current project‘s hypotheses were assessed in light of the qualitative and quantitative data 
presented. 
  Hypothesis 1:  Discouraging Voter Hypothesis. The standard model of voter suppression 
concluded that voter suppression measures were either misguided or intended to impede the 
participation of targeted groups.  In the absence of significant voter fraud, efforts to tighten the 
voting process burdened legitimate voters depressing turnout (Piven et al 2009, p. 202; Bassetti 
2012; Overton 2006, p. 148). 
 Differences observed between African American participation in North Carolina and 
Florida were consistent with voter suppression having a negative impact.  On all three measures, 
blacks in North Carolina participated at higher levels than those in Florida.  From 1996 to 2012, 
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the gap in state reported black registration between the states grew eight percent.  By 2012, 
blacks in North Carolina registered almost 20 percent higher than their counterparts in Florida. 
 If extraneous casual variables can be ruled out, these differences lend strong support to 
the argument that voter suppression impacted the participation of African American voters. 
Hypothesis 2:  Ensuring Integrity Hypothesis.  A small set of voter suppression 
proponents argued that these laws actually help promote turnout (Lott 2006, p. 11).  This 
approach assumes that voter suppression laws increased the safeness and integrity of elections.  
Subsequently, as citizens acquire more confidence in clean elections, participation increases.  
 The data however does not support this interpretation.  With increased voter suppression 
mechanisms in place in the state, this hypothesis predicted that Florida would display higher 
participation.  Contrary to this prediction, in the two most recent presidential election years, both 
whites and blacks participated at lower levels in Florida than their counterparts in North 
Carolina.  If voter suppression laws promoted integrity and turnout, we would expect Florida to 
display cleaner elections and higher levels of participation.  The former is a subjective judgment, 
but recent elections in Florida were rife with controversy.  The latter was contradicted by all 
three measures of participation presented in this study. 
 Additionally, the gap between black registration across Florida and North Carolina for 
2012 was nearly 20 percent.  The same for whites across states was only six percent.  This data 
provides additional evidence of racial effects.  Despite a highly motivated and mobilized African 
American community, blacks in Florida failed to eliminate the racial gap in participation. 
The ensuring integrity hypothesis was further weakened by its primary justification.  
Proponents of this hypothesis often assumed the existence of significant occurrences of voter 
fraud in contemporary American elections (Fund 2008, p. 196; Lott 2006, p. 11).  The current 
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study relied on the established literature to rule out this argument (Minnite 2010, p. 57; Piven et 
al 2009, p. 202; Hasen 2012, p. 6).  Minnite (2010) concluded that voter fraud was rare and that 
allegations of fraud were strategically employed to justify voter suppression laws (Minnite 2010, 
p. 153).  This study accepts the conclusion that voter fraud was not wide spread in Florida and 
North Carolina from 1988 to 2012. 
Further, Lott‘s (2006) formulation is refuted by the evidence presented in this study.  
Most notably, Lott hypothesized that if voter fraud were rampant; then voter suppression 
measures would produce lower, but more accurate, turnout (Lott 2006, p. 4).  Both racial groups 
in Florida displayed increasing levels of turnout from 1988 to 2008.  However, blacks continued 
to trail behind whites in the state.  From 1996 to 2008, whites in Florida registered on par with 
their counterparts in North Carolina.  The same cannot be said for blacks in Florida.  By 2012 the 
difference in black registration across states was stark.  
Hypothesis 3:  Minimal Effects.  Berinsky (2005) contended that the impact of voter 
suppression laws were likely minimal and limited by several factors.  Most importantly, 
contemporary laws targeted citizens who were the least likely to vote and presented only minor 
hurdles to participation (Berinsky 2005, p. 482).   Additionally, many of these efforts were 
frustrated by legal and political opposition.   
 The minimal effects model cannot be conclusively ruled out.  Due the complex 
interaction between the broader push for pro-voting reforms and targeted demobilization, the 
precise effects of voter suppression were difficult to establish.  It is likely that the effects were 
contingent upon local circumstances.  In some elections the impact may be minimal; in others it 
may be crucial. 
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 However, sizeable differences in African American participation across states suggest 
that the effect of voter suppression was substantial during the 2008 and 2012 elections.  If 
nothing else, the dramatic gains in black participation in North Carolina proved that racial 
disparities in voting could be overcome with the right combination of conditions.  These 
conditions would combine high levels of interest, motivation, and excitement with minimal 
institutional barriers to participation like voter suppression. 
Hypothesis 4:  Voter Suppression Backlash Hypothesis.  This hypothesis predicted that 
minority voters would respond to voter suppression laws with increased turnout. 
The current study identified two plausible mechanisms by which this might occur.  The 
first assumed that backlash effects were localized.  Under this model, blacks in Florida should 
participate at higher rates due to the motivating force of offensive voter suppression measures.  
The data does not support this interpretation.  Blacks in Florida participated at higher levels for 
the 2008 and 2012 elections than previous elections, but these gains were dwarfed by much 
larger increases by blacks in North Carolina.  Although the racial disparity in participation has 
decreased, black Floridians still lagged behind whites by a significant difference. 
The second possibility for backlash assumed that push back will be more intense in states 
without voter suppression regimes.  Localized backlash may be offset by actual voter 
suppression mechanisms resulting in a wash.  Further, African Americans in states without voter 
suppression regimes may face optimal conditions for mobilization.  Avery (1989) predicted that 
the perfect combination for increased turnout involved high mobilization, low demobilization, 
and a motivated electorate.  African American voters in non-voter suppressive states have 
motivation and an uninhibited pathway to express their discontent.   
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Since participation data was largely silent on intent, assessing the precise role of backlash 
was difficult for the current study.  However the data does not support localized backlash.  If 
black participation in Florida increased in direct response to voter suppression, the effect was not 
large enough to offset racial disparities.  Further, higher rates of participation in North Carolina 
were consistent with black voters having heightened motivation but this study could not 
substantiate any specific non-localized backlash effects.  On this matter, this study can only 
speculate that backlash contributed to historically high black participation in North Carolina. 
Although differences in African American participation between the two states were 
clear, this study acknowledges the need to evaluate alternative explanations. 
 
Assessing Alternative Explanations 
 Researchers have long investigated demographic changes as causal factors in shaping 
partisan realignment.  Scholars disagree on how diversification has altered southern politics.  For 
example, Prysby (2008) argued that ―race is clearly the most important demographic factor 
influencing voting in North Carolina‖ (Prysby 2008, p. 67).  While Luebke (1998) was skeptical 
that demographic changes would bring about dramatic short term changes in Tar Heel politics.  
He argued that, ―For the foreseeable future the additional coloring and diversity‖ [of the state] 
―will have little effect on politics.  Only as they become citizens and their children turn 18 are 
Latinos and Asians likely to impact politics‖ (Luebke 1998, p. 133).   
Building on V.O. Key‘s (1949) original analysis of the southern states, researchers 
developed a number of demographic and socio-economic variables thought to influence 
participation.  These included population growth, nativity, race, urbanization, income, and 
education.   To rule out alternative causes, this study compares these measures across cases.  For 
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this purpose, I employ the literature which provides demographic profiles of each southern U.S. 
state for recent years (MacManus 2012, Chp. 3).   
 
Growth and Migration 
Both Florida and North Carolina have experienced massive growth since 1950.  Along 
with western states, those in the southern U.S. have doubled the population growth rates of other 
regions (MacManus 2012, 50).   
 
Figure 6.1 Population size by southern state 1950 – 2030. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau (McManus 2012, 50). 
 
Figure 6.1 displays total population estimates and projections for each southern state 
from 1950 to 2030.  Florida ranked second to only Texas as the fastest growing state in the 
region, and Census population estimates projected the trend to continue.  From 1950 to 2000, 
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Florida climbed from 20
th
 in population to 4
th
 in the nation (Woodard 2006, p. 64).  By 2030, 
Florida‘s population is expected to reach close to 30 million residents (McManus 2012, p. 51).   
Although North Carolina‘s population growth lagged behind the region‘s leaders, the 
state grew at a steady rate.  By 2030, North Carolina is expected to boast a population of 13 
million residents.  This would place the state in the second tier of the region‘s most populated 
states competing with Georgia and Virginia. 
 
Figure 6.2 Population growth rate by southern state 1950 – 2030. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau. (McManus 2012, p. 51). 
 
 
Figure 6.2 reveals the population growth rate and projections for southern states from 
1950 to 2030.  Although Florida has historically experienced the fastest overall growth and in-
migration of new residents, the state has leveled out in recent years.  Florida remained the fastest 
growing state in the region, but North Carolina and other competitors were not far behind.   
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In sum, Florida‘s population grew larger and faster than almost all states in the region, 
with the exception of the region‘s population leader Texas.  Although not as populated, North 
Carolina shared similar general demographic profiles.  The Tar Heel state also grew; enough so 
to compete with other second tier states in the region. 
The current study identified no indications that suggested either the total population or 
growth rates likely depressed the political participation of African Americans in Florida 
differently than those in North Carolina. 
 
Size of African American Population 
Two direct outcomes of population growth were racial and ethnic diversity.  Both cases 
displayed high levels of growth and diversification.  Diversification may impact political 
participation in several ways.  First, immigration can alter the balance of native to foreign born 
residents.  This was true for residents born outside of the country, the state, or the region.  
Second, the process could disrupt the racial status quo.  This included the traditional black/white 
racial paradigm, but also the addition of Hispanics and other ethnic groups.  Finally, 
diversification alters the composition of the electorate. 
 One significant historical difference between the two cases has been the size of each 
state‘s African American population.  Historically, the size of Florida‘s black population was 
smaller compared to other states in the region while North Carolina‘s has been larger.  Some 
argued that Florida politics were different because a smaller black population limited racial 
politics.  Although politics in the state were not without racial discord, politicians avoided race 
baiting as often, or intensely, as those in other Deep South states (Woodard 2006, p. 259).  
Despite these historical traditions, growth and diversification have disrupted these trends. 
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Much of Florida‘s growth was due to a massive influx of new minority voters.  From 
1990 to 2005, the African American population increased from 13.8 percent to 15 percent of the 
state (Colburn 2007, p. 5).  This reversed the long trend of black outward migration.  In 2004, 
Broward County attracted more new black residents than any other county in the nation (Colburn 
2007, p. 5).  The new arrivals included Hispanic and Caribbean immigrants, but also many 
African Americans.  Colburn (2007) cited Florida‘s favorable business climate and the success of 
the state‘s minority small business owners for creating a welcoming climate for the newcomers 
(p. 5). 
Although not as diverse as Florida, North Carolina exhibited a sizeable African American 
population hovering around 22 percent, compared to 13 percent nationally.  Was it possible that 
North Carolina‘s black community displayed higher levels of participation because of its size?  
As the adage goes, perhaps strength in numbers promoted political participation.   
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Figure 6.3 Percentage black population by southern state, 1950 – 2012. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys; DemographicsNow.com 
(McManus 2012, p. 62). 
 
 
 Figure 6.3 displays the percentage black population by southern state from 1950 to 2012.  
The size of North Carolina‘s black community cannot be discounted as a factor in promoting 
black participation.  To test the impact of community size, this study compares participation 
across states by county.  If the relative size of the minority community were a critical difference, 
we would expect African Americans who resided in counties with higher black populations to 
display higher levels of participation.   
 To further assess these questions, this study employs the state reported county-level 
registration data compiled by this study. 
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Table 6.8 State Reported African American Registration in Florida and North Carolina by 
Percentage County African American in 2012 
     
        Florida          North Carolina  
% County Black Black Registration % County Black Black Registration  
 
0-10%  (n=25) 43.8%   0-10% (n=36)  65.2% 
11-19% (n=30 ) 50%   11-19% (n=18) 67.7% 
+20% (n=12)  52.6%   +20% (n=46  70% 
 
Note:  Percentages are calculated by merging Census Population estimates (2012) with county registration reports.  
See appendix A for details. 
Source:  U.S. Census Estimates; North Carolina State Board of Elections (2012); Florida Division of Elections 
(2012). 
 
 
 Table 6.8 reveals state reported registration for African Americans by the size of a 
county‘s black population for the 2012 election.  A general trend can be identified.  The size of 
the black population was positively correlated with black registration rates.  In counties where 
African Americans comprised over ten percent of the total population (for this study only 
counting two racial groups), African Americans registered at higher rates than in counties with 
less blacks.  However, this effect was more pronounced in Florida.  These findings suggest that 
the size of a relevant minority population merits further consideration as a factor that can 
promote participation.  
 
Size of Hispanic Population 
 Another potential difference between cases was the size of each state‘s Hispanic 
population.  Although Florida has fewer African American citizens, the state boasted the second 
highest concentration of Hispanics in the South, trailing only Texas.  North Carolina‘s Hispanic 
population was smaller, but has grown too.  By 2004, Hispanics grew to six percent of North 
Carolina‘s total population, placing it fourth in the region (Cooper and Knotts 2008, p. 4).  In 
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1990, there were approximately 77,000 Hispanics in North Carolina.  By 2006, that number had 
exploded to 600,000 and continued to climb (Christensen 2008, p. 307). 
 
Figure 6.4 Percentage Hispanic population by southern state, 1980 – 2012. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys (McManus 2012, 59). 
 
 Figure 6.4 reveals the percentage Hispanic population by southern state from 1980 to 
2012.  This data confirms that Latinos comprised nearly a quarter of Florida‘s population.  
Although this study cannot fully assess the role of the Hispanic community, this data suggests 
that the ethnic and racial composition of the state may be another fruitful avenue for future 
research.  Perhaps the addition of a third ethnic group in Florida altered the political dynamic 
depressing African American participation in some way.  It would also be of worth to explore the 
role of the Hispanic population and its relationship with voter suppression laws.  Ultimately, the 
backlash might best be measured by including all targeted groups and their responses.  Although 
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this study focused on African American participation, the literature and evidence suggested that 
Hispanic voters were, and are, targets of voter suppression also. 
 
Nativity 
Another factor that may depress turnout in Florida might be the high percentage of 
foreign born residents.  This category includes all residents born outside of the United States.  
Florida boasts the highest percentage of foreign-born residents of any state in the nation.  By 
2005 that number climbed to 18 percent of the state‘s total population (McManus 2012, p. 57).  
This could depress turnout as foreign born residents must often overcome social and language 
barriers to participation. 
 
Figure 6.5 Percentage foreign-born by state 1950 – 2005. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys (McManus 2012, p. 57). 
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Figure 6.5 displays the percentage of foreign born residents by southern state from 1950 
to 2005.  Florida and Texas stand out for their exceptionally higher than the national average 
percentages of foreign born residents.   
However, North Carolina features its own sizeable share of foreign born residents.  
Beginning in 1990, the percentage of foreign born North Carolinians grew.  In that year, less 
than two percent of North Carolina‘s citizens were born outside of the U.S.  By 2005, that 
number climbed to over six percent.  These numbers suggest that both states became more 
diverse with each passing year.  Although the percentage of foreign-born residents in a state 
might depress overall turnout, how this process impacted African American political 
participation is unclear.  Florida boasts a sizeable community of Caribbean blacks, but these 
populations do not account for the large differences in participation between blacks and whites in 
the state. 
Another factor associated with demographic growth was the percentage of residents born 
native to the state.  
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Figure 6.6 Percentage state natives, 1950 – 2006. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys; DemographicsNow.com 
(McManus 2012, p. 65). 
 
Figure 6.6 displays the percentage of native-born residents of each southern state.  
Despite the influx of foreign born residents, Florida led the region in the percentage of its 
residents born in the state.  From 2002 to 2006, over 60 percent of the state‘s residents were 
natives and conversely the state featured the smallest percentage of migrants from outside of the 
South (McManus 2012, p. 65). 
Traditional voting theory suggests that foreign born and non-native residents may lack 
the social bonds, history, and tradition, conducive to political participation (Verba et al 1995, p. 
454-455).  However, North Carolina‘s population included only 30 percent of its citizens born in 
the state.  If local attachments to home and community inspired participation, then participation 
in Florida should outpace the same in North Carolina where less of its citizens were born there. 
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Age 
 Florida holds a reputation for attracting retirees.  By 2012, nearly 18 percent of the 
population were 65 years of age or older.  Since the 1950‘s Americans migrated to the state 
during their retirement years to enjoy the weather and relaxed lifestyle.  These migration patterns 
continued into the contemporary era.  From 1995 to 2000, seniors flocked to Florida making it 
the strongest ―senior magnet‖ state scoring a net migration rate of 56.9 (McManus 2012, p. 63).   
The net migration rate measures how many senior (older than sixty-five years of age) citizens 
migrated into the state for every 1,000 older individuals already residing there (McManus 2012, 
p. 74). 
 The standard model of participation suggests that political participation increases with 
age.  Senior citizens and retirees possess the time, resources, and interests that promote 
participation and these citizens tend to turn out at higher rates than other age cohorts.  In the last 
fifty years, a number of interest groups like the American Association for Retired Persons 
(AARP) helped America‘s seniors congeal into a coherent and influential voting bloc (Popkin 
1994, p. 30).  However, elderly Americans were attracted to other states in the region and North 
Carolina was no exception.  From 1995 to 2005, North Carolina‘s net migration rate of 22.1 
trailed only South Carolina and the regions leader, Florida.  By 2012, residents 65 years and 
older accounted for nearly 14 percent of the state (McManus 2012, p. 62). 
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Figure 6.7 Percentage sixty-five and older by state, 1950 – 2012. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial and American Community Surveys; DemographicsNow.com 
(McManus 2012, p. 63). 
 
Figure 6.7 displays the percentage of state residents sixty-five and older from 1950 to 
2012.  Although seniors comprised a larger share of Florida‘s electorate, this finding is difficult 
to pair with lower levels of participation.  Seniors tend to display higher levels of participation 
with the effect declining in the latest years of life.  Additionally, North Carolina‘s percentage of 
seniors of around 15 percent of the population was not too far removed from Florida‘s 18 
percent. 
 
Urbanization 
 Another area of concern was urbanization.  This measure of urbanization reports the 
percentage of citizens that live in urban, and not rural, communities.  The U.S. Census defines 
urban areas as cities or suburbs with a population of 100,000 or more (U.S. Census 2014).  The 
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South, as a region, recently experienced heavy urbanization.  Although most states in the region 
began urbanization as early as the 1950‘s, this process developed unevenly across states.  Long 
passed were the days where most southern citizens resided in rural areas with agrarian 
economies.  Now, most southerners live in the urban inner cities or the surrounding suburbs.  
The same was true for both cases.  However, only Florida and Texas exhibited urban population 
counts above the national average (McManus 2012, p. 54-55). 
 
Figure 6.8 Percentage urban by state, 1950 – 2000. 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau (McManus 2012, p. 54). 
 
Figure 6.8 displays the percentage of the total population that resided in urban areas for 
southern states from 1950 to 2000.  Florida experienced the highest rate of urbanization in the 
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region.  Nearly 90 percent of the state resided in urban areas.  Scholars stressed the importance 
of county level politics and competition in Florida‘s urban centers.  Florida was a large state 
geographically, but high urbanization allowed political actors to gain state wide attention by 
focusing on urban markets and their surrounding suburbs (Woodard 2006, 74). 
 North Carolina did not quite follow Florida‘s lead when it comes to urbanization.  In fact, 
North Carolina‘s rate of urbanization trails behind the national average at 60 percent.  Despite 
this difference, it was unclear as to how urbanization effects participation.  On one hand, 
urbanization can promote political participation by improving access to polling locations, 
increasing media attention, and fostering an active political debate.  On the other hand, the 
process could depress participation by weakening social bonds that promote participation.  The 
former was likely the more influential. 
 
Education and SES 
Finally, this study examined educational and socioeconomic measures to see if the two 
states were comparable.  On education and income, Florida and North Carolina displayed similar 
profiles and trends.  In 2012, both states could boast that around 28 percent of their adult citizens 
were college graduates.  These scores were just below the national average of 30 percent 
(McManus 2012, p. 71). 
Additionally, Florida and North Carolina scored very similar on economic measures. For 
median family income and income per capita, both states scored just below the national averages.  
For 2012, the median family income for both cases was around 54,000 dollars (McManus 2012, 
p. 70).  These close similarities across SES measures suggest that differences in participation 
across states were not caused be these factors. 
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Summary 
 The measures of participation examined, including turnout and registration data, 
indicated that African American participation in Florida lagged behind gains made in North 
Carolina.  Blacks in North Carolina participated at higher levels, and displayed noticeably higher 
increases for the 2008 and 2012 elections.  This study contends that voter suppression efforts 
were, in part, responsible for these differences.  An assessment of alternative explanations 
provided mixed results.  Although Florida and North Carolina shared similar demographic and 
growth profiles, all potential differences could not be eliminated.  For example, the relative size 
of North Carolina‘s black population and Florida‘s Hispanic population could not be discounted.  
These factors remain areas of interest for future research. 
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 The purpose of this project was to examine voter suppression laws and their impact on 
African American participation.  To do so, this study compared two state voting systems, Florida 
and North Carolina.  The current study builds on the theoretical framework introduced by 
Carmine and Stimson (1989), which emphasized the linkage between racial and partisan politics.  
More specifically, this dissertation process traced election system reforms and their impact on 
black registration and turnout.  New data sources were employed to assess the plausibility of 
several competing theories of voter suppression.  This study found that state leaders in both 
cases, Florida and North Carolina, instituted many reforms intended to make voting easier.  In 
line with federal legislation, election officials adopted programs like early voting, one-stop 
voting, no-excuse absentee balloting, and registration at public offices. Despite this progress, this 
study identified selective efforts to target groups for demobilization and voter suppression.  In 
one case, officials adopted a broad range of pro-voting reforms while avoiding intensive voter 
suppression measures.  In the other, state leaders developed a much tougher voter suppression 
regime.  This study finds that the political development and levels of black participation in the 
two cases were consistent with voter suppression laws having a depressive effect. 
 This kind of investigation of targeted demobilization is important due to the recent 
proliferation of voter suppression laws.  The issue carries scientific and theoretical importance, 
but also practical significance.  The changing demographics of American society will no doubt 
alter our politics by disrupting old alignments.  If the construct described by Carmines and 
Stimson (1989) proves correct, specifically the merger of racial and ideological issues; then the 
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diversification of the American electorate may prove decisive in determining how battles over 
voting rights, and other public policy debates, are resolved.   
 
Main Findings 
Careful process analysis across cases resulted in several important findings.  The primary 
findings supported hypothesis 1 and rejected hypotheses 2.  This study‘s results were 
inconclusive on hypotheses 3 and 4.  Although not all of the hypotheses could be ruled out, the 
data collected provided insights into all four of the competing frameworks evaluated. 
H1, the discouraging voter hypothesis, argued that voter suppression measures negatively 
impacted African American participation (Piven et al 2009, p. 202; Bassetti 2012, p. 174; 
Overton 2006, p. 148).  Process analysis revealed stark differences in the level of voter 
suppression across the cases.  In Florida, state officials engaged in a concerted effort to depress 
the turnout of Democratic-leaning voters.  These efforts included, but were not exclusive to, 
African American voters.  Further, this study found that these efforts were successful at 
depressing black participation, as measured using registration and turnout data.  African 
American participation in Florida lagged behind that of whites in the state, and also behind 
African Americans in North Carolina, across multiple measures. 
 H2, the ensuring integrity hypothesis, predicted that heightened elections security and 
voter suppression laws would promote confidence and induce higher participation (Lott 2006, p. 
4).  According to the assumptions of this model, Florida elections should have displayed higher 
levels of participation.  This study‘s data denotes otherwise on two counts.  First, in the past two 
elections, overall participation in Florida lagged behind that in North Carolina.  Both black and 
white Floridians participated less than their counterparts in North Carolina.  Additionally, the 
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racial disparity in voting proved more persistent in Florida.  Second, the absence of equitable 
increases across states in 2008 and 2012 challenges the importance of motivation.  In Florida, 
high levels of excitement for these two presidential contests among African American voters 
only produced small increases in participation. 
 H3, the minimal effects hypothesis, posited that voter suppression was ineffectual mainly 
because voters were likely to overcome all but the strictest of voter suppression mechanisms 
(Berinsky 2005, p. 482).  Although this hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out, the data 
strongly indicated that the impact of voter suppression varies.  Large differences in black 
participation across states confirm that something depressed black participation in Florida.  As 
this study cannot eliminate every potentially spurious relationship, I reserve a final judgment on 
the minimal effects model.  Nonetheless, the evidence was consistent with voter suppression 
having a sizeable impact on black participation in 2012. 
 H4, or the backlash hypothesis, questioned whether voter suppression laws inspired 
enough push back to mitigate their effectiveness.  The current study was unable to reach a 
decisive conclusion on the scope of backlash.  However, I was able to identify two pathways by 
which backlash might occur.  The first, localized backlash was not supported by the evidence.  
Although black participation in Florida was up in 2008 and 2012, these increases were minor 
compared to North Carolina.  This means that either counter demobilization efforts were 
ineffective, or that backlash and voter suppression cancelled each other out.  The second avenue 
for backlash involved push back across state lines.  The current study was unable to isolate inter-
state backlash effects. Yet, the data did not preclude it.  One possible explanation for the high 
rates of black participation in North Carolina may be that higher participation was a response to 
voter suppression in other states.  Publicized voter suppression efforts may trigger the winning 
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combination of motivation and access.  African Americans in states that lack aggressive voter 
suppression regimes may be motivated by media accounts and civil rights protests.  Without 
legal and administrative barriers to suppress them, it makes sense that these voters would turn 
out in higher numbers.  However, without more specific data measuring voter intent this finding 
is only speculative. 
 Although the evidence only fully supported the first hypothesis, the analysis produced 
several interesting ancillary findings.  First, voting frameworks were subtle.  Various protections 
against racial disfranchisement prevented the most egregious voter suppression laws.  Therefore, 
contemporary voter suppression operated at the margins making it challenging to separate anti-
democratic targeting from legitimate partisan conflict.   Despite this difficulty, officials in 
Florida pursued much harsher voter suppression policies than those in North Carolina.  
Beginning in 1998, Florida‘s legislature adopted several reforms suspected of depressing black 
participation.   
 As a result, black participation was much higher in North Carolina than in Florida.  This 
finding was consistent across multiple measures.  This study confirms that racial disparities in 
participation can be mitigated with the right combination of motivation and mobilization.  In 
North Carolina, with a sizeable African American community with a strong tradition of civil 
rights activism; mobilization and participation were high.  Turnout in the 2008 and 2012 
elections show that when politics matter to voters, even those with a history of low turnout can 
be inspired to the polls.  This is consistent with prior studies that found that African Americans 
have historically displayed extremely high turnout when motivated and mobilized.  During 
Reconstruction, African American turnout was nearly 90% in some areas (Goldfield 1997, p. 
121).  However, African American participation rates reached dramatic lows under less favorable 
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institutional conditions.  For example, in 1964 black registration in Mississippi was reportedly 
less than seven percent (Parker 1990, p. 23). 
The standard explanation for political participation suggests that massive growth and out-
of-state immigration produces an electorate disconnected from local politics, more loyal to their 
hometown allegiances.  This was not supported in North Carolina where growth and turnout 
were high.  Other factors indicate that Florida should display higher turnout including high 
profile partisan conflicts, the large numbers of senior voters, and close competition in 
presidential elections.  Despite these competing claims, this study finds that Florida and North 
Carolina experienced similar demographic trends. 
 Finally, an analysis of partisan transition confirms the linkage between realignment and 
targeted demobilization.  This study identifies a rise in voter suppression measures occurring in 
both states following GOP takeovers of each state‘s government. Partisan transition occurred 
first in Florida in 1998, and then later in 2013 for North Carolina.  In both cases, the newly 
seated Republican majorities adopted several voter suppression measures.  However, the data in 
Florida from 1988 to 2012 indicated that Republican elite support for voter suppression was not 
monolithic.  For example, the wavering implementation of ―no-excuse‖ absentee balloting rules 
signified differences among officials over specific measures.  This study speculates that 
differences among Republicans on this issue likely mirror differences between ideological and 
racial conservatism discussed in the literature review.  
 
Limitations of Study 
Like all research methods and designs, this study has its strengths and limitations. 
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The primary weakness of this study was the danger inherent in drawing broad 
conclusions from a limited number of cases.  Although detailed process analysis can mitigate 
some of these risks, I accept that comparisons of participation data were less reliable than 
comparisons of actual state laws.  In the case of the former, it was difficult to eliminate all 
potential sources of spuriousness.  For the latter, process analysis allowed for a comprehensive 
comparison of each state‘s political development.  To improve upon the current study, 
researchers could expand this type of detailed process analysis to other states.   
 A second limitation, inherent to any form of historical analysis, was that this study 
suffered the risk of over-generalizing or omitting important points.  Examining an extended time 
period requires that some elements be glossed over.  This study undoubtedly covers some 
important materials too briskly, while perhaps omitting others altogether.  In order to mitigate 
this problem, this study relied on established works on Florida and North Carolina state politics.  
This study attempted to strike a balance between rich description and scientific parsimony. 
 A third limitation involved the reliability of data sources.  State reported registration, 
Census population, registration, and turnout data were all vulnerable to error.  Despite these 
concerns, these data sources remain the best available way to measure participation.  Although 
exact estimates were imprecise, general trends in participation were much more reliable and 
consistent when evaluated across multiple measures. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The findings presented in this study offer several interesting avenues for future research.  
A good first step would be to increase the sample size to include a broader range of states.  This 
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would allow for more in depth process analysis and comparison.  Additionally, it would enable a 
fuller explication of the variables that influence the effectiveness of voter suppression. 
A second area exposed by this study was the role of backlash.  Future research should 
examine more closely the potential for localized and non-localized push back against these laws.  
Various surveys methods could be employed to deeply probe black citizen attitudes and opinions 
toward voter suppression laws and their reaction to them.  Another approach might be to conduct 
qualitative analysis of civil rights and pro-voting protest groups to explicate the strategies used to 
counteract demobilization.   
Third, researchers could identify additional alternative causes for the discrepancies in 
African American participation across states.  This study discussed the leading demographic and 
SES variables suggested by the literature, but an expansion of this portion would strengthen the 
current findings.  For example, two potential variables stood out.  The size of the African 
American and Hispanic populations may impact the role each of these communities plays in state 
politics.  Additional research is needed to more fully explain how these factors influence 
minority, and overall, levels of political participation. 
Fourth, the current study emphasized legislative action and electoral reforms.  Additional 
work is needed to investigate voter suppression measures that originate from the executive and 
judicial branches of government.  The battle over voting rights was so dynamic precisely because 
elections laws were influenced by many different actors.   
Finally, the most important prediction generated by this study concerns black 
participation in North Carolina.   The state‘s partisan transition, followed by the passage of voter 
suppression legislation in 2013, provides an excellent opportunity to test this study‘s findings.  In 
North Carolina, newly enacted voter suppression measures should allow for a strong test of the 
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impact of demobilization versus efforts to counter their effects.  High African American turnout 
in North Carolina creates great risk, but perhaps also reward, for those seeking to erect barriers 
based on race.   If North Carolina‘s recent voter suppression laws stand, then the next 
presidential election in 2016 should provide researchers an excellent opportunity to further 
evaluate the voter suppression hypotheses discussed in this study. 
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APPENDIX A: STATE REPORTED REGISTRATION DATA PROCEDURES 
State reported registration – this measure is calculated by combining official voter registration 
data from North Carolina‘s State Board of Elections and Florida‘s Division of Elections, with 
U.S. Census population estimates for presidential elections from 1996 to 2012.  ―One-race‖ 
Census data, collected at the county level, is combined with county level registration reports to 
estimate registration rates for black and white Voting-Age-Persons in each of the two state‘s 
counties.  To do so, county level population estimates for black and white voters are divided by 
the number of registered voters of each race to calculate racial registration rates.  This study then 
totals registration by race for the state using the total registration reported by each county.   
 
Important Terms 
Terms Definition/Procedure 
Total Population (TP) Total population of all citizens of the county. 
White Population (WP) 
Census population estimate for ―white (one race)‖ 
respondents. 
 
Black Population (BP) 
Census population estimate for ―black (one race)‖ 
respondents. 
% Black in County BP / TP (by race) 
White Registration (WR) 
State reported total number of white (non Hispanic/Other) 
registrants. 
Black Registration (BR) 
State reported total number of black (non Hispanic/Other) 
registrants. 
White Rate by county (WR%) WR / WP 
Black Rate by county (BR%) BR / BP 
Total Registration Rates by 
County 
Total reported registration all races. 
 
Additional Notes: 
1.  This study uses U.S. Census County Population Estimates for ―5 Race Alone and One Group 
with Two or More Race Groups‖.  Response categories used include White (one race) and Black 
or African American (one race).   
2.  State reported registration data collection and reporting procedures changed in 2008.  For 
1996, 2000, and 2004 – reports recorded whites, blacks, and ―other‖.  Beginning in 2008, the 
option to answer Hispanic was added.  However, the ―other‖ and ―Hispanic‖ categories are 
consistent across the switch, meaning that the size of the ―other‖ community was very similar to 
the ―Hispanic‖ data for the next election year.  To test this, I visually examined midterm election 
years.  However, this study still prescribes caution when making comparisons across the switch. 
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Due to these and other inconsistencies across Census reports, Hispanics are excluded from this 
analysis. 
2.  VAP – Voting Age Population – Census total population estimates include all adults 18 years 
of age.  The VAP estimate includes non-citizens but excludes citizens overseas, military 
members deployed overseas, and institutionalized citizens like those in nursing homes, in prison 
or other settings.  An alternative measures VEP, or Voting Eligible Population excludes felons, a 
point of focus for the current study.   
Census Bureau turnout and registration data employ VAP data.   
To remain consistent across measures, this study employs the VAP measure.  This study 
calculates white and black registration rates as a measure of the total number of whites and 
blacks estimated to live in each county.   
3.  For 2012, white-alone respondent population data for Miami-Dade County are omitted from 
the analysis.  The Census reported data for that year was over 2 million whites.  Due to this 
discrepancy this data value is counted as a missing value.  The difference is likely due to a 
change in the way whites and white-Hispanics are counted in the county. 
4.  County-level population estimates and registration data tables for years 1996 to 2004 
available upon request. 
5.  State reported registration data derived from the Florida Division of Elections and North 
Carolina Board of Elections.  The following reporting dates were used: 
Florida 
1996 – October 7, 1996; 2000 – October 10, 2000; 2004 – October 4, 2004; 2008 – October 6, 
2008; 2012 - October 9, 2008. 
North Carolina 
1996 – April 1, 1996; 2000 – April 1, 2000; 2004 – May 1, 2004; 2008 – December 27, 2008; 
2012 - December 29, 2012 
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APPENDIX B: MAP OF FLORIDA; POPULATION BY COUNTY/MAJOR CITIES 
STATE OF FLORIDA; POPULATION AND REGISTRATION BY COUNTY AND 
RACE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau.  2010 Census Redistricting Data Summary.  www.census.gov. 
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Florida, 2008 – Racial Population and Registration by County 
County Total Pop. White Black % Black 
Total 
Reg. 
White 
Reg. 
Black 
Reg. 
White 
Rate 
Black 
Rate 
Alachua 241,364 165179 48069 19.9% 154,706 108,163 25,346 65.5% 52.7% 
Baker 26,164 21712 3691 14.1% 14,172 12,315 1,345 56.7% 36.4% 
Bay 163,946 134450 19874 12.1% 110,739 94,582 9,817 70.3% 49.4% 
Bradford 29,012 21651 6255 21.6% 15,732 13,094 2,101 60.5% 33.6%  
Brevard 536,521 432036 55214 10.3% 351,488 296,386 26,946 68.6% 48.8% 
Broward 1,751,234 842529 436597 24.9% 1,008,656 579,315 207,451 68.8% 47.5% 
Calhoun 13,617 10625 2172 16.0% 8,622 7,516 797 70.7% 36.7% 
Charlotte 150,060 130739 9055 6.0% 118,837 106,711 4,407 81.6% 48.7% 
Citrus 141,416 128468 4941 3.5% 102,742 94,960 2,142 73.9% 43.4% 
Clay 184,727 147419 18914 10.2% 120,656 99,894 9,634 67.8% 50.9% 
Collier 315,258 214392 17138 5.4% 203,075 174,600 6,148 81.4% 35.9% 
Columbia 69,092 53368 12213 17.7% 38,272 31,087 5,415 58.3% 44.3% 
DeSoto 33,991 18069 3997 11.8% 15,613 12,674 1,644 70.1% 41.1% 
Dixie 14,957 13034 1438 9.6% 10,775 10,164 422 78.0% 29.3% 
Duval 850,962 515279 253825 29.8% 536,588 337,241 147,704 65.4% 58.2% 
Escambia 302,939 212925 69728 23.0% 195,193 144,962 36,894 68.1% 52.9% 
Flagler 91,247 72001 10005 11.0% 60,079 47,856 5,456 66.5% 54.5% 
Franklin 11,202 9014 1848 16.5% 7,722 7,036 587 78.1% 31.8% 
Gadsden 47,560 17051 26034 54.7% 30,128 11,916 16,651 69.9% 64.0% 
Gilchrist 17,191 15312 1212 7.1% 10,721 10,082 266 65.8% 21.9% 
Glades 11,175 7406 1311 11.7% 6,584 5,550 420 74.9% 32.0% 
Gulf 15,667 11603 3363 21.5% 9,123 7,915 1,002 68.2% 29.8% 
Hamilton 14,348 7910 5082 35.4% 7,688 5,148 2,333 65.1% 45.9% 
Hardee 28,888 13855 2520 8.7% 11,802 8,808 804 63.6% 31.9% 
Hendry 39,453 14967 5130 13.0% 16,936 10,700 2,533 71.5% 49.4% 
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Hernando 171,689 144621 9518 5.5% 123,013 107,238 4,678 74.2% 49.1% 
Highlands 100,011 72859 9228 9.2% 66,092 54,081 4,915 74.2% 53.3% 
Hillsborough 1,180,784 686561 189670 16.1% 701,464 462,417 105,718 67.4% 55.7% 
Holmes 19,328 17158 1420 7.3% 11,513 11,029 216 64.3% 15.2% 
Indian River 132,315 105527 11866 9.0% 90,053 78,442 5,554 74.3% 46.8% 
Jackson 49,656 34038 13407 27.0% 28,128 20,658 6,407 60.7% 47.8% 
Jefferson 14,547 8964 5007 34.4% 10,310 6,756 3,311 75.4% 66.1% 
Lafayette 8,013 5631 1358 16.9% 4,469 4,149 238 73.7% 17.5% 
Lake 307,243 241243 28392 9.2% 188,702 156,694 14,361 65.0% 50.6% 
Lee 593,136 436209 45635 7.7% 320,512 271,865 15,375 62.3% 33.7% 
Leon 264,063 162550 83154 31.5% 174,544 110,728 47,597 68.1% 57.2% 
Levy 39,460 32641 4314 10.9% 25,924 22,379 2,139 68.6% 49.6% 
Liberty 7,957 5880 1477 18.6% 4,304 3,826 394 65.1% 26.7% 
Madison 18,895 10617 7308 38.7% 12,278 7,453 4,274 70.2% 58.5% 
Manatee 315,766 240894 27967 8.9% 206,211 177,757 13,290 73.8% 47.5% 
Marion 329,628 254509 38928 11.8% 214,722 176,633 20,571 69.4% 52.8% 
Martin 138,660 113797 8233 5.9% 101,155 92,506 3,646 81.3% 44.3% 
Miami-Dade 2,398,245 437344 430570 18.0% 1,243,315 279,291 253,218 63.9% 58.8% 
Monroe 72,243 53843 3695 5.1% 50,136 42,796 1,740 79.5% 47.1% 
Nassau 69,835 61294 5886 8.4% 47,501 42,129 2,898 68.7% 49.2% 
Okaloosa 179,693 145042 18847 10.5% 129,373 109,468 9,876 75.5% 52.4% 
Okeechobee 40,359 26997 3464 8.6% 18,859 16,033 942 59.4% 27.2% 
Orange 1,072,801 548058 212486 19.8% 604,243 328,026 104,486 59.9% 49.2% 
Osceola 263,676 120566 25746 9.8% 136,544 68,601 10,765 56.9% 41.8% 
Palm Beach 1,265,293 810545 201731 15.9% 831,423 628,870 97,095 77.6% 48.1% 
Pasco 471,028 390456 21527 4.6% 294,431 255,597 9,647 65.5% 44.8% 
Pinellas 910,260 724076 95545 10.5% 643,423 538,750 52,337 74.4% 54.8% 
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Polk 580,594 395406 82396 14.2% 332,015 247,945 40,660 62.7% 49.3% 
Putnam 73,459 54582 12295 16.7% 46,432 36,837 6,569 67.5% 53.4% 
Santa Rosa 150,053 131131 9118 6.1% 107,253 97,206 3,942 74.1% 43.2% 
Sarasota 372,057 322898 17928 4.8% 260,618 235,321 8,726 72.9% 48.7% 
Seminole 410,854 286917 45977 11.2% 259,336 188,808 24,082 65.8% 52.4% 
St. Johns 181,540 157427 11993 6.6% 131,744 118,367 5,991 75.2% 50.0% 
St. Lucie 265,108 172357 47073 17.8% 157,676 115,551 23,896 67.0% 50.8% 
Sumter 74,721 59065 8828 11.8% 59,913 54,503 3,033 92.3% 34.4% 
Suwannee 39,802 31578 4641 11.7% 24,791 21,323 2,402 67.5% 51.8% 
Taylor 21,546 15849 4897 22.7% 13,088 10,748 1,898 67.8% 38.8% 
Union 15,141 10667 3734 24.7% 7,273 6,314 793 59.2% 21.2% 
Volusia 498,036 385582 51754 10.4% 326,854 263,705 27,850 68.4% 53.8% 
Wakulla 31,089 25694 4213 13.6% 18,565 16,493 1,719 64.2% 40.8% 
Walton 53,837 46854 4149 7.7% 36,847 33,827 1,430 72.2% 34.5% 
Washington 23,928 18958 3724 15.6% 15,938 13,624 1,738 71.9% 46.7% 
Sources:  U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin: (Vintage 2008); Florida Division of Elections (2008).  Registration data reported on October 6, 
2008. 
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Florida, 2012 – Racial Population and Registration by County 
County Total Pop. White Black % Black 
Total 
Reg. 
White 
Reg. 
Black 
Reg. 
White 
Rate 
Black 
Rate 
Alachua 251,417 179,166 51,115 20.3% 164,912 113,224 27,647 63.2% 54.1% 
Baker 27,086 22,782 3,617 13.4% 14,006 12,242 1,287 53.7% 35.6% 
Bay 171,903 142,501 19,161 11.1% 112,915 95,393 10,122 66.9% 52.8% 
Bradford 27,049 21,118 5,259 19.4% 15,491 12,884 2,087 61.0% 39.7% 
Brevard 547,307 461,103 57,500 10.5% 380,469 314,187 31,416 68.1% 54.6% 
Broward 1,815,137 1,199,522 506,874 27.9% 1,140,454 596,526 255,035 49.7% 50.3% 
Calhoun 14,723 12,105 2,013 13.7% 8,278 7,204 769 59.5% 38.2% 
Charlotte 162,449 147,493 9,917 6.1% 115,050 102,725 4,726 69.6% 47.7% 
Citrus 139,360 130,446 4,204 3.0% 98,639 90,551 2,230 69.4% 53.0% 
Clay 194,345 161,639 20,137 10.4% 132,585 107,408 11,812 66.4% 58.7% 
Collier 332,427 299,082 23,527 7.1% 180,560 152,483 6,398 51.0% 27.2% 
Columbia 67,966 53,053 12,527 18.4% 35,539 28,755 5,064 54.2% 40.4% 
DeSoto 34,712 28,958 4,688 13.5% 16,376 12,944 1,782 44.7% 38.0% 
Dixie 16,126 14,339 1,431 8.9% 10,229 9,535 457 66.5% 31.9% 
Duval 879,602 550,055 262,849 29.9% 557,282 342,358 155,371 62.2% 59.1% 
Escambia 302,715 212,263 69,289 22.9% 198,275 144,386 38,958 68.0% 56.2% 
Flagler 98,359 82,569 11,321 11.5% 69,597 55,015 6,617 66.6% 58.4% 
Franklin 11,686 9,709 1,650 14.1% 7,174 6,537 535 67.3% 32.4% 
Gadsden 46,528 19,761 25,668 55.2% 29,625 11,295 16,786 57.2% 65.4% 
Gilchrist 16,815 15,460 950 5.6% 11,121 10,506 252 68.0% 26.5% 
Glades 13,107 10,480 1,729 13.2% 6,668 5,509 445 52.6% 25.7% 
Gulf 15,718 12,289 3,004 19.1% 9,030 7,862 951 64.0% 31.7% 
Hamilton 14,708 9,177 5,049 34.3% 7,963 5,349 2,369 58.3% 46.9% 
Hardee 27,514 24,392 2,063 7.5% 12,312 8,916 819 36.6% 39.7% 
Hendry 37,447 30,694 5,100 13.6% 17,264 10,215 2,588 33.3% 50.7% 
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Hernando 173,422 157,862 9,582 5.5% 123,346 105,612 4,981 66.9% 52.0% 
Highlands 98,128 84,430 9,997 10.2% 62,076 49,474 4,945 58.6% 49.5% 
Hillsborough 1,277,746 968,749 221,976 17.4% 747,587 471,993 116,471 48.7% 52.5% 
Holmes 19,804 17,829 1,277 6.4% 11,560 11,028 232 61.9% 18.2% 
Indian River 140,567 123,120 12,984 9.2% 93,569 80,100 6,123 65.1% 47.2% 
Jackson 48,968 34,176 13,274 27.1% 29,003 21,302 6,610 62.3% 49.8% 
Jefferson 14,256 8,789 5,108 35.8% 9,517 6,283 3,037 71.5% 59.5% 
Lafayette 8,804 7,255 1,363 15.5% 4,568 4,204 243 57.9% 17.8% 
Lake 303,186 257,614 31,736 10.5% 201,652 163,397 16,182 63.4% 51.0% 
Lee 645,293 563,553 57,810 9.0% 388,947 320,885 21,327 56.9% 36.9% 
Leon 283,769 179,657 88,587 31.2% 190,574 118,756 53,274 66.1% 60.1% 
Levy 40,025 34,928 3,895 9.7% 25,053 21,611 2,077 61.9% 53.3% 
Liberty 8,276 6,432 1,573 19.0% 4,410 3,899 409 60.6% 26.0% 
Madison 18,907 11,060 7,419 39.2% 12,001 7,267 4,189 65.7% 56.5% 
Manatee 333,895 289,246 31,212 9.3% 209,468 177,831 14,084 61.5% 45.1% 
Marion 335,125 278,967 43,691 13.0% 223,478 180,385 22,110 64.7% 50.6% 
Martin 148,817 134,808 8,613 5.8% 101,835 92,011 3,753 68.3% 43.6% 
Miami-Dade 2,591,035 * 496,932 19.2% 1,313,850 267,403 250,071 * 50.3% 
Monroe 74,809 67,467 4,759 6.4% 51,524 43,229 1,798 64.1% 37.8% 
Nassau 74,629 67,470 4,939 6.6% 51,607 45,989 3,016 68.2% 61.1% 
Okaloosa 190,083 156,460 18,678 9.8% 128,865 107,569 10,276 68.8% 55.0% 
Okeechobee 39,467 34,417 3,569 9.0% 19,185 15,977 953 46.4% 26.7% 
Orange 1,202,234 838,791 262,499 21.8% 690,645 356,486 121,710 42.5% 46.4% 
Osceola 287,416 231,282 37,298 13.0% 163,384 72,754 14,005 31.5% 37.5% 
Palm Beach 1,356,545 1,042,888 246,973 18.2% 870,186 623,711 113,606 59.8% 46.0% 
Pasco 470,391 423,963 24,545 5.2% 310,322 262,763 11,999 62.0% 48.9% 
Pinellas 921,319 770,466 99,137 10.8% 626,348 515,072 53,828 66.9% 54.3% 
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Polk 616,158 493,063 95,980 15.6% 351,119 252,336 45,688 51.2% 47.6% 
Putnam 73,263 58,871 12,227 16.7% 43,581 34,584 6,262 58.7% 51.2% 
Santa Rosa 158,512 138,715 10,273 6.5% 116,941 104,973 4,720 75.7% 45.9% 
Sarasota 386,147 354,649 19,243 5.0% 277,672 247,989 9,871 69.9% 51.3% 
Seminole 430,838 350,875 50,770 11.8% 277,376 194,720 27,489 55.5% 54.1% 
St. Johns 202,188 181,736 11,594 5.7% 152,849 135,987 6,938 74.8% 59.8% 
St. Lucie 283,866 215,071 56,369 19.9% 175,554 123,214 28,859 57.3% 51.2% 
Sumter 101,620 90,377 9,156 9.0% 73,946 68,098 3,130 75.3% 34.2% 
Suwannee 43,656 36,600 5,850 13.4% 25,043 21,425 2,491 58.5% 42.6% 
Taylor 22,744 17,244 4,767 21.0% 12,585 10,423 1,734 60.4% 36.4% 
Union 15,212 11,452 3,455 22.7% 7,313 6,325 801 55.2% 23.2% 
Volusia 496,950 422,296 54,706 11.0% 332,556 264,232 29,545 62.6% 54.0% 
Wakulla 30,818 25,339 4,545 14.7% 18,501 16,278 1,749 64.2% 38.5% 
Walton 57,582 51,576 3,451 6.0% 38,368 35,293 1,366 68.4% 39.6% 
Washington 24,892 19,999 3,896 15.7% 14,668 12,566 1,594 62.8% 40.9% 
Sources:  U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin: (Vintage 2012); Florida Division of Elections (2012).  Registration data reported on October 9, 
2012. 
*Miami-Dade white population and registration data for 2012 excluded (see appendix A for a detailed 
explanation.) 
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APPENDIX C: MAP OF NORTH CAROLINA; POPULATION  
BY COUNTY/MAJOR CITIES STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA;  
POPULATION AND REGISTRATION BY COUNTY AND RACE 
 
MAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  U.S. Census Bureau.  2010 Census Redistricting Data Summary.  www.census.gov. 
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North Carolina, 2008 – Racial Population and Registration by County 
County Total Pop. White Black % Black 
Total 
Reg. 
White 
Reg. 
Black 
Reg. 
White 
Rate 
Black 
Rate 
Alamance 148,053 101661 28068 19.0% 89,954 68,708 17,829 67.6% 63.5% 
Alexander 36,537 32652 2353 6.4% 24,489 22,997 1,115 70.4% 47.4% 
Alleghany 10,951 9771 179 1.6% 7,296 7,090 79 72.6% 44.1% 
Anson 25,162 12348 12144 48.3% 16,573 8,380 7,873 67.9% 64.8% 
Ashe 25,702 24427 258 1.0% 20,500 20,151 107 82.5% 41.5% 
Avery 17,884 16163 944 5.3% 12,701 12,404 70 76.7% 7.4% 
Beaufort 46,035 31287 12626 27.4% 32,154 23,025 8,528 73.6% 67.5% 
Bertie 19,337 7302 11681 60.4% 14,426 5,428 8,605 74.3% 73.7% 
Bladen 32,312 18154 11581 35.8% 22,352 13,332 8,277 73.4% 71.5% 
Brunswick 103,160 85673 12628 12.2% 75,923 66,213 7,868 77.3% 62.3% 
Buncombe 229,047 199267 17405 7.6% 176,290 158,256 10,451 79.4% 60.0% 
Burke 89,361 75345 6205 6.9% 57,264 52,229 3,473 69.3% 56.0% 
Cabarrus 168,740 125408 25899 15.3% 110,129 89,003 16,234 71.0% 62.7% 
Caldwell 80,059 71852 4545 5.7% 53,748 49,818 2,831 69.3% 62.3% 
Camden 9,682 7890 1559 16.1% 7,213 5,909 1,142 74.9% 73.3% 
Carteret 63,195 56240 4849 7.7% 47,718 44,044 2,556 78.3% 52.7% 
Caswell 23,248 14678 7981 34.3% 15,414 9,488 5,669 64.6% 71.0% 
Catawba 157,079 124763 13740 8.7% 104,743 91,947 8,920 73.7% 64.9% 
Chatham 63,077 45447 8548 13.6% 42,520 34,446 6,296 75.8% 73.7% 
Cherokee 26,568 25233 576 2.2% 20,886 20,340 207 80.6% 35.9% 
Chowan 14,565 9035 5223 35.9% 10,625 7,053 3,350 78.1% 64.1% 
Clay 10,389 10012 138 1.3% 8,512 8,384 26 83.7% 18.8% 
Cleveland 99,015 75431 20829 21.0% 61,776 47,455 13,017 62.9% 62.5% 
Columbus 54,212 34005 16715 30.8% 39,052 25,404 12,075 74.7% 72.2% 
Craven 96,892 68681 23283 24.0% 68,750 50,375 15,732 73.3% 67.6% 
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Cumberland 312,696 166314 116663 37.3% 211,611 107,647 82,814 64.7% 71.0% 
Currituck 24,183 21653 1888 7.8% 16,635 15,117 1,036 69.8% 54.9% 
Dare 33,584 31008 1192 3.5% 27,115 25,930 530 83.6% 44.5% 
Davidson 158,166 131764 15271 9.7% 101,517 90,155 9,236 68.4% 60.5% 
Davie 40,971 35300 2954 7.2% 26,864 24,573 1,806 69.6% 61.1% 
Duplin 53,362 27993 13800 25.9% 28,964 18,930 9,134 67.6% 66.2% 
Durham 262,715 121341 98031 37.3% 192,482 102,050 74,436 84.1% 75.9% 
Edgecombe 52,682 20585 29845 56.7% 38,882 15,076 23,126 73.2% 77.5% 
Forsyth 343,028 213151 88068 25.7% 224,041 153,843 60,988 72.2% 69.3% 
Franklin 58,927 38402 15792 26.8% 36,508 25,064 10,327 65.3% 65.4% 
Gaston 206,679 161780 30971 15.0% 128,848 106,061 18,844 65.6% 60.8% 
Gates 11,708 7434 4064 34.7% 8,171 5,073 2,848 68.2% 70.1% 
Graham 7,825 7046 60 0.8% 6,598 6,226 1 88.4% 1.7% 
Granville 57,044 33999 18993 33.3% 33,788 21,353 11,377 62.8% 59.9% 
Greene 20,677 9766 8345 40.4% 11,027 6,603 4,222 67.6% 50.6% 
Guilford 472,216 276519 150128 31.8% 354,477 225,078 113,156 81.4% 75.4% 
Halifax 54,983 22465 29745 54.1% 37,879 16,157 19,731 71.9% 66.3% 
Harnett 112,030 75606 25370 22.6% 62,844 45,561 14,186 60.3% 55.9% 
Haywood 56,590 54103 935 1.7% 42,683 41,641 413 77.0% 44.2% 
Henderson 102,367 89052 3713 3.6% 77,276 72,965 2,018 81.9% 54.3% 
Hertford 23,224 8172 14291 61.5% 15,457 5,757 9,323 70.4% 65.2% 
Hoke 43,409 19542 14850 34.2% 25,626 12,078 10,083 61.8% 67.9% 
Hyde 5,181 3172 1856 35.8% 3,708 2,635 1,022 83.1% 55.1% 
Iredell 155,359 124732 19545 12.6% 101,832 85,976 12,107 68.9% 61.9% 
Jackson 36,739 31068 950 2.6% 27,494 24,489 504 78.8% 53.1% 
Johnston 163,428 118012 25907 15.9% 101,523 82,099 15,872 69.6% 61.3% 
Jones 10,113 6304 3381 33.4% 7,313 4,605 2,581 73.0% 76.3% 
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Lee 59,091 36872 11858 20.1% 32,910 24,653 6,870 66.9% 57.9% 
Lenoir 56,826 30605 23259 40.9% 38,041 21,650 15,669 70.7% 67.4% 
Lincoln 74,746 63157 4959 6.6% 50,036 46,039 2,801 72.9% 56.5% 
Macon 33,005 31053 652 2.0% 25,331 24,671 190 79.4% 29.1% 
Madison 20,432 19628 294 1.4% 16,500 16,004 131 81.5% 44.6% 
Martin 23,398 12204 10306 44.0% 18,267 9,974 8,034 81.7% 78.0% 
McDowell 43,843 39507 1828 4.2% 29,573 28,148 957 71.2% 52.4% 
Mecklenburg 890,515 494771 265034 29.8% 627,997 393,615 186,925 79.6% 70.5% 
Mitchell 15,784 15036 113 0.7% 11,933 11,787 19 78.4% 16.8% 
Montgomery 27,358 17100 5389 19.7% 16,941 12,711 3,709 74.3% 68.8% 
Moore 85,608 67139 12566 14.7% 60,651 51,256 7,961 76.3% 63.4% 
Nash 93,674 53447 34956 37.3% 65,848 40,739 23,267 76.2% 66.6% 
New 
Hanover 
192,538 152867 30663 15.9% 147,009 121,996 19,337 79.8% 63.1% 
Northampton 20,487 8256 11918 58.2% 15,362 6,248 8,842 75.7% 74.2% 
Onslow 165,938 121807 29601 17.8% 86,967 64,412 16,298 52.9% 55.1% 
Orange 126,532 94029 17356 13.7% 104,179 82,786 12,675 88.0% 73.0% 
Pamlico 12,502 9325 2882 23.1% 9,813 7,607 1,981 81.6% 68.7% 
Pasquotank 41,111 23704 16004 38.9% 28,613 16,771 10,669 70.8% 66.7% 
Pender 51,314 38599 9827 19.2% 34,122 26,708 6,456 69.2% 65.7% 
Perquimans 12,856 9421 3275 25.5% 9,469 7,040 2,262 74.7% 69.1% 
Person 37,438 25621 10558 28.2% 25,014 17,608 6,771 68.7% 64.1% 
Pitt 156,081 94243 52821 33.8% 108,414 68,955 35,325 73.2% 66.9% 
Polk 19,074 17167 1077 5.6% 15,201 14,191 739 82.7% 68.6% 
Randolph 141,186 116249 8642 6.1% 86,116 78,781 5,040 67.8% 58.3% 
Richmond 46,005 28549 14415 31.3% 30,145 19,734 9,525 69.1% 66.1% 
Robeson 129,123 38228 31458 24.4% 72,403 24,983 20,615 65.4% 65.5% 
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Rockingham 92,282 69126 17889 19.4% 60,012 46,940 11,883 67.9% 66.4% 
Rowan 139,225 106774 22081 15.9% 91,426 74,034 15,020 69.3% 68.0% 
Rutherford 63,424 54601 7197 11.3% 43,055 37,825 4,345 69.3% 60.4% 
Sampson 63,927 34335 17928 28.0% 37,008 23,474 11,736 68.4% 65.5% 
Scotland 36,508 18290 14029 38.4% 23,234 12,626 8,703 69.0% 62.0% 
Stanly 59,614 49442 7128 12.0% 39,303 34,590 3,907 70.0% 54.8% 
Stokes 46,171 42663 2284 4.9% 30,822 28,870 1,432 67.7% 62.7% 
Surry 72,468 62196 3043 4.2% 46,039 43,269 1,930 69.6% 63.4% 
Swain 13,512 9528 189 1.4% 9,930 8,026 63 84.2% 33.3% 
Transylvania 30,187 28035 1596 5.3% 23,577 22,260 869 79.4% 54.4% 
Tyrrell 4,087 2086 1715 42.0% 2,662 1,689 913 81.0% 53.2% 
Union 193,255 147040 23933 12.4% 121,384 101,840 14,374 69.3% 60.1% 
Vance 42,891 18723 21128 49.3% 29,805 14,041 15,046 75.0% 71.2% 
Wake 866,410 571284 179402 20.7% 595,713 431,187 120,774 75.5% 67.3% 
Warren 19,388 7434 10510 54.2% 14,639 5,791 7,957 77.9% 75.7% 
Washington 12,946 5962 6524 50.4% 9,079 4,461 4,459 74.8% 68.3% 
Watauga 45,196 42832 1036 2.3% 43,232 41,053 696 95.8% 67.2% 
Wayne 113,671 67424 37329 32.8% 69,170 43,044 22,877 63.8% 61.3% 
Wilkes 66,655 59608 2967 4.5% 42,356 40,125 1,682 67.3% 56.7% 
Wilson 77,527 39692 30459 39.3% 53,148 30,126 21,499 75.9% 70.6% 
Yadkin 37,954 32992 1376 3.6% 23,447 22,280 733 67.5% 53.3% 
Yancey 18,503 17246 218 1.2% 14508 14,251 107 82.6% 49.1% 
Sources:  U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin: (Vintage 200); North Carolina State Board of Elections (2008).  Registration reported December 
27, 2008. 
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North Carolina, 2012 – Racial Population and Registration by County 
County Total Pop. White Black % Black 
Total 
Reg. 
White 
Reg. 
Black 
Reg. 
White 
Rate 
Black 
Rate 
Alamance 153,920 117,096 29,607 19.2% 94,627 69,421 19,183 59.3% 64.8% 
Alexander 36,853 33,763 2,088 5.7% 24,487 22,875 1,087 67.8% 52.1% 
Alleghany 10,927 10,510 174 1.6% 7,387 7,129 79 67.8% 45.4% 
Anson 26,351 12,689 12,809 48.6% 17,592 8,021 7,870 63.2% 61.4% 
Ashe 27,097 26,392 234 0.9% 19,031 18,644 103 70.6% 44.0% 
Avery 17,635 16,566 753 4.3% 12,074 11,679 101 70.5% 13.4% 
Beaufort 47,507 34,054 12,176 25.6% 33,230 23,629 8,758 69.4% 71.9% 
Bertie 20,653 7,416 12,781 61.9% 15,001 5,369 8,988 72.4% 70.3% 
Bladen 34,915 21,140 12,231 35.0% 23,135 13,467 8,719 63.7% 71.3% 
Brunswick 112,257 95,772 12,889 11.5% 83,626 72,259 8,745 75.4% 67.8% 
Buncombe 244,490 219,464 16,011 6.5% 180,008 159,267 10,896 72.6% 68.1% 
Burke 90,505 78,436 6,163 6.8% 58,867 53,153 3,588 67.8% 58.2% 
Cabarrus 184,498 145,416 29,872 16.2% 120,453 93,922 19,262 64.6% 64.5% 
Caldwell 81,930 75,577 4,209 5.1% 54,763 50,390 2,964 66.7% 70.4% 
Camden 10,090 8,317 1,321 13.1% 7,531 6,137 1,165 73.8% 88.2% 
Carteret 67,632 60,816 4,285 6.3% 51,333 46,772 2,782 76.9% 64.9% 
Caswell 23,217 14,846 7,841 33.8% 15,599 9,585 5,611 64.6% 71.6% 
Catawba 154,339 131,690 13,443 8.7% 104,823 90,099 9,578 68.4% 71.2% 
Chatham 65,976 54,300 8,930 13.5% 45,521 36,457 6,266 67.1% 70.2% 
Cherokee 26,992 25,406 376 1.4% 22,238 21,552 235 84.8% 62.5% 
Chowan 14,772 9,354 5,072 34.3% 10,850 7,145 3,443 76.4% 67.9% 
Clay 10,618 10,305 104 1.0% 9,124 8,907 36 86.4% 34.6% 
Cleveland 97,474 74,719 20,205 20.7% 63,889 48,123 14,022 64.4% 69.4% 
Columbus 57,638 36,878 17,642 30.6% 38,115 24,261 12,088 65.8% 68.5% 
Craven 104,770 75,837 23,164 22.1% 72,110 51,755 16,630 68.2% 71.8% 
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Cumberland 324,049 174,166 121,332 37.4% 217,027 102,826 88,918 59.0% 73.3% 
Currituck 24,077 21,896 1,434 6.0% 17,822 16,233 1,006 74.1% 70.2% 
Dare 34,573 32,628 977 2.8% 28,459 27,060 578 82.9% 59.2% 
Davidson 163,260 142,714 14,854 9.1% 105,619 92,759 9,872 65.0% 66.5% 
Davie 41,433 37,533 2,693 6.5% 28,427 25,732 1,939 68.6% 72.0% 
Duplin 60,033 42,336 15,594 26.0% 30,273 19,254 9,581 45.5% 61.4% 
Durham 279,641 148,241 108,441 38.8% 213,490 108,165 82,915 73.0% 76.5% 
Edgecombe 55,954 22,609 32,251 57.6% 40,079 14,907 24,370 65.9% 75.6% 
Forsyth 358,137 243,373 96,953 27.1% 247,469 165,131 68,737 67.9% 70.9% 
Franklin 61,475 42,900 16,623 27.0% 40,502 27,519 11,264 64.1% 67.8% 
Gaston 208,049 168,029 32,671 15.7% 136,283 108,249 21,817 64.4% 66.8% 
Gates 11,869 7,581 3,967 33.4% 8,622 5,303 2,993 70.0% 75.4% 
Graham 8,700 7,883 25 0.3% 6,663 6,227 2 79.0% 8.0% 
Granville 60,436 38,649 19,955 33.0% 37,026 22,994 12,437 59.5% 62.3% 
Greene 21,429 12,641 7,953 37.1% 11,242 6,606 4,318 52.3% 54.3% 
Guilford 500,879 296,944 167,959 33.5% 363,419 216,855 124,317 73.0% 74.0% 
Halifax 54,006 22,109 28,716 53.2% 38,711 15,472 20,902 70.0% 72.8% 
Harnett 122,135 88,547 26,257 21.5% 69,357 48,535 16,204 54.8% 61.7% 
Haywood 58,908 56,984 716 1.2% 41,735 40,557 418 71.2% 58.4% 
Henderson 108,266 100,969 3,513 3.2% 79,479 74,123 2,270 73.4% 64.6% 
Hertford 24,438 8,830 14,809 60.6% 15,398 5,302 9,612 60.0% 64.9% 
Hoke 50,536 25,470 17,301 34.2% 29,536 13,571 11,534 53.3% 66.7% 
Hyde 5,859 3,895 1,836 31.3% 3,645 2,635 935 67.7% 50.9% 
Iredell 162,708 135,523 19,949 12.3% 110,609 92,162 13,544 68.0% 67.9% 
Jackson 40,448 34,631 823 2.0% 26,695 22,716 504 65.6% 61.2% 
Johnston 174,938 141,463 27,519 15.7% 108,431 84,943 17,530 60.0% 63.7% 
Jones 10,275 6,699 3,280 31.9% 7,590 4,780 2,630 71.4% 80.2% 
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Lee 59,715 45,049 12,127 20.3% 35,041 25,261 7,701 56.1% 63.5% 
Lenoir 59,227 33,492 24,233 40.9% 39,242 21,554 16,745 64.4% 69.1% 
Lincoln 79,313 72,855 4,649 5.9% 51,624 46,906 3,034 64.4% 65.3% 
Macon 44,998 32,498 563 1.3% 24,943 24,133 155 74.3% 27.5% 
Madison 33,869 20,012 289 0.9% 16,707 16,019 160 80.0% 55.4% 
Martin 20,742 13,044 10,467 50.5% 18,139 9,725 8,075 74.6% 77.1% 
McDowell 23,961 41,897 1,808 7.5% 28,099 26,777 851 63.9% 47.1% 
Mecklenburg 969,031 582,550 307,802 31.8% 680,253 401,889 217,921 69.0% 70.8% 
Mitchell 15,368 14,903 83 0.5% 11,802 11,595 23 77.8% 27.7% 
Montgomery 27,668 21,391 5,270 19.0% 16,740 12,314 3,719 57.6% 70.6% 
Moore 90,302 74,773 12,127 13.4% 64,420 53,878 8,416 72.1% 69.4% 
Nash 95,708 55,468 36,796 38.4% 68,318 39,910 25,938 72.0% 70.5% 
New 
Hanover 
209,234 170,334 30,593 14.6% 160,201 129,722 22,104 76.2% 72.3% 
Northampton 21,428 8,547 12,492 58.3% 15,544 6,026 9,167 70.5% 73.4% 
Onslow 183,263 140,385 29,764 16.2% 92,109 66,375 17,511 47.3% 58.8% 
Orange 137,941 106,717 16,780 12.2% 111,239 86,000 13,527 80.6% 80.6% 
Pamlico 13,074 10,099 2,655 20.3% 9,330 7,209 1,850 71.4% 69.7% 
Pasquotank 40,591 23,593 15,423 38.0% 28,336 15,768 11,196 66.8% 72.6% 
Pender 54,195 42,830 9,605 17.7% 36,555 28,552 6,736 66.7% 70.1% 
Perquimans 13,563 9,887 3,375 24.9% 10,054 7,432 2,412 75.2% 71.5% 
Person 39,268 27,619 10,638 27.1% 26,425 18,357 7,280 66.5% 68.4% 
Pitt 172,554 105,563 59,765 34.6% 117,064 71,018 40,288 67.3% 67.4% 
Polk 20,271 18,891 912 4.5% 15,197 14,105 732 74.7% 80.3% 
Randolph 142,466 128,670 8,673 6.1% 91,725 82,825 5,694 64.4% 65.7% 
Richmond 46,627 29,278 14,523 31.1% 31,261 19,763 10,280 67.5% 70.8% 
Robeson 135,496 44,414 33,527 24.7% 76,102 24,527 22,170 55.2% 66.1% 
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Rockingham 92,720 72,557 17,609 19.0% 61,069 46,895 12,339 64.6% 70.1% 
Rowan 138,180 111,216 22,669 16.4% 94,432 75,078 16,218 67.5% 71.5% 
Rutherford 67,323 58,875 6,752 10.0% 44,137 38,222 4,668 64.9% 69.1% 
Sampson 63,949 42,959 17,443 27.3% 38,143 23,554 12,212 54.8% 70.0% 
Scotland 36,094 16,888 14,026 38.9% 23,328 11,769 9,258 69.7% 66.0% 
Stanly 60,576 51,579 6,760 11.2% 40,638 35,063 4,385 68.0% 64.9% 
Stokes 46,783 43,952 1,974 4.2% 31,134 29,110 1,376 66.2% 69.7% 
Surry 73,561 68,891 2,969 4.0% 45,000 41,944 1,855 60.9% 62.5% 
Swain 14,141 9,396 143 1.0% 10,254 8,111 108 86.3% 75.5% 
Transylvania 32,849 30,732 1,310 4.0% 24,429 22,755 970 74.0% 74.0% 
Tyrrell 4,338 2,525 1,632 37.6% 2,580 1,647 858 65.2% 52.6% 
Union 208,520 174,519 25,171 12.1% 137,260 112,775 17,002 64.6% 67.5% 
Vance 45,132 21,110 22,852 50.6% 30,857 13,913 15,977 65.9% 69.9% 
Wake 952,151 662,907 203,809 21.4% 636,874 437,428 130,937 66.0% 64.2% 
Warren 20,576 8,311 10,742 52.2% 13,834 5,477 7,360 65.9% 68.5% 
Washington 12,736 6,095 6,333 49.7% 9,215 4,369 4,658 71.7% 73.6% 
Watauga 51,871 49,483 923 1.8% 42,630 40,045 757 80.9% 82.0% 
Wayne 124,246 79,284 39,823 32.1% 75,298 44,961 25,747 56.7% 64.7% 
Wilkes 69,306 64,878 3,027 4.4% 42,639 40,141 1,705 61.9% 56.3% 
Wilson 81,867 47,087 32,435 39.6% 56,421 30,615 23,483 65.0% 72.4% 
Yadkin 38,084 36,033 1,294 3.4% 24,233 22,828 774 63.4% 59.8% 
Yancey 17,630 17,078 183 1.0% 14,239 13,904 93 81.4% 50.8% 
Sources:  U.S. Census, State and County Resident Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic 
Origin: (Vintage 2012); North Carolina State Board of Elections (2012).  Registration reported 
December 29, 2012. 
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APPENDIX D: TABLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
REFORMS FOR NORTH CAROLINA 1988 TO 2012. 
Year Name of Legislation 
Legislative 
Chamber and 
Bill No. 
Description 
1991 
Election Law Reform 
Act 
House Bill 
586 
1. Prohibited voter intimidation and 
misleading voter suppression 
mailings. 
2. Updated criminal penalties for voter 
and elections fraud. 
3. Required polls open until 7:30 p.m.; 
and extend to 9:30 if needed. 
4. Limited the power of partisan poll 
watchers. 
5. Allowed college students to vote in 
state. 
6. Instituted ―one-stop‖ voting. 
1993 
National Voter 
Registration Act, or 
NVRA; or ―Motor-
Voter‖ 
Federal 
1. Expanded registration to state 
government offices. 
2. Prohibited voter purges for non 
activity. 
1993 
North Carolina Voter 
Registration Rewrite Act 
House Bill 
1776 
1. Prohibited officials from favoring 
candidates or parties, 
2. Expanded registration to state 
offices, 
3. Established a statewide registrar. 
1993 Kids Voting Project 
Senate Bill 
684 
1. Waived electioneering rules for 
youth voter education program. 
1995 Voter Testimony Act 
Senate Bill 
1162 
1. Prohibited ineligible voters from 
testifying at election hearings. 
2. Proscribed for the reversal of 
elections in cases of voter or 
elections fraud. 
1995 
Limit Relatives on 
Election Board Act 
House Bill 
277 
1. Banned family members of 
candidates from serving on boards of 
elections. 
1997 Voter I.D. Act 
House Bill 
736 
1. Proposed photo-identification voting 
requirement (returned to committee). 
 
1999 
Election Law Changes 
Act 
House Bill 
1074 
1. Penalized election administrators 
who alter voter records. 
2. Required voter registration drives to 
submit forms within five days. 
3. Prohibited payment for the collection 
of registration forms. 
1999 One Stop Voting Sites Senate Bill 1. Expanded ―one-stop‖ voting 
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Act of 568 program. 
2000 
Election Board Conduct 
Act 
Senate Bill 
1290 
1. Banned board of elections members 
from making public statements in 
support of candidates or referenda, 
and prohibited them from soliciting 
political contributions. 
2001 
Elections Law Revision 
Commission 
House Bill 31 
House Bill 34 
1. Banned butterfly ballots and punch 
card machines, and reformed vote 
certification procedures. 
2001 Election Changes Act 
House Bill 
831 
1. Established four-week training       
program for elections administrators. 
2. Provided for procedures to remove 
elections supervisors. 
2001 
Elections Law Revision 
Commission 
Senate Bill 17 
Senate Bill 14 
1. Rewrote rules for ballot design, 
counting, and challenges.  Mandated 
that election results be withheld by 
the press until the polls close. 
2001 
Ballot Instructions in 
Spanish Act 
House Bill 
1041 
1. Mandated Spanish-language ballots 
in counties with over a six percent 
Hispanic population. 
2001 Data by Precinct Act 
House Bill 
1046 
1. Allowed military voters to make one 
yearly request for absentee ballots. 
2001 
Clarify Incumbents 
Residency Act 
House Bill 
1126 
1. Enabled state representatives to vote 
in their home district. 
2001 
Early Voting Act; Voter 
Registration by Fax Act; 
Annual Absentee Ballot 
Request Act 
House Bill 
977 
House Bill 
1186 
House Bill 
1195 
1.  Permitted registration by fax. 
2.  Extended once yearly request policy 
to disabled voters. 
3. Established ―no-excuse‖ absentee 
ballots. 
4. Allowed voters to vote by mail 
without showing cause. 
2001 
Children in Voting 
Enclosures Act 
House Bill 
980 
1. Allowed minors to enter the polling 
booth with parents. 
2001 Election Changes Act 
House Bill 
831 
1. Shortened early voting period from 
22 to 19 days. 
2. Expanded early voting to Saturdays. 
2002 
Federal Help American 
Vote Act, or HAVA 
Federal 
1. Mandated statewide registration lists. 
2. Established polling machine 
standards. 
3. Adopted the provisional balloting 
system. 
4.  Required photo identification for 
first time voters. 
5.  Detailed processes for voter 
challenges. 
6.  Standardized rules for absentee 
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ballots. 
2003 
Establish Election Fund 
to Implement HAVA Act 
House Bill 
549 
1. Provided special elections fund to 
implement main provisions of 
HAVA. 
2003 
Help America Vote 
Compliance Act 
House Bill 
842 
1. Mandated that all North Carolina 
elections comply with HAVA. 
2003 
H.S. Students as Poll 
Workers Act 
House Bill 
1120 
1. Expanded pre-registration to 17 year 
olds. 
2. Allowed high school students to 
serve as assistants to elections 
administrators. 
2005 
Election Administration 
Amendments Act 
House Bill 
1115 
1. Adopted a forgiving provisional 
balloting policy. 
2. Allowed citizens who move to a new 
county to re-establish residency via 
personal affirmation. 
3. Extended the provisional balloting 
period up to two weeks after the 
election. 
2005 
Reconfirming 
Provisional Voting Act 
Senate Bill 
133 
1. Established committee to study the 
issue of ballots cast out of precinct. 
2. Required that provisional ballots be 
counted fairly. 
2005 
Public Confidence in 
Elections Act 
Senate Bill 
223 
1. Mandated paper receipts. 
2. Required regular testing of voting 
machines including the source code. 
2005 
Orange County Super 
Precinct Act or ―One 
Stop‖ Voting Act 
Senate Bill 98 
1. Established a ―One-Stop‖ super 
center pilot program in Orange 
County. 
2007 
Election Administration 
Amendments Act 
House Bill 
1743 
1. Allowed former felons to vote upon 
completion of their sentences. 
2007 
Registration and Voting 
at One-Stop Sites Act 
House Bill 91 
1. Required that voters be able to 
access ―One Stop‖ voting in their 
home county. 
2007 
Candidate Felony 
Disclosure Act 
Senate Bill 
1218 
1. Required political candidates to 
disclose past felony convictions. 
2009 
Election Administration 
Amendments Act 
House Bill 
908 
1. Lowered pre-registration to 16 and 
17 year olds. 
2009 
Federal Military and 
Overseas Empowerment 
Act or MOVE Act 
Federal 
1. Removed notarization requirements 
for registration. 
2. Required electronic registration and 
ballots. 
3. Extends the re-registration 
requirement to every two elections. 
4. Mandated that states provide 
absentee ballots 45 days before the 
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election. 
5. Allowed military ballots to mail 
without postage. 
6. Established voter education and 
outreach. 
2011 
North Carolina Uniform 
Military and Overseas 
Voters Act 
House Bill 
514 
1. Adopted the main provisions of 
MOVE. 
2013 
Voter Information and 
Verification Act or 
VIVA 
House Bill 
589 
1. Instituted a photo-identification 
requirement for voting. 
2. Reduced the early voting period. 
3. Eliminated pre-registration for 16 
and 17 year olds. 
4. Ended same day registration during 
early voting. 
5. Terminated early voting on Sundays 
 
Sources: North Carolina General Assembly; Election Reform Legislation Database, National Conference 
of State Legislatures. 
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APPENDIX E: TABLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
REFORMS FOR FLORIDA 1988 TO 2012. 
Year Name of Legislation 
Legislative 
Chamber and Bill 
No. 
Description 
1993 
National Voter 
Registration Act of 
1993, or NVRA, or 
―Motor-Voter‖ 
Federal 
1. Expanded registration to state 
government offices. 
2. Prohibited voter purges for non 
activity. 
1995 
Florida Voter 
Registration Act or 
FVRA 
Florida Constitution, 
Chapter 97 
1. Expanded registration to 
government offices including 
those included in the NVRA. 
2. Expanded registration to 
libraries, senior living centers, 
and military recruitment 
offices. 
3. Mandated in-home registration 
services for offices that serve 
citizens in their homes. 
1996 
No Excuse Absentee 
Balloting 
Senate Bill 270, 
Senate Staff 
Analysis. 
1. Waived ―show cause‖ 
requirement for absentee ballot 
establishing ―no excuse‖ 
absentee ballots. 
1998 
Florida Omnibus 
Elections Reform Act 
Senate Bill 1402 
1. Instituted a photo-identification 
requirement for voting. 
2. Required first time absentee 
voters to appear in person first 
before mailing future ballots. 
3. Mandated records matching. 
4. Increased penalties for election 
and voter fraud. 
5. Reversed ―no excuse‖ absentee 
ballots again requiring citizens 
to ―show cause.‖ 
1998 
Florida Constitution 
Revision Commission 
 
1. Allowed the Governor to 
appoint the Secretary of State. 
2001 
Florida Elections 
Reform Act 
Senate Bill 1118 
1. Banned punch card voting 
machines. 
2. Mandated the use of a 
provisional ballot in the case of 
inaccurate records. 
3. Required that voters who are 
waiting in line at the close of 
the polls be permitted to vote. 
4. Strengthened elections and 
178 
 
 
 
voter fraud penalties. 
 
2002 
An Act Relating to 
Elections 
Senate Bill 618 
1. Allowed for late registration at 
Supervisor of Elections office. 
2. Required voter registration 
drives to submit forms within 
five days. 
3. Prohibited payment for the 
collection of registration forms. 
2002 
An Act Relating to 
Violations of Elections 
Code 
Senate Bill 172 
1. Strengthened elections and 
voter fraud to include 
conspiracy and cover ups. 
2002 
An Act Relating to 
Voter Registration 
House Bill 493 
1. Clarified the rules for voter 
purges allowed the removal of 
citizens who move and those 
with felony convictions. 
2002 
Federal Help American 
Vote Act, or HAVA 
Federal 
1. Mandated statewide 
registration lists. 
2. Established polling machine 
standards. 
3. Adopted the provisional 
balloting system. 
4. Required photo identification 
for first time voters. 
5. Detailed processes for voter 
challenges. 
2003 
An Act Relating to 
Elections 
House Bill 1861 
House Bill 7A 
House Bill 29B 
1.  Mandated state compliance 
with HAVA. 
2.  Adopted provisional ballots. 
3.  Required access for disabled 
voters. 
4.  Modified the statewide registry 
to comply with HAVA. 
2004 
An Act Relating to 
Absentee Ballots 
Senate Bill 2566 
1.  Established 15 day early voting 
period. 
2005 
An Act Relating to 
Elections 
House Bill 1567 
1. Prohibits electioneering within 
100 feet of a polling location. 
2. Allows the ballots of voters 
who have died to be counted if 
submitted before death. 
3. Revised the section of the 
Voters Bill of Rights that 
granted citizens the option of 
proving identity via personal 
affirmation. 
4. Allows for voter eligibility 
challenges but provides 
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penalties for abuse. 
5. Prohibits recounts in cases 
where the margin of victory 
renders a recount obsolete. 
6. Shortened the early voting 
period and limited daily 
session hours. 
2005 
An Act Relating to 
Elections 
House Bill 1589 
1. Empowered the Secretary of 
State to sanction local elections 
administrators for non-
compliance. 
2. Required voters who submit 
ballots by mail to present photo 
identification the first time they 
vote by mail. 
3. Voters who move between 
counties must re-register. 
4. Eliminated entertainment ID 
cards as acceptable forms of 
photo ID. 
5. Required that each polling 
location have a polling 
machine for citizens with 
disabilities. 
2005 
An Act Relating to 
Voting and Public 
Records 
House Bill 1591 
1. Exempted victims of domestic 
abuse from public information 
requests. 
2. Protected sensitive personal 
information from public 
information requests. 
3. Required that all boxes be 
filled out on voter registration 
forms. 
2006 
An Act Relating to 
Voter Registration 
House Bill 125 
1. Expanded ―motor-voter‘ 
provisions to including 
businesses that sell hunting, 
fishing and trapping licenses. 
2006 
An Act Relating to 
Restoration of Civil 
Rights 
House Bill 55 
1. Charged county jail officials 
with assisting discharged 
felons with voting restoration 
process. 
2007 
An Act Relating to 
Elections 
House Bill 537 
1. Allowed for pre-registration of 
17 year olds. 
2. Enabled citizens to correct 
minor registration errors at the 
polls. 
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3. Lowered the civil penalties for 
independent voter registration 
groups. 
2008 
Omnibus Elections 
Reform of 2008 
Senate Bill 866 
1. Lowered pre-registration to 16. 
2. Removed buyers club I.D. 
from list of acceptable photo 
I.D. 
3. Mandated that challenges be 
issued from poll watcher who 
resides in same county as 
voter. 
2009 
Federal Military and 
Overseas Empowerment 
Act or MOVE Act 
Federal 
1. Removed notarization 
requirements for registration. 
2. Required electronic registration 
and ballots. 
3. Extends the re-registration 
requirement to every two 
elections. 
4. Mandated that states provide 
absentee ballots 45 days before 
the election. 
5. Allowed military ballots to 
mail without postage. 
6. Established voter education 
and outreach. 
2010 
Florida Military and 
Overseas Empowerment 
Act 
House Bill 131 
1.   Established electronic tracking 
for absentee ballots. 
2. Adopted the main provisions of 
MOVE. 
2011 
Federal Write in 
Absentee Ballot Act 
House Bill 227 
1.  Allowed absentee voters to use 
the FWAB balloting system. 
2011 
An Act Relating to 
Elections 
House Bill 1355 
1.  Eliminated the option of 
updating registration at the polls 
when voters move between 
counties. 
2.  Shortened the maximum hours 
that polling locations may be open 
during early voting. 
3.  Banned early voting on the 
Sunday before the election. 
4.  Reduced the early voting period 
from 14 to 8 days. 
5.  Placed tough restrictions and 
penalties on independent voter 
registration groups. 
Required registration forms to be 
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submitted with 48 hours. 
 
Sources:  Florida Senate Website Archive; Election Reform Legislation Database,   National Conference 
of State Legislatures; Election Law Changes 2005.  Brevard County Supervisor of Elections.   
<http://www.cityofcocoabeach.com/citylife/election>.  (Accessed June 2, 2014).  
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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACT OF VOTER SUPPRESSION LAWS ON AFRICAN AMERICAN 
PARTICIPATION IN FLORIDA AND NORTH CAROLINA FROM 1988 TO 2012 
by  
ANTHONY LEWIS DANIELS 
May 2015 
 
Advisor: Dr. Michael Goldfield 
Major: Political Science 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy 
 
A rich body of research presents conflicting accounts describing how contemporary voter 
suppression laws impact political participation.  This study process traces the political 
development of North Carolina and Florida from 1988 to 2012 to assess four competing 
explanations of this process.  This study compares three measures of participation that strongly 
support the discouraging voter hypothesis, which finds that voter suppression laws depressed 
black participation. 
This study finds that state officials in Florida adopted a much stricter voter suppression 
regime than those in North Carolina for the period under study.  As a result, the two states 
developed differing levels of democratization.  In North Carolina, longstanding racial disparities 
in participation were mitigated by 2012.  However, during this same period, black participation 
in Florida was suppressed.  Despite high levels of African American mobilization for recent 
elections, this study finds that voter suppression negatively impacted participation.   
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